K3 surfaces

La Tesi tratta la descrizione delle superfici K3 mediante l'utilizzo degli schemi e dei fasci. Viene calcolato il diamante di Hodge di ogni superficie K3

Delegating home care for the elderly to external caregivers? An empirical study on Italian data

We study care arrangement decisions in Italy, where families are increasingly delegating the role of primary caregiver to external (paid) people also for the provision of home care. We consider a sample of households with a dependent elderly person cared for either at home or in a residential home, extracted from a survey representative of the population of Italy’s Emilia-Romagna region. We investigate the determinants of a household’s decision to opt for one of the following three alternatives: the institutionalisation of elderly family members, informal home care, or paid home care. We estimate two model specifications, based on a simultaneous and a sequential decision process respectively, the results of which are fairly consistent. Disability related variables, rather than family characteristics, emerge as the main determinants of institutionalisation. On the other hand, household characteristics and socio-economic variables are more influential when it comes to choosing between informal and formal home care provisions

Superfici di Riemann compatte di genere zero e uno

Caratterizzazione delle superfici di Riemann compatte di genere zero e un

Does the extension of primary care practice opening hours reduce the use of emergency services?

Over-crowding in Emergency Departments (EDs) generates potential inefficiencies. Using regional administrative data, we investigate the impact of an increase in the accessibility of primary care on ED visits in Italy. We test whether extending practice opening hours up to 12 hours/day reduces inappropriate ED visits. We estimate count data models, considering different measures for ED visits recorded at the list level. Since the extension programme is voluntary, we also account for the potential endogeneity of participation, using a two-stage residual inclusion and a GMM approach. Our results show that improving primary care accessibility favours a more appropriate use of EDs

Economic Incentives in General Practice: the Impact of Pay for Participation Programs on Diabetes Care.

Financial incentives are increasingly adopted to improve allocative efficiency and quality in primary care. Although it has been recognised that incentive-based remuneration schemes can have an impact on GP behaviour, there is still weak empirical evidence on the extent to which such programs influence healthcare outcomes and on the degree of physicians’ responsiveness to their introduction. This problem reflects the lack of adequate empirical data but also the complexity of general practice systems where many confounding and institutional factors are likely to influence physician behaviour. Given this background, we investigate the impact on quality of care of the introduction of pay for participation incentives in primary care contracts in the Italian region Emilia Romagna. We concentrate on patients affected by diabetes mellitus type 2, for which the assumption of responsibility and the adoption of clinical guidelines are specifically rewarded. We test the hypothesis that, other things equal, patients under the responsibility of GPs receiving a higher share of their income through these programs are less likely to experience hospitalisation for hyperglycaemic emergencies. To this end, we examined the combined influence of physician, organisational and patient factors through the use of multilevel modelling. Data were obtained form a large dataset made available by the Regional Agency for Health Care Services of Emilia Romagna. This dataset covers patients and GPs of the whole region and provides detailed information on healthcare consumption of the population, on the different components of GP remunerations, on morbidity levels of large groups of patients. Estimations are obtained for the year 2003

GPs and hospital expenditures. Should we keep expenditure containment programs alive?

Pay-for-performance programs offering additional payments to GPs can be used not only to improve the quality of care but also for cost containment purposes. In this paper, we analyse the impact of removing financial incentives in primary care that were aimed at containing hospital expenditure in the Italian region of Emilia Romagna during the period 2002-04. Our analysis draws on regional databanks linking GPs’ characteristics to those of their patients (including all sources of public payments made to GPs), together with information on the utilisation of hospital services. We employ a difference-in-difference specification to assess changes in expenditures for avoidable and total hospital admissions. We identify the treatment group with GPs operating in districts where the program is withdrawn during the observation period (“Leavers”). Their performance is compared to that of two separate control groups, namely: GPs working in districts that grant incentives for the entire period (“Stayers”), and those working in districts that never introduced measures for the containment of hospitalisations (“Non Participants”). The comparison between treatment and control groups shows that removing incentives does not result in a worse performance by Leavers compared to both control groups. This supports the policy of removing incentives, as such entail extra payments to GPs which, however, do not seem capable of significantly influencing their behaviour in the desired ways. Our findings complement previous evidence from the same institutional context showing that only those programs that aim to improve disease management for specific conditions - rather than to simply contain expenditure - have proven successful in reducing avoidable admissions for the target population

The role of GP’s compensation schemes in diabetes care: evidence from panel data

The design of incentive schemes that improve quality of care is a central issue for the healthcare sector. Nowadays we observe many pay-for-performance programs, where payment is contingent on meeting indicators of provider effort, but also other alternative strategies have been introduced, for example programs rewarding physicians for participation in diseases management plans. Although it has been recognised that incentive-based remuneration schemes can have an impact on GP behaviour, there is still weak empirical evidence on the extent to which such programs influence health outcomes. We investigate the impact of financial incentives in Regional and Local Health Authority contracts for primary care in the Italian Region Emilia Romagna for the years 2003-05. We focus on avoidable hospitalisations (Ambulatory Care Sensitive Conditions) for patients affected by type 2 diabetes mellitus, for which the assumption of responsibility and the adoption of clinical guidelines are specifically rewarded. We estimate a panel count data model using a Negative Binomial distribution to test the hypothesis that, other things equal, patients under the responsibility of GPs receiving a higher share of their income through these programs are less likely to experience avoidable hospitalisations. Our findings support the hypothesis that financial transfers may contribute to improve quality of care, even when they are not based on the ex-post verification of performances

Disentangling the effect of waiting times on hospital choice: Evidence from a panel data analysis

This study examines the effect of waiting times on hospital choice by using patient-level data on elective Percutaneous Transluminal Coronary Angioplasty (PTCA) procedures in the Italian NHS over the years 2008-2011. We perform a multinomial logit analysis including conditional logit and mixed logit specifications. Our findings show the importance of jointly controlling for time-invariant and time varying dimensions of hospital quality in order to disentangle the effect of waiting times on hospital choice. We provide evidence that patients are responsive to changes in waiting times and aspects of clinical quality within hospitals over time, and estimate the trade-off that patients make between different hospital attributes. The results convey important policy implications for highly regulated health care markets

Incentives In Primary Care and Their Impact on Potentially Avoidable Hospital Admissions

Financial incentives in primary care have been often introduced with the purpose of improving appropriateness of care and containing demand. We usually observe pay-for-performance programs, but alternatives have been also implemented, such as pay-for-participation in improvement activities and pay-for-compliance with clinical guidelines. Here, we assess the influence of different programs which ensure extra-payments to GPs, for containing episodes of avoidable hospitalisations. Our dataset covers patients and GPs of the Italian region Emilia-Romagna for year 2005, and we control for a wide range of factors potentially influencing GPs’ behaviour. By separating pay-for-performance from pay-for-participation and pay-for-compliance programs, we estimate the impact on the probability of (inappropriate) hospitalisation of financial incentives included in contracts between GPs and the NHS. As dependent variable, we consider two different sets of conditions, for both of which timely and effective primary care should be able to limit the need of hospital admission. The first is based on 27 medical DRGs that Emilia-Romagna identifies as at risk of inappropriateness in primary care, while the second refers to the internationally recognised ACSCs (ambulatory care-sensitive conditions). We show that pay-for-performance schemes may have a significant effect over aggregate indicators of appropriateness, while the effectiveness of pay-for-participation schemes is adequately captured only by taking into account subpopulations affected by specific diseases. Moreover, the same incentive scheme has fairly different effects on the two sets of indicators used, with performance improvements limited to the target explicitly addressed by the policy maker (i.e. the list of 27 DRGs). This evidence is consistent with the idea that a “tunnel vision” effect may occur when public authorities promote and monitor specific sets of objectives, as proxies for more general improvements in health care practices

Price Changes in Regulated Healthcare Markets: Do Public Hospitals Respond and How?

This paper examines the behaviour of public hospitals in response to the average payment incentives created by price changes for patients classified in different Diagnosis Related Groups (DRGs). Using panel data on public hospitals located within the Italian region of Emilia-Romagna, we test whether a one-year increase in DRG prices induced public hospitals to increase their volume of activity, and whether a potential response is associated with changes in waiting times and/or length of stay. We find that public hospitals reacted to the policy change by increasing the number of patients with surgical treatments. This effect was smaller in the two years after the policy change than in later years, and for providers with a lower excess capacity in the pre-policy period, whereas it did not vary significantly across hospitals according to their degree of financial and administrative autonomy. For patients with medical DRGs, instead, there appeared to be no effect on inpatient volumes. Our estimates also suggest that an increase in DRG prices either decreased or had no impact on the proportion of patients waiting more than six months. Finally, we find no evidence of a significant effect on patients’ average length of stay