Hybrid Advertising Auctions

Several major websites offer hybrid auctions that allow advertisers to bid on a per-impression or a per-click basis. We present the first analysis of this hybrid advertising auction setting. The conventional wisdom is that brand advertisers (e.g. Coca-Cola) will bid per impression, while direct response advertisers (e.g. Amazon.com) will bid per click. We analyze a theoretical model of advertiser bidding to ask whether this conventional wisdom will hold up in practice. We find the opposite in a static game: brand advertisers bid per click, while direct response advertisers bid per impression. In a more realistic repeated game, we find that direct response advertisers bid per click, but brand advertisers may profitably alternate between bidding for clicks and bidding for impressions. The analysis implies that sellers of online advertising (a) may sometimes prefer not to offer advertisers multiple bidding options, (b) should try to ascertain advertisers' types when they do use hybrid auctions, and (c) should consider advertisers' strategic incentives when forming click-through rate expectations in hybrid auction formats

September 25, 1937 Football Program, UOP vs. USC

https://scholarlycommons.pacific.edu/ua-football/1186/thumbnail.jp

October 5, 1935 Football Program, UOP vs. USC Trojans

https://scholarlycommons.pacific.edu/ua-football/1170/thumbnail.jp

Platform Competition: The Role of Multi-homing and Complementors

In this paper we present a model of platform competition in which two firms offer horizontally differentiated platforms and a group of complementors offers products that are complementary to each platform. Consumers can buy either or both platforms (single- or multihoming) and complementors can produce for either or both platforms (single- or multi-production). We first characterize the pricing structure and find that, in equilibrium, consumers are more likely to multihome as the differentiation of platforms decreases or as the number of complementors for either platform increases. We show that the platform and its complementors always benefit from an increase in the number of complementors in their own platform. When single-homing arises in equilibrium, the platform and its complementors suffer from an increase in the number of complementors in the rival platform. We also study the incentives of the platform to integrate with its complementors, to charge them a royalty or give a subsidy, and to sell its own complementary products to the rival platform

Platform Competition: The Role of Multi-homing and Complementors

In this paper we present a model of platform competition in which two firms offer horizontally differentiated platforms and a group of complementors offers products that are complementary to each platform. Consumers can buy either or both platforms (single- or multihoming) and complementors can produce for either or both platforms (single- or multi-production). We first characterize the pricing structure and find that, in equilibrium, consumers are more likely to multihome as the differentiation of platforms decreases or as the number of complementors for either platform increases. We show that the platform and its complementors always benefit from an increase in the number of complementors in their own platform. When single-homing arises in equilibrium, the platform and its complementors suffer from an increase in the number of complementors in the rival platform. We also study the incentives of the platform to integrate with its complementors, to charge them a royalty or give a subsidy, and to sell its own complementary products to the rival platform

Hybrid Advertising Auctions

Several major websites offer hybrid auctions that allow advertisers to bid on a per-impression or a per-click basis. We present the first analysis of this hybrid advertising auction setting. The conventional wisdom is that brand advertisers (e.g. Coca-Cola) will bid per impression, while direct response advertisers (e.g. Amazon.com) will bid per click. We analyze a theoretical model of advertiser bidding to ask whether this conventional wisdom will hold up in practice. We find the opposite in a static game: brand advertisers bid per click, while direct response advertisers bid per impression. In a more realistic repeated game, we find that direct response advertisers bid per click, but brand advertisers may profitably alternate between bidding for clicks and bidding for impressions. The analysis implies that sellers of online advertising (a) may sometimes prefer not to offer advertisers multiple bidding options, (b) should try to ascertain advertisers' types when they do use hybrid auctions, and (c) should consider advertisers' strategic incentives when forming click-through rate expectations in hybrid auction formats

Ad-sponsored Business Models and Compatibility Incentives of Social Networks

This paper examines social networks' incentives to establish compatibility under fee and ad-sponsored business models. I analyze the competition between two social networks and show that compatibility is only possible when the two networks are ad-sponsored. I also find that even when both networks are ad-sponsored, a network with a significant installed-base advantage may choose not to be compatible when the cost from sharing the market outweighs the benefit from additional ad profits. Finally, compatibility also requires a significant number of single-homing users. The results are consistent with empirical observations of social networks and suggest that increased adoption of ad-sponsored business models may lead to many de-facto standards in high-technology industries

Technology Shocks in Multi-Sided Markets: The Impact of Craigslist on Local Newspapers

Theories of multi-sided markets suggest that a platform's pricing strategies on different sides of the market are closely linked, and in particular, an increase in competition on one side may lead to an increase in price on other sides. We empirically examine platforms' pricing strategies by exploiting the gradual expansion of Craigslist, a website providing classified ads services, into local newspaper markets. We adopt a differences-in-differences approach by comparing the pricing strategies of local newspapers for which classified ads are likely to be a significant portion of their revenue to others before and after Craigslist's entry. We find that these newspapers drop their classified ad rates significantly more after Craigslist's entry. We also find that the impact of the entry of Craigslist propagates to other sides of the newspaper market. These newspapers increase their subscription rates relative to others, and consequently, their circulation also drops more. Finally, lower circulation also leads to lower display ad rates for these newspapers. Our study helps build an understanding of how incumbent media platforms respond to technologically disruptive entrants in multi-sided markets

A Dyad Model of Calling Behaviour with Tie Strength Dynamics

This paper investigates the dynamic relation between callers' social ties and their wireless phone service consumption. We construct a large pair-level panel dataset with information on the number of each pair's common contacts, calling activities, prices, and each caller's characteristics over a one-year time period. We estimate a dynamic model that encapsulates the evolving relationship between each pair of consumers. We find the amount of communications between a pair of consumers increases with the strength of their tie, which is higher when these two consumers share more common contacts. Our results support the reciprocity rule in telephone calls, i.e. when individual A initiates more (less) phone calls to individual B in one month, their social tie will be strengthened (weakened) and individual B will make more (less) calls to individual A in the subsequent months. We demonstrate the implications of our results in evaluating the return of temporary price promotions and designing price plans. Our results underscore the importance of incorporating social network characteristics in the study of telecommunications markets

Strategies to Fight Ad-sponsored Rivals

We analyze the optimal strategy of a high-quality incumbent that faces a low-quality ad-sponsored competitor. In addition to competing through adjustments of tactical variables such as price or advertising intensity, we allow the incumbent to consider changes in its business model. We consider four alternative business models, two pure models (subscription-based and ad-sponsored) and two mixed models that are hybrids of the two pure models. We show that the optimal response to an ad-sponsored rival often entails business model reconfigurations, a phenomenon that we dub 'competing through business models.' We also find that when there is an ad-sponsored entrant, the incumbent is more likely to prefer to compete through a pure, rather than a mixed, business model because of cannibalization and endogenous vertical differentiation concerns. We discuss how our study helps improve our understanding of notions of strategy, business model, and tactics in the field of strategy