Religious Lawyering\u27s Second Wave

Since the mid-1990s, the religious lawyering movement has expanded dramatically, receiving greater attention within the academy and the bar. As the movement enters what we term its second wave of development, this essay begins with a look back to its first wave of path-breaking scholarship and its gradual shift toward more institutionalized structures and programs. It argues that the predominant characteristic of first-wave religious lawyering scholarship was to claim a space within the professional conversation for lawyers to bring religious values to bear on their work. The essay then predicts that in the second wave religious lawyering conversations and scholarship will increasingly move beyond the question of whether lawyers should bring religious values to bear on their work, toward the difficult issues of how this should be done. It concludes with a glance toward the ways in which international horizons might bring new and refreshing challenges to the religious lawyering movement

The Distinctive Questions of Catholics in History

(Excerpt) Let me start by saying how much I enjoyed working through the manuscript that Professors Breen and Strang shared with us, and how much I look forward to the development of this project on the history of Catholic legal education. My comments focus on the architecture of Chapter Three and the conceptual driver for Chapter Five. The frame for my suggestions is the challenge that emerges clearly in the 1960s when, as James Burtchaell noted, students were “drop[ping] their faith like baby teeth.” As Professors Breen and Strang summarize: “University administrators were well aware that even Catholic students were being more thoroughly formed by the surrounding culture than by their faith.

Crime Spectators and the Tort of Objectification

Reports of how some bystanders interact with victims on the scene of an emergency are shocking. Instead of assisting or calling for help, these individuals take pictures or recordings of the victims on their cell phones. This Article concentrates on the question of whether such an interaction with a victim might in certain circumstances constitute a distinct and legally actionable harm. This Article proposes a new tort: exploitative objectification of a person in need of emergency assistance. It works to articulate the moral and legal foundations for an argument that treating a person in need of emergency assistance as an object of amusement should be considered a legally cognizable harm. Cognizant of concerns about over-breadth and moral overload, it clearly distinguishes between those who cross the line of engaging the scene and the victim (“engaged spectators”) and those who do not (“pure bystanders”). It argues for ample space for discretion in the decision whether to engage, respecting subjective assessments of risks and priorities as grounded in the emotional and interior life of the bystander