XRIndex:a brief screening tool for individual differences in security threat detection in x-ray images

X-ray imaging is a cost-effective technique at security checkpoints that typically require the presence of human operators. We have previously shown that self-reported attention to detail can predict threat detection performance with small-vehicle x-ray images (Rusconi et al., 2012). Here, we provide evidence for the generality of such a link by having a large sample of naïve participants screen more typical dual-energy x-ray images of hand luggage. The results show that the Attention to Detail score from the autism-spectrum quotient (AQ) questionnaire (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001) is a linear predictor of threat detection accuracy. We then develop and fine-tune a novel self-report scale for security screening: the XRIndex, which improves on the Attention to Detail scale for predictive power and opacity to interpretation. The XRIndex is not redundant with any of the Big Five personality traits. We validate the XRIndex against security x-ray images with an independent sample of untrained participants and suggest that the XRIndex may be a useful aid for the identification of suitable candidates for professional security training with a focus on x-ray threat detection. Further studies are needed to determine whether this can also apply to trained professionals

Why (and how) should we study the interplay between emotional arousal, Theory of Mind, and inhibitory control to understand moral cognition?

Findings in the field of experimental psychology and cognitive neuroscience have shed new light on our understanding of the psychological and biological bases of morality. Although a lot of attention has been devoted to understanding the processes that underlie complex moral dilemmas, attempts to represent the way in which individuals generate moral judgments when processing basic harmful actions are rare. Here, we will outline a model of morality which proposes that the evaluation of basic harmful actions relies on complex interactions between emotional arousal, Theory of Mind (ToM) capacities, and inhibitory control resources. This model makes clear predictions regarding the cognitive processes underlying the development of and ability to generate moral judgments. We draw on data from developmental and cognitive psychology, cognitive neuroscience, and psychopathology research to evaluate the model and propose several conceptual and methodological improvements that are needed to further advance our understanding of moral cognition and its development.- We would like to thank the anonymous reviewers for their comments on the previous version of this manuscript. We thank Marianne Habib and Eamon McCrory for useful discussions and insights. We are also very grateful to the Fyssen Fundation whose grant to Marine Buon supported this work. During the writing of this paper, Ana Seara Cardoso was supported by Fundacao para a Ciencia e Tecnologia (FCT: SFRH/BD/60279/2009; SFRH/BPD/94970/2013), partially at the Psychology Research Centre, University of Minho (UID/PSI/01662) co-funded by FCT and the Portuguese Ministry of Science, Technology and Higher Education through national funds, and by FEDER through COMPETE2020, PT2020 Partnership Agreement (POCI-01-0145-FEDER-007653)

Why (and how) should we study the interplay between emotional arousal, Theory of Mind, and inhibitory control to understand moral cognition?

Findings in the field of experimental psychology and cognitive neuroscience have shed new light on our understanding of the psychological and biological bases of morality. Although a lot of attention has been devoted to understanding the processes that underlie complex moral dilemmas, attempts to represent the way in which individuals generate moral judgments when processing basic harmful actions are rare. Here, we will outline a model of morality which proposes that the evaluation of basic harmful actions relies on complex interactions between emotional arousal, Theory of Mind (ToM) capacities, and inhibitory control resources. This model makes clear predictions regarding the cognitive processes underlying the development of and ability to generate moral judgments. We draw on data from developmental and cognitive psychology, cognitive neuroscience, and psychopathology research to evaluate the model and propose several conceptual and methodological improvements that are needed to further advance our understanding of moral cognition and its development.- We would like to thank the anonymous reviewers for their comments on the previous version of this manuscript. We thank Marianne Habib and Eamon McCrory for useful discussions and insights. We are also very grateful to the Fyssen Fundation whose grant to Marine Buon supported this work. During the writing of this paper, Ana Seara Cardoso was supported by Fundacao para a Ciencia e Tecnologia (FCT: SFRH/BD/60279/2009; SFRH/BPD/94970/2013), partially at the Psychology Research Centre, University of Minho (UID/PSI/01662) co-funded by FCT and the Portuguese Ministry of Science, Technology and Higher Education through national funds, and by FEDER through COMPETE2020, PT2020 Partnership Agreement (POCI-01-0145-FEDER-007653)

Understanding patch foraging strategies across development

Patch foraging is a near-ubiquitous behaviour across the animal kingdom and characterises many decision-making domains encountered by humans. We review how a disposition to explore in adolescence may reflect the evolutionary conditions under which hunter-gatherers foraged for resources. We propose that neurocomputational mechanisms responsible for reward processing, learning, and cognitive control facilitate the transition from exploratory strategies in adolescence to exploitative strategies in adulthood - where individuals capitalise on known resources. This developmental transition may be disrupted by psychopathology, as there is emerging evidence of biases in explore/exploit choices in mental health problems. Explore/exploit choices may be an informative marker for mental health across development and future research should consider this feature of decision-making as a target for clinical intervention

Inclusiveness in mental health research: a survey of attitudes, awareness, and actions among journal editors

Background: Improving inclusiveness in mental health research merits attention as we seek to reduce inequalities in mental health. Academic journals can promote inclusiveness through editorial practices related to the selection of content and the composition of journal editorial boards. Objectives: To investigate the attitudes, awareness, and actions of journal editors con-cerning inclusiveness in mental health research and editorial practices. Methods: We surveyed 74 chief and senior editors, representing 55 prominent journals in neuroscience, psychiatry, and psychology (2021 impact factor M = 8.04, SD = 10.76). Results: Most respondents (74–99%) acknowledged the importance of inclusiveness in mental health research, and a majority (62–78%) were familiar with existing guide-lines. Half or fewer of the journals (49–50%) had policies for selecting content that is diverse, and 20% had policies regarding inclusion of individuals with lived experience of mental health challenges. Well over half the journals (57–72%) had policies to widen diversity among their editorial boards and roughly half (43–53%) among peer reviewers, although only a few (18–23%) included among their editors or peer reviewers individuals with lived experience of dealing with mental health challenges. Conclusions: This study highlighted an intention-action gap, with positive attitudes and awareness but limited editorial practices promoting inclusiveness in mental health research. Inclusion of individuals with lived experience emerged as an area in particular need of improvement. We discuss potential strategies that journals might consider to foster inclusiveness, such as diversity training, publication checklists, and infrastructure that supports participatory approaches

Social Reward Questionnaire – Adolescent Version and its association with callous-unemotional traits

This article describes a study in which the adult Social Reward Questionnaire is adapted for use with adolescents

Behavioral Improvements but Limited Change in Callous-Unemotional Traits in Adolescents Treated for Conduct Problems

Callous-unemotional (CU) traits have been linked to more severe and sustained behavior problems among adolescents. The aims of this study were to examine the treatment impact and malleability of CU traits among adolescents and explore potential moderation effects of treatment condition and CU sub-typology. A sample of 159 adolescents (45.9% girls; M age = 14.7 years, SD = 1.47) and their parents participated in a randomized controlled trial of Functional Family Therapy with three assessments (baseline, 6-months and 18-months) of behavior problems, CU traits, prosocial skills and the parent-youth relationship. Latent growth curve model (LGCM) analyses revealed that children with higher CU traits had greater reductions in aggressive and rule-breaking behavior and greater improvements in social skills (|standardized coefficients| = 0.27–0.32). Similarly, higher CU traits were linked to larger increases in parent-ratings of family cohesion and youth-ratings of maternal support (standardized coefficients = 0.26–0.27). Reliable Change Index summaries showed that CU traits remained unchanged for the majority of participants (73.6% and 72.6% had no reliable short- and long-term change, respectively). Baseline anxiety linked to CU sub-typology moderated some of the study results. Findings show that adolescents with co-occurring behavior problems and elevated CU traits can obtain improvement in behavioral and relational outcomes in out-patient treatment. Strikingly, such improvements can occur notwithstanding a limited reduction in CU traits. Future work should investigate whether the treatment gains would be more substantial and stable if treatment adjuncts modifying the CU traits themselves were concurrently deployed

An ‘embedded brain’ approach to understanding antisocial behaviour

Antisocial behaviour (ASB) incurs substantial costs to the individual and society. Cognitive neuroscience has the potential to shed light on developmental risk for ASB, but it cannot achieve this potential in an ‘essentialist’ framework that focuses on the brain and cognition isolated from the environment. Here, we present the case for studying the social transactional and iterative unfolding of brain and cognitive development in a relational context. This approach, which we call the study of the ‘embedded brain’, is needed to fully understand how risk for ASB arises during development. Concentrated efforts are required to develop and unify methods to achieve this approach and reap the benefits for improved prevention and intervention of ASB.</p

An ‘embedded brain’ approach to understanding antisocial behaviour

Antisocial behaviour (ASB) incurs substantial costs to the individual and society. Cognitive neuroscience has the potential to shed light on developmental risk for ASB, but it cannot achieve this potential in an ‘essentialist’ framework that focuses on the brain and cognition isolated from the environment. Here, we present the case for studying the social transactional and iterative unfolding of brain and cognitive development in a relational context. This approach, which we call the study of the ‘embedded brain’, is needed to fully understand how risk for ASB arises during development. Concentrated efforts are required to develop and unify methods to achieve this approach and reap the benefits for improved prevention and intervention of ASB