Designing cost-sharing methods for Bayesian games

We study the design of cost-sharing protocols for two fundamental resource allocation problems, the Set Cover and the Steiner Tree Problem, under environments of incomplete information (Bayesian model). Our objective is to design protocols where the worst-case Bayesian Nash equilibria, have low cost, i.e. the Bayesian Price of Anarchy (PoA) is minimized. Although budget balance is a very natural requirement, it puts considerable restrictions on the design space, resulting in high PoA. We propose an alternative, relaxed requirement called budget balance in the equilibrium (BBiE).We show an interesting connection between algorithms for Oblivious Stochastic optimization problems and cost-sharing design with low PoA. We exploit this connection for both problems and we enforce approximate solutions of the stochastic problem, as Bayesian Nash equilibria, with the same guarantees on the PoA. More interestingly, we show how to obtain the same bounds on the PoA, by using anonymous posted prices which are desirable because they are easy to implement and, as we show, induce dominant strategies for the players

Sequential Deliberation for Social Choice

In large scale collective decision making, social choice is a normative study of how one ought to design a protocol for reaching consensus. However, in instances where the underlying decision space is too large or complex for ordinal voting, standard voting methods of social choice may be impractical. How then can we design a mechanism - preferably decentralized, simple, scalable, and not requiring any special knowledge of the decision space - to reach consensus? We propose sequential deliberation as a natural solution to this problem. In this iterative method, successive pairs of agents bargain over the decision space using the previous decision as a disagreement alternative. We describe the general method and analyze the quality of its outcome when the space of preferences define a median graph. We show that sequential deliberation finds a 1.208- approximation to the optimal social cost on such graphs, coming very close to this value with only a small constant number of agents sampled from the population. We also show lower bounds on simpler classes of mechanisms to justify our design choices. We further show that sequential deliberation is ex-post Pareto efficient and has truthful reporting as an equilibrium of the induced extensive form game. We finally show that for general metric spaces, the second moment of of the distribution of social cost of the outcomes produced by sequential deliberation is also bounded

Occasional errors can benefit coordination

The chances solving a problem that involves coordination between people are increased by introducing robotic players that sometimes make mistakes. This finding has implications for real-world coordination problems

Cooperation, Norms, and Revolutions: A Unified Game-Theoretical Approach

Cooperation is of utmost importance to society as a whole, but is often challenged by individual self-interests. While game theory has studied this problem extensively, there is little work on interactions within and across groups with different preferences or beliefs. Yet, people from different social or cultural backgrounds often meet and interact. This can yield conflict, since behavior that is considered cooperative by one population might be perceived as non-cooperative from the viewpoint of another. To understand the dynamics and outcome of the competitive interactions within and between groups, we study game-dynamical replicator equations for multiple populations with incompatible interests and different power (be this due to different population sizes, material resources, social capital, or other factors). These equations allow us to address various important questions: For example, can cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma be promoted, when two interacting groups have different preferences? Under what conditions can costly punishment, or other mechanisms, foster the evolution of norms? When does cooperation fail, leading to antagonistic behavior, conflict, or even revolutions? And what incentives are needed to reach peaceful agreements between groups with conflicting interests? Our detailed quantitative analysis reveals a large variety of interesting results, which are relevant for society, law and economics, and have implications for the evolution of language and culture as well

Observation of electron transfer mediated decay in aqueous solution

Photoionization is at the heart of X ray photoelectron spectroscopy XPS , which gives access to important information on a sample s local chemical environment. Local and non local electronic decay after photoionization in which the refilling of core holes results in electron emission from either the initially ionized species or a neighbour, respectively have been well studied. However, electron transfer mediated decay ETMD , which involves the refilling of a core hole by an electron from a neighbouring species, has not yet been observed in condensed phase. Here we report the experimental observation of ETMD in an aqueous LiCl solution by detecting characteristic secondary low energy electrons using liquid microjet soft XPS. Experimental results are interpreted using molecular dynamics and high level ab initio calculations. We show that both solvent molecules and counterions participate in the ETMD processes, and different ion associations have distinctive spectral fingerprints. Furthermore, ETMD spectra are sensitive to coordination numbers, ion solvent distances and solvent arrangemen

coreNASH: Multi-stakeholder Consensus on Core Outcomes for Decision Making About Nonalcoholic Steatohepatitis Treatment

The increasing prevalence and burden of nonalcoholic steatohepatitis (NASH) has spurred the development of new treatments and a need to consider outcomes used for NASH treatment decision making. Development of a NASH core outcome set (COS) can help prioritize outcomes of highest importance by incorporating the perspectives from a variety of decision makers. coreNASH was an initiative to develop a COS for NASH using a modified Delphi consensus process with a multi-stakeholder voting panel. A candidate outcome list was created based on a literature review and key informant interviews. The candidate outcome list was then condensed and prioritized through three rounds of online voting and through discussion at an in-person meeting. Outcomes were retained or eliminated based on predetermined consensus criteria, which included special weighting of patients’ opinions in the first two voting rounds. The coreNASH Delphi panel included 53 participants (7 patients, 10 clinicians and researchers, 7 health technology assessors, 22 industry representatives, 2 regulators, and 5 payers) who considered outcomes for two NASH-related COS: one for NASH without cirrhosis (F2-F3) and one for NASH with cirrhosis (F4). The initial candidate outcome list for both disease stages included 86 outcomes. The panel agreed on including two core outcomes for NASH without cirrhosis and nine core outcomes for NASH with cirrhosis in the COS. Conclusion: A consensus-based COS has been developed that can be used across the life cycle of NASH treatments. Outcomes included can contribute to decision making for regulatory, market access, and on-market decision making. Including the coreNASH COS in clinical development programs will facilitate improved comparisons and help decision makers assess the value of new products