2 research outputs found
Cooperation enhanced by inhomogeneous activity of teaching for evolutionary Prisoner's Dilemma games
Evolutionary Prisoner's Dilemma games with quenched inhomogeneities in the
spatial dynamical rules are considered. The players following one of the two
pure strategies (cooperation or defection) are distributed on a two-dimensional
lattice. The rate of strategy adoption from a randomly chosen neighbors are
controlled by the payoff difference and a two-value pre-factor
characterizing the players whom the strategy learned from. The reduced teaching
activity of players is distributed randomly with concentrations at the
beginning and fixed further on. Numerical and analytical calculations are
performed to study the concentration of cooperators as a function of and
for different noise levels and connectivity structures. Significant
increase of cooperation is found within a wide range of parameters for this
dynamics. The results highlight the importance of asymmetry characterizing the
exchange of master-follower role during the strategy adoptions.Comment: 4 pages, 5 figures, corrected typo
Disordered Environments in Spatial Games
The Prisoner's dilemma is the main game theoretical framework in which the
onset and maintainance of cooperation in biological populations is studied. In
the spatial version of the model, we study the robustness of cooperation in
heterogeneous ecosystems in spatial evolutionary games by considering site
diluted lattices. The main result is that due to disorder, the fraction of
cooperators in the population is enhanced. Moreover, the system presents a
dynamical transition at , separating a region with spatial chaos from
one with localized, stable groups of cooperators.Comment: 6 pages, 5 figure