Chemistry and biology of bile acids

This review makes an attempt to combine the insights gained into the biochemistry and physiology of bile acids with the elegant supramolecular systems designed from them. Bile acids are cholesterol-derived facial amphiphiles responsible for the solubilization of cholesterol and fat through mixed micelle formation with phospholipids. An intriguing aspect of bile acids is that their chemical structure has been postulated to correlate with vertebrate evolution. However, the etiology of molecular evolution of bile acids is still poorly understood. There has been a steady progress in the studies aimed at elucidating physiological functions and developing pharmacological applications of bile acids. In recent years, bile acids and their analogues have been extensively utilized as supramolecular receptors for various types of guest molecules and ions. Under certain defined conditions, the supramolecular association of bile acids and their derivatives leads to gel formation. Thus, modified bile acids might find use in the design of futuristic materials

Personalized Pricing and Quality Differentiation on the Internet

No changes were made in the Abstract. Please use the previous Abstract that was submittedVertical Differentiation, Personalization, Price Discrimination, Electronic Commerce,

Magnetic transition in Ni-Pt alloy Systems : Experiment and Theory

We report here the preparation and measurements on the susceptibility, sound velocity and internal friction for Ni-Pt systems. We then compare these experimental results with the first principle theoretical predictions and show that there is reasonable agreement with experiment and theory.Comment: 9 pages, 5 figures. submitted to Journal of Magnetism and Magnetic Material

The Impact of Internet Referral Services on a Supply Chain

In many industries, Internet referral services, hosted either by independent third-party infomediaries or by manufacturers, serve as digitally enabled lead generators in electronic markets, directing consumer traffic to downstream retailers in a distribution network. This reshapes the extended enterprise from the traditional network of upstream manufacturers and downstream retailers to include midstream third-party and manufacturerowned referral services in the supply chain. We model competition between retailers in a supply chain with such digitally enabled institutions and consider their impact on the optimal contracts among the manufacturer, referral intermediary, and the retailers. Offline, retailers face a higher customer discovery cost. In return, they can engage in price discrimination based on consumer valuations. Online, they save on the discovery costs but lose the ability to identify consumer valuations. This critical trade-off drives firms’ equilibrium strategies. We derive the optimal contracts for different entities in the supply chain and highlight how these contracts change with the entry of independent and manufacturer-owned referral services. The establishment of a referral service is a strategic decision by the manufacturer. It leads to diversion of supply chain profit from a third-party infomediary to the manufacturer. Further, it enables the manufacturer to respond to an infomediary, by giving itself greater flexibility in setting the unit wholesale fee to the profit-maximizing level. Both third-party and manufacturer-sponsored referral services play a critical role in enabling retailers to discriminate across consumers’ different valuations. Retailers use online referral services to screen out low-valuation consumers and sell only to high-valuation consumers in the online channel. Our model thus endogenously derives a correlation between consumer valuation and online purchase behavior. Finally, we show that under some circumstances, it is too costly for the manufacturer to eliminate the referral infomediaryNYU, Stern School of Business, IOMS Department, Center for Digital Economy Researc

Strategic Impact of Internet Referral Services on Channel Profits

Internet Referral Services, hosted either by independent third-party infomediaries or by manufacturers serve as âÃÂÃÂlead-generatorsâÃÂàin electronic marketplaces, directing consumer traffic to particular retailers. In a model of price dispersion with mixed strategy equilibria, we investigate the competitive implications of these institutions on retailer and manufacturer pricing strategies as well as their impact on channel structures and distribution of profits. Offline, retailers face a higher customer acquisition cost. In return, they can engage in price discrimination. Online, they save on the acquisition costs, but lose the ability to price discriminate. This critical tradeoff drives firmsâÃÂàequilibrium strategies. The establishment of a referral service is a strategic decision by the manufacturer, in response to a third-party infomediary. It leads to an increase in channel profits and a reallocation of the increased surplus to the manufacturer, via the franchise fees. Further, it enables the manufacturer to respond to an infomediary, by giving itself a wider leeway to set the unit wholesale fee to the profit maximizing level. We discuss implications of referral services on channel coordination issues, and whether a two part tariff can be successfully used to maximize channel profits. Contrary to prior literature, we find that when retailers can price discriminate among consumers, the manufacturer may not set the wholesale price to marginal cost to coordinate the channel. Consistent with anecdotal evidence, our model predicts that while it is optimal for an infomediary to enroll only one retailer, it is optimal for a manufacturer to enroll both retailers. Finally, our results show that under some circumstances, the manufacturer even benefits from the presence of the competing referral infomediary and hence, will not want to eliminate it.Information Systems Working Papers Serie

Personalized Pricing and Quality Differentiation

We develop an analytical framework to investigate the competitive implications of personalized pricing (PP), whereby firms charge different prices to different consumers, based on their willingness to pay. We embed personalized pricing in a model of vertical product differentiation, and show how it affects firmsâÃÂàchoices over quality. We show that firmsâÃÂàoptimal pricing strategies with PP may be non-monotonic in consumer valuations. When the PP firm has a high quality both firms raise their qualities, relative to the uniform pricing case. Conversely, when the PP firm has low quality, both firms lower their qualities. Although many firms are trying to implement such pricing policies, we find that a higher quality firm can actually be worse off with PP. While it is optimal for the firm adopting PP to increase product differentiation, the non-PP firm seeks to reduce differentiation by moving in closer in the quality space. While PP results in a wider market coverage, it also leads to aggravated price competition between firms. Since this entails a change in equilibrium qualities, the nature of the cost function determines whether firms gain or lose by implementing such PP policies. Despite the threat of first-degree price discrimination, we find that personalized pricing with competing firms can lead to an overall increase in consumer welfare.Information Systems Working Papers Serie

Personalized Pricing and Quality Differentiation

We develop an analytical framework to investigate the competitive implications of personalized pricing (PP), whereby firms charge different prices to different consumers based on their willingness to pay. We embed PP in a model of vertical product differentiation and show how it affects firms’ choices over quality. We show that firms’ optimal pricing strategies with PP may be nonmonotonic in consumer valuations. When the PP firm has high quality, both firms raise their qualities relative to the uniform pricing case. Conversely, when the PP firm has low quality, both firms lower their qualities. Although many firms are trying to implement such pricing policies, we find that a higher-quality firm can actually be worse off with PP. While it is optimal for the firm adopting PP to increase product differentiation, the non-PP firm seeks to reduce differentiation by moving in closer in the quality space. While PP results in a wider market coverage, it also leads to aggravated price competition between firms. Because this entails a change in equilibrium qualities, the nature of the cost function determines whether firms gain or lose by implementing such PP policies. Despite the threat of first-degree price discrimination, we find that PP with competing firms can lead to an overall increase in consumer welfare.NYU, Stern School of Business, IOMS Department, Center for Digital Economy Researc

Dynamic Pricing: A Strategic Advantage for Electronic Retailers

We develop an analytical framework to investigate the competitive implications of dynamic pricing technologies (DPT), which enable precise inferring of consumersí valuations for firmsí products and personalized pricing. These technologies enable first-degree price discrimination: firms charge different prices to different consumers, based on their willingness to pay. We first show that, even though the monopolist makes a higher profit with DPT, its optimal quality is the same with or without DPT. Next we show that in a duopoly setting, dynamic pricing adds value only if it is associated with product differentiation. We then consider a model of vertical product differentiation, and show how dynamic pricing on the Internet affects firmsí choices of quality differentiation in a competitive scenario. We find that when the high quality firm adopts DPT both firms raise their quality. Conversely, when the low quality firm adopts DPT, both firms lower their quality. While it is optimal for the firm adopting DPT to increase product differentiation, the non-DPT firm seeks to reduce differentiation by moving closer in the quality space. Our model also points out firmsí optimal pricing strategies with DPT, which may be non-monotonic in consumer valuations. Finally, we show that consumer surplus is highest when both firms adopt DPT. Thus, despite the threat of first-degree price discrimination, dynamic pricing with competing firms can lead to an overall increase in consumer welfare

Personalized Pricing and Quality Differentiation

We develop an analytical framework to investigate the competitive implications of personalized pricing (PP), whereby firms charge different prices to different consumers based on their willingness to pay. We embed PP in a model of vertical product differentiation and show how it affects firms’ choices over quality. We show that firms’ optimal pricing strategies with PP may be nonmonotonic in consumer valuations. When the PP firm has high quality, both firms raise their qualities relative to the uniform pricing case. Conversely, when the PP firm has low quality, both firms lower their qualities. Although many firms are trying to implement such pricing policies, we find that a higher-quality firm can actually be worse off with PP. While it is optimal for the firm adopting PP to increase product differentiation, the non-PP firm seeks to reduce differentiation by moving in closer in the quality space. While PP results in a wider market coverage, it also leads to aggravated price competition between firms. Because this entails a change in equilibrium qualities, the nature of the cost function determines whether firms gain or lose by implementing such PP policies. Despite the threat of first-degree price discrimination, we find that PP with competing firms can lead to an overall increase in consumer welfare.NYU, Stern School of Business, IOMS Department, Center for Digital Economy Researc

Personalized Pricing and Quality Differentiation

We develop an analytical framework to investigate the competitive implications of personalized pricing (PP), whereby firms charge different prices to different consumers, based on their willingness to pay. We embed personalized pricing in a model of vertical product differentiation, and show how it affects firmsâÃÂàchoices over quality. We show that firmsâÃÂàoptimal pricing strategies with PP may be non-monotonic in consumer valuations. When the PP firm has a high quality both firms raise their qualities, relative to the uniform pricing case. Conversely, when the PP firm has low quality, both firms lower their qualities. Although many firms are trying to implement such pricing policies, we find that a higher quality firm can actually be worse off with PP. While it is optimal for the firm adopting PP to increase product differentiation, the non-PP firm seeks to reduce differentiation by moving in closer in the quality space. While PP results in a wider market coverage, it also leads to aggravated price competition between firms. Since this entails a change in equilibrium qualities, the nature of the cost function determines whether firms gain or lose by implementing such PP policies. Despite the threat of first-degree price discrimination, we find that personalized pricing with competing firms can lead to an overall increase in consumer welfare.Information Systems Working Papers Serie