The Effectiveness of Contracted Coalitions

The debate on the effectiveness of Private Security Contractors (PSCs) in Iraq has been waged ever since their first appearance. Statists have argued that they are much less effective than regular troops, while neoliberals consider them an effective supplement to regular troops. However, so far, both schools alike have drawn on anecdotal evidence only; yet, such evidence is prone to a high margin of error and does not allow a comparison of different actors. This article addresses these shortfalls by providing hard data, drawn from the Wikileaks “Iraq War logs” data set, on the conduct of PSCs in Iraq and comparing their performance to that of regular troops, that is, the US and Iraqi armed forces. In general, if PSCs are co-deployed alongside regular troops and oversight is institutionalized, their performance supersedes that of poorly trained military personnel, such as the Iraqi military, and in many cases even that of the highly capable US military. </jats:p

Die Nutzung privater Militärfirmen durch US-Streitkräfte und Bundeswehr

"Seit Anfang der neunziger Jahre verstärkt sich in den westlichen Staaten der Trend zum Einkauf militärischer Dienstleistungen bei privaten Firmen. Viele Leistungen, die ehemals von Soldaten erbracht wurden, werden nun von privaten Militärfirmen (PMF) ausgeführt. Eine Vorreiterrolle nehmen dabei die US-Streitkräfte ein, aber auch die Bundeswehr hat die Auslagerung militärischer Aufgaben an Private eingeleitet. Der Einkauf von militärischen Dienstleistungen wird damit begründet, dass PMF viele Dienstleistungen wesentlich kostengünstiger erbringen können, dass der Einsatz von PMF den politischen Handlungsspielraum erweitere und die Streitkräfte entlaste. Allerdings stehen diesen Vorteilen auch Nachteile gegenüber. So kann der Einkauf militärischer Dienstleistungen die Fähigkeit des Staates beeinträchtigen, das Gut Sicherheit selbständig zu produzieren, völkerrechtliche Probleme aufwerfen und negative Folgen für die Einsatzführung haben. Die USA und die Bundesrepublik Deutschland haben ähnliche Strategien zur Nutzung von PMF entwickelt, die allerdings keine Lösungen für die völkerrechtlichen Fragen und die Probleme bei der Einsatzführung bieten. Eine umfassende Lösung, mit der sich die gewünschten Vorteile erzielen und die Nachteile größtenteils vermeiden lassen, bietet das britische 'Sponsored Reserve'-Modell. Dabei werden PMF-Angestellte durch einen Vertrag zwischen den Streitkräften und der PMF den Reservisten quasi gleichgestellt und in die reguläre militärische Kommandokette eingegliedert." (Autorenreferat

Commercial Military Actors and Civilian Victimization in Africa, Middle East, Latin America, and Asia, 1980–2011

Abstract The current international normative order strongly condemns strategies of civilian victimization, and actors engaging in atrocities face material, criminal, and reputational sanctions. The growth of the market for force has raised concerns about clients outsourcing atrocities to commercial military actors (CMAs), such as private military and security companies or mercenaries, and thereby circumventing accountability under international norms. This investigation explores whether interactions on the market for force are associated with an increase in the likelihood of violence against civilians. We argue that there is a variance in market interactions. While some market actors will comply with international norms, others will take advantage and circumvent normative restrictions. The crucial factor determining compliance and noncompliance are costs of norm violation, which vary across market actors. Those clients and CMAs with a higher exposure to sanctions, or an interest in the status quo of the normative order, are less likely to be associated with norm violations, and vice versa. We test our claims using a negative binomial regression and by drawing on new data from the Commercial Military Actor Dataset, which records contracting for force and force-related services. Overall, we found that there is a market segment where actors use market relations to circumvent international norms, yet mostly market interactions appear to comply with international norms.</jats:p

The Impact of Mercenaries and Private Military and Security Companies on Civil War Severity between 1946 and 2002

Research has long abandoned the view that only states wage war. On the contrary, civil war research has produced an impressive body of literature on violent non-state actors. Still, a particular group of actors—mercenaries—has been widely neglected so far, although they have participated in numerous conflicts in the second half of the twentieth century. Whether their presence aggravated or improved the situation is a matter of dispute. Some believe that the additional military capabilities provided by mercenaries help to end civil wars quickly without increased bloodshed, while others deem mercenaries greedy and bloodthirsty combatants who contribute to making civil wars more brutal, while a third opinion differentiates between different types of mercenaries. This article tests the impact of mercenaries on civil war severity. The evidence indicates that the presence of both mercenaries and private military and security contractors increases its severity

The Social Structure of the Market for Force

Over the past two decades, governments have increasingly contracted private military and security companies (PMSCs) to support military operations in conflicts. However, many observers have argued that such companies are ‘greedy market actors’ or ‘reckless mercenaries’ and their level of performance very poor. A minority has defended them as security professionals. If market competition is present, the level of performance is high and positive contributions to the client’s military operation can be expected. However, neither PMSC opponents nor proponents can account for the variance in the level of performance in three crucial cases – Sierra Leone, Iraq, and Afghanistan. This article argues that different market structures explain this variance. At least three ideal configurations exist: collaborative, competitive, and rival structures. These structures influence the level of performance. PMSC performance levels are expected to decrease from the first configuration, being positive, to the last, being negative

Privatising Security: The Limits of Military Outsourcing

ISSN:2296-024

Reframing the Anti-mercenary norm: Private Military and Security Companies and Mercenarism

Since the nineteenth century, the anti-mercenary norm has prohibited violent market actors from participating in combat. Today, however, private military and security companies (PMSCs) are widely perceived as legitimate. How did they achieve that legitimacy? This article argues that PMSCs initially resembled mercenaries. Previously, mercenaries were defined as fighters participating in combat for pay, be it offensive or defensive. PMSC advocates aimed to alter the combat component of the anti-mercenary norm. By arguing that PMSCs’ use of force was not combat, but rather individual self-defence, they created an alternative interpretation that established the practice as appropriate. As critical actors like the US, the United Kingdom, and the United Nations adopted their interpretation, the regulatory scope of the norm changed. In short, PMSCs are perceived to be legitimate because they are no longer implicated in the anti-mercenary norm