An Impact Assessment Report on the Multiple-Cropping Project (KABSAKA), Sta. Barbara, Iloilo

This article is a product of a nine-month training and application program implemented by the micro component of the Economic and Social Impact Analysis/Women in Development (ESIA/WID) and the Food Systems Program of the East-West Center Resource Systems Institute (RSI). It focuses on Kabusugan sa Kaumhan (KABSAKA) project launched in Santa Barbara, Iloilo. In particular, it discusses the level and extent of component technologies vis-a-vis land-use intensity, cropping pattern and input usage adoption by the farmers. Examination of socioeconomic, institutional and other perceived benefits accruing to beneficiaries is conducted.land management, agriculture sector, utilization, rural sector, crop production, farm lands, impact analysis

An Impact Assessment Report on the Multiple-Cropping Project (KABSAKA), Sta. Barbara, Iloilo

This article is a product of a nine-month training and application program implemented by the micro component of the Economic and Social Impact Analysis/Women in Development (ESIA/WID) and the Food Systems Program of the East-West Center Resource Systems Institute (RSI). It focuses on Kabusugan sa Kaumhan (KABSAKA) project launched in Santa Barbara, Iloilo. In particular, it discusses the level and extent of component technologies vis-a-vis land-use intensity, cropping pattern and input usage adoption by the farmers. Examination of socioeconomic, institutional and other perceived benefits accruing to beneficiaries is conducted.land management, agriculture sector, utilization, rural sector, crop production, farm lands, impact analysis

BARGAINING, VOTING, AND VALUE

This paper addresses the following issue: If a set of agents bargain on a set of feasible alternatives 'in the shadow' of a voting rule, that is, any agreement can be enforced if a 'winning coalition' supports it, what general agreements are likely to arise? In other words: What influence can the voting rule used to settle (possibly non-unanimous) agreements have on the outcome of negotiations? To give an answer we model the situation as an extension of the Nash bargaining problem in which an arbitrary voting rule replaces unanimity to settle agreements by n players. This provides a setting in which a natural extension of Nash's solution is obtained axiomatically. Two extensions admitting randomization on voting rules based on two informational scenarios are considered.Bargaining, voting, value, bargaining in committees.

POTENTIAL, VALUE AND PROBABILITY

This paper focuses on the probabilistic point of view and proposes a extremely simple probabilistic model that provides a single and simple story to account for several extensions of the Shapley value, as weighted Shapley values, semivalues, and weak (weighted or not) semivalues, and the Shapley value itself. Moreover, some of the most interesting conditions or notions that have been introduced in the search of alternatives to Shapley's seminal characterization, as 'balanced contributions' and the 'potential', are reinterpreted from this same point of view. In this new light these notions and some results lose their 'mystery' and acquire a clear and simple meaning. These illuminating reinterpretations strongly vindicate the complementariness of the probabilistic and the axiomatic approaches, and shed serious doubts about the achievements of the axiomatic approach since Nash's and Shapley's seminal papers in connection with the genuine notion of value.Coalition games, value, potential

A CRITICAL REAPPRAISAL OF SOME VOTING POWER PARADOXES

Power indices are meant to assess the power that a voting rule confers a priori to each of the decision makers who use it. In order to test and compare them, some authors have proposed "natural" postulates that a measure of a priori voting power "should" satisfy, the violations of which are called "voting power paradoxes". In this paper two general measures of factual success and decisiveness based on the voting rule and the voters' behavior, and some of these postulates/paradoxes test each other. As a result serious doubts on the discriminating power of most voting power postulates are cast.Voting power, decisiveness, success, voting rules, voting behavior, postulates, paradoxes.

- POWER INDICES AND THE VEIL OF IGNORANCE

We provide an axiomatic foundation of the expected utility preferences over lotteries on roles in simple superadditive games represented by the two main power indices, the Shapley-Shubik index and the Banzhaf index, when they are interpreted as von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions. Our axioms admit meaningful interpretations in the setting proposed by Roth in terms of different attitudes toward risk involving roles in collective decision procedures under the veil of ignorance. In particular, an illuminating interpretation of ''efficiency'', up to now missing in this set up, as well as of the corresponding axiom for the Banzhaf index, is provided.Power indices, voting power, collective decision-making, lotteries

ASSESSMENT OF VOTING SITUATIONS: THE PROBABILISTIC FOUNDATIONS

In this paper we revise the probabilistic foundations of the theory of the measurement of 'voting power' either as success or decisiveness. For an assessment of these features two inputs are claimed to be necessary: the voting procedure and the voters' behavior. We propose a simple model in which the voters' behavior is summarized by a probability distribution over all vote configurations. This basic model, at once simpler and more general that other probabilistic models, provides a clear conceptual common basis to reinterpret coherently from a unified point of view di.erent power indices and some related game theoretic notions, as well as a wider perspective for a dispassionate assessment of the power indices themselves, their merits and their limitations.Voting rules, voting power, decisiveness, success, power indices

- SHAPLEY-SHUBIK AND BANZHAF INDICES REVISITED.

We provide a new axiomatization of the Shapley-Shubik and the Banzhaf power indices in thedomain of simple superadditive games by means of transparent axioms. Only anonymity isshared with the former characterizations in the literature. The rest of the axioms are substitutedby more transparent ones in terms of power in collective decision-making procedures. Inparticular, a clear restatement and a compelling alternative for the transfer axiom are proposed.Only one axiom differentiates the characterization of either index, and these differentiatingaxioms provide a new point of comparison. In a first step both indices are characterized up to azero and a unit of scale. Then both indices are singled out by simple normalizing axioms.Power indices, voting power, collective decision-making, simple games

BARGAINING IN COMMITTEES OF REPRESENTATIVES: THE OPTIMAL VOTING RULE

Committees are often made up of representatives of different-sized groups of individuals, and make decisions by means of a voting rule which specifies what vote configurations can pass a decision. This raises the question of the choice of the optimal voting rule, given the different sizes of the groups that members represent. In this paper we take a new departure to address this problem, assuming that the committee is a bargaining scenario in which negotiations take place 'in the shadow of the voting rule' in search of unanimous consensus. That is, a general agreement is looked for, but any winning coalition can enforce an agreement.Voting rule, Bargaining, Nash solution.

Majorities with a quorum

Based on a general model of "quaternary" voting rule, sensitive to voters' choices between four different options (abstaining, voting "yes", voting "no" and staying home), we systematically study different types of majority and quorum. The model allows for a precise formulation of majority rules and quorum constraints. For such rules four types of majority can be defined. We also consider four types of quorum. Then we study the possible combinations of a majority system with a type of quorum and provide examples from rules actually used in parliaments.