Touro Nieuws No. 1

A periodical by the Faculty of Medicine at the University of Groningen. Contents are entirely in Dutch.https://touroscholar.touro.edu/archives_books/1093/thumbnail.jp

Who's who in networks. Wanted: the key group

Ballester, Calv ́o-Armengol, and Zenou (2006, Econometrica, 74/5, pp. 1403-17) show that in a network game with local payoff complementarities, together with global uniform payoff substitutability and own concavity effects, the intercentrality measure identifies the key player - a player who, once removed, leads to the optimal change in overall activity. In this paper we search for the key group in such network games, whose members are, in general, different from the players with the highest individual intercentralities. Thus the quest for a single target is generalized to a group selection problem targeting an arbitrary number of players, where the key group is identified by a group intercentrality measure. We show that the members of a key group are rather nonredundant actors, i.e., they are largely heterogenous in their patterns of ties to the third parties

Who's who in networks. Wanted: the key group

Ballester, Calv ́o-Armengol, and Zenou (2006, Econometrica, 74/5, pp. 1403-17) show that in a network game with local payoff complementarities, together with global uniform payoff substitutability and own concavity effects, the intercentrality measure identifies the key player - a player who, once removed, leads to the optimal change in overall activity. In this paper we search for the key group in such network games, whose members are, in general, different from the players with the highest individual intercentralities. Thus the quest for a single target is generalized to a group selection problem targeting an arbitrary number of players, where the key group is identified by a group intercentrality measure. We show that the members of a key group are rather nonredundant actors, i.e., they are largely heterogenous in their patterns of ties to the third parties

Co-opetition in standard-setting: the case of the Compact Disc

The success of the CD has (partly) been attributed to the ability of Sony, Philips and Matsushita to cooperate in the run-up to the DAD conference in 1981, where the technological standard was set. We model the situation leading up to the conference in a simple game with technological progress and the possibility of prelaunching a technology. We identify players' trades between prelaunching(which ends technological progress) and continued development (which involves the risk of being pre-empted). Contrasting outcomes with complete and incomplete information, we find that there appeared to be considerable uncertainty about rivals' technological progress