Linking Decisions with Moments.

This paper proposes a mechanism that can be operated without money in situations where agents have to decide over some common projects when they are not informed about others ’ preferences. The success of the mechanisms proposed in the literature to deal with similar problems usually relies on the assumption that the entire probability distribution that describes uncertainty is common knowledge. This modified linking mechanism requires the knowledge of solely two moment conditions. It proves to be a useful tool for achieving efficiency improvements in public decision problems. Jackson and Sonnenschein [2005] offer the study of the so-called linking mechanism. Here I show that, while allowing for heterogeneity among problems and agents, the linking mechanism keeps its asymptotic properties when run with solely two moment conditions

Sustainability of Collusion: Evidence from the Late 19th Century Basque Iron and Steel Industry.

This paper presents evidence on actual collusive agreements from the late 19th Century iron and steel industry in Spain. We examine the minutes of the executive boards of two Basque firms, Altos Hornos de Bilbao and Vizcaya, to discuss the relevance of different factors on survival and failure of a number of explicit collusive agreements reached in the industry from 1886 to 1901. We find that collusion was more likely to break down in periods of falling demand, and that strong demand provides these agreements with stability. Additionally, we argue that the presence of centralized sales agencies, similar degrees of vertical integration among colluding firms, and tariff protection are factors that facilitate collusion