A revealed preference analysis of the rational addiction model.

We provide a revealed preference analysis of the rational addiction model. The revealed preference approach avoids the need to impose an, a priori unverifiable, functional form on the underlying utility function. Our results extend the previously established revealed preference characterizations for the life cycle model and the one-lag habits model. We show that our characterization is easily testable by means of linear programming methods and we demonstrate its practical usefulness by means of an application to Spanish household consumption data.

A revealed preference analysis of the rational addiction model

We provide a revealed preference analysis of the rational addiction model. The revealed preference approach avoids the need to impose an, a priori unverifiable, functional form on the underlying utility function. Our results extend the previously established revealed preference characterizations for the life cycle model and the one-lag habits model. We show that our characterization is easily testable by means of linear programming methods and we demonstrate its practical usefulness by means of an application to Spanish household consumption data.

Commitment in intertemporal household consumption: a revealed preference analysis

We present a revealed preference methodology for analyzing intertemporal household consumption behavior. In doing so, we follow a collective approach, which explicitly recognizes that multi-member households consist of multiple decision makers with their own rational preferences. Following original work of Mazzocco (2007), we develop tests that can empirically verify whether observed consumption behavior is consistent with (varying degrees of) intrahousehold commitment. In our set-up, commitment means that households choose consumption allocations on the ex ante Pareto frontier. The distinguishing feature of our tests is that they are entirely nonparametric, i.e. their implementation does not require an a priori (typically non-verifiable) specification of the intrahousehold decision process (e.g. individual utilities). We demonstrate the practical usefulness of our methodology by means of an empirical application. For the data at hand, our results suggest using a so-called limited commitment model that allows for household-specific commitment patterns. Importantly, our application also shows that bringing intertemporal dynamics in the empirical analysis can substantially increases the discriminatory power of the revealed preference methodology.

Essays in Applied Microeconomics

This dissertation consists of three chapters. The first chapter, "Household Labor Supply, Child Development and Childcare Policies in the United States", studies the dynamic relationship between parental labor supply, children's cognitive development and intra-household bargaining power. To do so, I construct a model that incorporates preference heterogeneity across and within households, a constrained cooperative bargaining framework with explicit outside options, a dynamic technology of the child's cognitive development, and endogenous parental human capital and wages. Using detailed U.S. panel data on married households, I identify and estimate the model with the Method of Simulated Moments, and show that it replicates observable trends and heterogeneity in parental time use, the use of formal childcare arrangements and child test scores. I use the model to simulate the effects of cash transfers and formal childcare subsidies. First, I find that the cost-effectiveness of the recently expanded Child Tax Credit, in terms of fostering child cognition and reducing intra-household inequality, could be improved by giving cash to mothers directly, and by making the credit increase with the child's age. Second, I consider expansions of the Child and Dependent Care Tax Credit which offer larger formal childcare subsidies and relax the employment requirements. I estimate that a 25 percent subsidy could boost young children's skills by over 0.1 standard deviations, increase maternal labor supply even when there is no work requirement, and be financed at no additional cost through a 50 percent reduction in the Child Tax Credit for households with young children. The second chapter, "Actors in the Child Development Process" is coauthored with Daniela Del Boca, Christopher Flinn and Matt Wiswall. In this paper, we construct and estimate a model of child development in which both the parents and children make investments in the child's skill development. In each period of the development process, partially altruistic parents act as the Stackelberg leader and the child the follower when setting her own study time. We then extend this non-cooperative form of interaction by allowing parents to offer incentives to the child to increase her study time, at some monitoring cost. We show that this incentive scheme, a kind of internal conditional cash transfer, produces efficient outcomes and, in general, increases the child's cognitive ability. In addition to heterogeneity in resources (wage offers and non-labor income), the model allows for heterogeneity in preferences both for parents and children, and in monitoring costs. Like their parents, children are forward-looking, but we allow children and parents to have different preferences and for children to have age-varying discount rates, becoming more ``patient'' as they age. Using detailed time diary information on the allocation of parent and child time linked to measures of child cognitive ability, we estimate several versions of the model. Using model estimates, we explore the impact of various government income transfer policies on child development. As in Del Boca et al. (2016), we find that the most effective set of policies are (external) conditional cash transfers, in which the household receives an income transfer given that the child's cognitive ability exceeds a prespecified threshold. We find that the possibility of households using internal conditional cash transfers greatly increases the cost effectiveness of external conditional cash transfer policies. The third chapter, "The Power of the Agenda Setter: A Dynamic Legislative Bargaining Game", is coauthored with Ravideep Sethi. In this paper, we consider a society with three players. Through an infinitely repeated legislative bargaining game in which the agents split a dollar in every period, we study theoretically the conditions under which a veto player (e.g. a monarch) would initiate or support "voluntary democratization", i.e. a democratic reform which provides more agenda setting power to the non-veto players (e.g. the bourgeoisie and nobility). We show that such transitions could be the result of a rational, farsighted monarch trying to weaken coalitional ties between her opponents. In the model, the status quo evolves endogenously over time, as agents can approve new proposals by simple majority. Crucially, the veto player must approve any proposal that alters the status quo. The veto player's agenda setting power is defined as the probability (p) that she is randomly selected as the proposer in a given period. We characterize a symmetric Markov Perfect Equilibrium for all possible primitives, and show that for any interior initial status quo allocation and for sufficiently patient players, there exists a threshold of p beyond which the non-veto players can sustain positive allocations, by forming a permanent blocking coalition against the veto player. Below this threshold, the veto player can exploit her ``weakness'' by offering alternating bribes to her opponents, allowing her to slowly but surely acquire the full surplus in the long run. We interpret this incentive of the monarch to reduce her own recognition probability as voluntary democratization. The MPE that we find is unique after applying a coalitional stability refinement, and robust to having an arbitrary odd number of players

A revealed preference analysis of the rational addiction model

We provide a revealed preference analysis of the rational addiction model. The revealed preference approach avoids the need to impose an, a priori unverifiable, functional form on the underlying utility function. Our results extend the previously established revealed preference characterizations for the life cycle model and the one-lag habits model. We show that our characterization is easily testable by means of linear programming methods and we demonstrate its practical usefulness by means of an application to Spanish household consumption data.status: publishe

I’ll never forget my first cigarette: a revealed preference analysis of the ‘habits as durables’ model

We provide a revealed preference analysis of the “habits as durables” model. This approach avoids the need to impose a functional form on the underlying utility function. We show that our characterization is testable by means of linear programming methods, and we demonstrate its practical usefulness by means of an application to cigarette consumption using a Spanish household consumption data set. We find that the “habits as durables” model has better empirical fit in terms of predictive success compared to the “short memory habits” and life cycle models.status: publishe

I'll never forget my first cigarette: A revealed preference analysis of the 'habits as durables' model

info:eu-repo/semantics/publishe

Commitment in intertemporal household consumption: a revealed preference analysis

We present a revealed preference methodology for analyzing intertemporal household consumption behavior. In doing so, we follow a collective approach, which explicitly recognizes that multi-member households consist of multiple decision makers with their own rational preferences. Following original work of Mazzocco (2007), we develop tests that can empirically verify whether observed consumption behavior is consistent with (varying degrees of) intrahousehold commitment. In our set-up, commitment means that households choose consumption allocations on the ex ante Pareto frontier. The distinguishing feature of our tests is that they are entirely nonparametric, i.e. their implementation does not require an a priori (typically non-verifiable) specification of the intrahousehold decision process (e.g. individual utilities). We demonstrate the practical usefulness of our methodology by means of an empirical application. For the data at hand, our results suggest using a so-called limited commitment model that allows for household-specific commitment patterns. Importantly, our application also shows that bringing intertemporal dynamics in the empirical analysis can substantially increases the discriminatory power of the revealed preference methodology.status: publishe

Consume now or later? Time inconsistency, collective choice and revealed preference

This paper develops a revealed preference methodology for exploring whether time inconsistencies in household choice are the product of nonstationarities at the individual level or the result of individual heterogeneity and renegotiation within the collective unit. An empirical application to household-level microdata highlights that an explicit recognition of the collective nature of choice allows the vast majority of household behaviour to be rationalised by theory that assumes preference stationarity at the individual level. For our particular short panel data set, simply permitting limited intrahousehold heterogeneity in time preferences allows the choices of 98.4% of the sample to be rationalised by a model that assumes exponential discounting at the individual level. We also find that couples characterized by lower divergence in spousal discount rates are older, more likely to have children and wealthier, which we take as indications of experiencing higher match quality.status: publishe