Long term debt with hidden borrowing

We consider borrowers with the opportunity to raise funds from a competitive baking sector, that shares information about borrowers, and an alternative hidden lender. We highlight that the presence of the hidden lender restricts the contracts that can be obtained from the banking sector and that in equilibrium some borrowers obtain funds from both the banking sector and the (inefficient) hidden lender simultaneously. We further show that as the inefficiency of the hidden lender increases, total welfare decreases. By extending the model to examine a partially hidden lender, we further highlight the key role of information.Hidden Borrowing, Informal Lenders, Borrower Screening, Long Term Debt

Costly search and design

Firms compete by choosing both a price and a design from a family of designs that can be represented as demand rotations. Consumers engage in costly sequential search among firms. Each time a consumer pays a search cost he observes a new offering. An offering consists of a price quote and a new good, where goods might vary in the extent to which they are good matches for the consumer. In equilibrium, only two design- styles arise: either the most niche where consumers are likely to either love or loathe the product, or the broadest where consumers are likely to have similar valuations. In equilibrium, different firms may simultaneously offer both design-styles. We perform comparative statics on the equilibrium and show that a fall in search costs can lead to higher industry prices and profits and lower consumer surplus. Our analysis is related to discussions of how the internet has led to the prevalence of niche goods and the "long tail" phenomenon.Product design, search costs, long tail

Cavity approach for modeling and fitting polymer stretching

The mechanical properties of molecules are today captured by single molecule manipulation experiments, so that polymer features are tested at a nanometric scale. Yet devising mathematical models to get further insight beyond the commonly studied force--elongation relation is typically hard. Here we draw from techniques developed in the context of disordered systems to solve models for single and double--stranded DNA stretching in the limit of a long polymeric chain. Since we directly derive the marginals for the molecule local orientation, our approach allows us to readily calculate the experimental elongation as well as other observables at wish. As an example, we evaluate the correlation length as a function of the stretching force. Furthermore, we are able to fit successfully our solution to real experimental data. Although the model is admittedly phenomenological, our findings are very sound. For single--stranded DNA our solution yields the correct (monomer) scale and, yet more importantly, the right persistence length of the molecule. In the double--stranded case, our model reproduces the well-known overstretching transition and correctly captures the ratio between native DNA and overstretched DNA. Also in this case the model yields a persistence length in good agreement with consensus, and it gives interesting insights into the bending stiffness of the native and overstretched molecule, respectively.Comment: 12 pages; 3 figures; 1 tabl

Information Gathering and Marketing

Consumers have only partial knowledge before making a purchase decision, but can choose to acquire more detailed information. A Örm can make it easier or harder for these consumers to obtain such information. We explore consumersíinformation gathering and the Örmís integrated strategy for marketing, pricing, and investment in quality. In particular, we highlight that when consumers are ex-ante heterogeneous, the Örm might choose an intermediate marketing strategy for two quite di§erent reasons. First, it serves as a non-price means of discriminationó it can make information only partially available, in a way that induces some, but not all, consumers to acquire the information. Second, when the Örm cannot commit to a given investment in quality, it can still convince all consumers of its provision by designing a pricing and marketing policy that induces some consumers to actively gather further information. This mass of consumers, in exchange, is su¢ ciently large to discipline the monopolist to invest in the quality of the product

The Castilian Fleet during the War against the Crown of Aragon of 1429-30: Rigging of Ships, Crews, Naval Ordinances and War Campaign

El objetivo principal del presente artículo, es dar a conocer el papel que jugó la flota castellana durante el conflicto armado que enfrentó a dicho reino contra la Corona de Aragón, entre 1429-30. Esta contienda, aunque ya ha sido bastante estudiada, el papel que desempeñó en el mismo la escuadra de Castilla no se conoce en profundidad, principalmente, por el desconocimiento general de los fondos municipales de Orihuela y Elche, donde se encuentran el mayor número de referencias a este respecto. Por lo tanto, gracias a la documentación conservada en estos archivos del territorio perteneciente al antiguo Reino de Valencia, pretendemos presentar una visión histórica totalmente renovada sobre el papel de la marina de guerra castellana en esta contienda.The aim of this paper is to show the role played by the Castilian navy during the armed conflict that faced the kingdom against the Crown of Aragon, between 1429-30. Although the struggle has been well studied, the role played by the fleet of Castile is not known in depth, mainly due to the fact that the general ignorance of the municipal funds of Orihuela and Elche, where the largest number of references in this regard. Therefore, thanks to the documentation kept in these archives of the territory of the ancient Kingdom of Valencia, we intend to present a totally renewed historical vision on the role of the Castilian navy in that war

Diversity and demand externalities: How cheap information can reduce welfare

Goods and services vary along a number of dimensions independently. Customers can choose to acquire information on the quality of some dimensions and not others. Their choices affect firms’ incentives to invest in quality and so lead to indirect externalities in consumers’ choices. We illustrate these ideas in a simple model with a monopolist selling a product with two characteristics, investments in quality with stochastic realizations and heterogeneous consumers. A fall in the cost of acquiring information on the quality of one characteristic leads more consumers to verify that characteristic. Consequently, the firm may under-provide quality on the other. This may paradoxically reduce consumer surplus, profits and welfare. Our discussion concludes with a number of potential extensions and applications of the basic framework