Evolutive equilibrium selection I: symmetric two player binary choice games

The aim of the paper is the construction of a distributional model which enables the study of the evolutionary dynamics that arise for symmetric games, and the equilibrium selection mechanisms that originate from such processes. The evolution of probability distributions over the state variables is studied using the Fokker-Planck diffusion equation. Equilibrium selection using the ��basin of attraction�� approach, and a selection process suggested by Pontryagin are contrasted. Examples are provided for all generic 2-person symmetric binary choice games

Dynamic deadweight loss in monopolistic and related market structures

The aim of the paper is to construct a framework in which welfare losses over time generated by alternative market structures may be estimated. An adjustment cost model of the firm under imperfect competition is developed, and consequent industry equilibria determined. A dynamic analogue of Harberger's measure of welfare loss is specified, and for the case of a monopoly industry can be expressed as a function solely of Tobin's average q. The welfare measures calculated are on the basis of the market's expectations of the future profitability of firms; such measures allow a significant additional set of data to be used to construct a forward looking measure of welfare loss, and thus augment existing measures of industry appraisal

Evolutive equilibrium selection II: quantal response mechanisms

In this paper we develop a model of Evolutive Quantal Response (EQR) mechanisms, and contrast the outcomes with the Quantal Response Equilibria (QRE) as developed by McKelvey and Palfrey(1995). A clear distinction between the two approaches can be noted; EQR is based on a dynamic formulation of individual choice in the context of evolutionary game theory in which games are played repeatedly in populations, and the aim is to determine both the micro-configuration of strategy choices across the population, and the dynamics of the population frequencies of the strategies played. Quantal Response Equilibria focuses on the more traditional aspects of non-co-operative game theory, i.e. on equilibrium in beliefs regarding strategies.We focus attention on an analytical approach which enables closed form solutions to be constructed. We consider the case of all symmetric binary choice games, which will include analysis of all well known generic games in this context, such as Prisoner's dilemma, Stag-Hunt and Pure coordination games

Computer program analyzes generalized environmental control and life support systems

Versatile computer program analyzes environmental control and life support systems. The program permits changes of system component arrangements, component design details, and operating modes. It is written in FORTRAN language for use on the IBM 7094 computer

Minimum Number of k-Cliques in Graphs with Bounded Independence Number

Erdos asked in 1962 about the value of f(n,k,l), the minimum number of k-cliques in a graph of order n and independence number less than l. The case (k,l)=(3,3) was solved by Lorden. Here we solve the problem (for all large n) when (k,l) is (3,4), (3,5), (3,6), (3,7), (4,3), (5,3), (6,3), and (7,3). Independently, Das, Huang, Ma, Naves, and Sudakov did the cases (k,l)=(3,4) and (4,3).Comment: 25 pages. v4: Three new solved cases added: (3,5), (3,6), (3,7). All calculations are done with Version 2.0 of Flagmatic no

Weld-bonded titanium structures

Structurally stronger titanium articles are produced by a weld-bonding technique comprising fastening at least two plates of titanium together using spotwelding and curing an adhesive interspersed between the spot-weld nuggets. This weld-bonding may be employed to form lap joints or to stiffen titanium metal plates

Intermediate Subfactors with No Extra Structure

If $N \subset P,Q \subset M$ are type II_1 factors with $N' \cap M = C id$ and $[M:N]$ finite we show that restrictions on the standard invariants of the elementary inclusions $N \subset P$, $N \subset Q$, $P \subset M$ and $Q \subset M$ imply drastic restrictions on the indices and angles between the subfactors. In particular we show that if these standard invariants are trivial and the conditional expectations onto $P$ and $Q$ do not commute, then $[M:N]$ is 6 or $6 + 4\sqrt 2$. In the former case $N$ is the fixed point algebra for an outer action of $S_3$ on $M$ and the angle is $\pi/3$, and in the latter case the angle is $cos^{-1}(\sqrt 2-1)$ and an example may be found in the GHJ subfactor family. The techniques of proof rely heavily on planar algebras.Comment: 51 pages, 65 figure