1,466 research outputs found
Touro Nieuws No. 1
A periodical by the Faculty of Medicine at the University of Groningen. Contents are entirely in Dutch.https://touroscholar.touro.edu/archives_books/1093/thumbnail.jp
Who's who in networks. Wanted: the key group
Ballester, Calv ́o-Armengol, and Zenou (2006, Econometrica, 74/5, pp.
1403-17) show that in a network game with local payoff
complementarities, together with global uniform payoff substitutability
and own concavity effects, the intercentrality measure identifies the
key player - a player who, once removed, leads to the optimal change in
overall activity. In this paper we search for the key group in such
network games, whose members are, in general, different from the players
with the highest individual intercentralities. Thus the quest for a
single target is generalized to a group selection problem targeting an
arbitrary number of players, where the key group is identified by a
group intercentrality measure. We show that the members of a key group
are rather nonredundant actors, i.e., they are largely heterogenous in
their patterns of ties to the third parties
Who's who in networks. Wanted: the key group
Ballester, Calv ́o-Armengol, and Zenou (2006, Econometrica, 74/5, pp.
1403-17) show that in a network game with local payoff
complementarities, together with global uniform payoff substitutability
and own concavity effects, the intercentrality measure identifies the
key player - a player who, once removed, leads to the optimal change in
overall activity. In this paper we search for the key group in such
network games, whose members are, in general, different from the players
with the highest individual intercentralities. Thus the quest for a
single target is generalized to a group selection problem targeting an
arbitrary number of players, where the key group is identified by a
group intercentrality measure. We show that the members of a key group
are rather nonredundant actors, i.e., they are largely heterogenous in
their patterns of ties to the third parties
Co-opetition in standard-setting: the case of the Compact Disc
The success of the CD has (partly) been attributed to the ability of
Sony, Philips and Matsushita to cooperate in the run-up to the DAD
conference in 1981, where the technological standard was set. We model
the situation leading up to the conference in a simple game with
technological progress and the possibility of prelaunching a technology.
We identify players' trades between prelaunching(which ends
technological progress) and continued development (which involves the
risk of being pre-empted). Contrasting outcomes with complete and
incomplete information, we find that there appeared to be considerable
uncertainty about rivals' technological progress
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