USAF Aircraft Maintenance Officer Knowledge, Skills and Abilities and Commonalities among the Logistics Officer Corps

This study investigated options to improve 21A training and education by first validating the Air Force\u27s logistics mission sets as Deployment, Distribution, Supply Management, Repair Network Integration, Mission Generation, Lifecycle Logistics and Joint Logistics. Then, the Knowledge, Skills, and Abilities (KSAs) considered important to execute each mission set were gathered from a representative sample of Air Force Logistics Officers via field interviews and focus groups. An analysis of results categorizes probable needs (high, medium, low) of KSAs for each mission set and assesses how well they are currently taught, if at all. Additionally, lists of KSAs that overlap multiple mission sets were created along with process options for integrating them into training and education. Based on a discussion of the synergistic effects on acquiring these KSAs, it is also recommended that the Logistics Readiness Squadron be realigned under a common group at the operational wing with the rest of the Logistics Units (presently the Maintenance Group). Finally, a career tracking model is proposed to deliberately build experts in strategic 21A career paths, which this study identifies as Career Maintenance Officers, Air Force Materiel Managers and Joint Logistics Officers

Application of Absorbing Markov Chains to the Assessment of Education Attainment Rates within Air Force Materiel Command Civilian Personnel

Increasing the education levels of an organization is a common response when attempting to improve organizational performance; however, organizational performance improvements are seldom found when the current and future workforce education levels are unknown. In this research, absorbing Markov chains are used to probabilistically forecast the educational composition of the Air Force Materiel Command civilian workforce to enable organizational performance improvements. Through the purposeful decoupling of effects resulting from recent workforce arrivals and education level progressions, this research attempts to determine the implications that stationarity assumptions have throughout the model development process of an absorbing Markov chain. The results of the analysis indicate that the four combinations of stationarity assumptions perform similarly at representing the historical data and that the forecasted educational attainment rates of the Air Force Materiel Command civilian workforce are expected to increase significantly

An Exploratory Case Study of Information-Sharing and Collaboration within Air Force Supply Chain Management

This research sought to identify key elements of the Air Force supply chain as it relates to industry, determine how techniques of information-sharing and collaboration are used to make Air Force Supply Chain decisions, and examine how the resulting impacts on operational readiness may be measured. A multiple case study research design was used to investigate the application of information-sharing and collaboration in two distinct Air Force supply chains. Cross-case comparative analysis of the supply chains supporting the PTO shafts on the F-15 engine and the T-38 engine evaluated each supply chain\u27s characteristics and levels of information-sharing and collaboration. The research highlighted one example of proactive sharing of information and collaborative decision-making to avoid supply chain inefficiencies, and one example of using information-sharing to recover from a decision made without using a collaborative approach. Specifically, the research identified that proactive sharing of information and collaborative decision-making for the T-38 avoided supply chain failures, while the F-15 supply chain was reactive, failing to collaborate or share information, resulting in a failure of the supply chain and an increase in the MICAP rate. The F-15 community used information-sharing to recover from this failure. The culmination of this effort provided insight into the interactions and complexities of the Air Force supply chain and highlighted a need for a more thorough evaluation of the impact of supply chain relationships, information-sharing, and collaborative decision-making on operational readiness

CSR 381-1, Military Intelligence, Technical Intelligence Relationships, 12 November 1958.

This document was issued by the Chief of Staff to prescribe relationships between different officers in the Army staff. Specifically, it was inteded to “prescribe relationships between the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence (ACSI), the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics (DCSLOG), and the technical Services in the field of intelligence activities.” It was published as part of an attempt to solve an ongoing organizational problem: how to coordinate the intelligence activities of the US government. In the 1950s, military intelligence was decentralized. There was no national-level military intelligence agency. In theory, the Chief of Staff and the army general staff directed the activities of the army. However, much of the work of the army was done by the special staff, a set of special-purpose bureaus. Within the special staff, the army technical services – the Army Medical Service, the Corps of Engineers, the Chemical Corps, the Ordnance Corps, the Quartermaster Corps, and the Transportation Corps – supplied the army with weapons and equipment, services, training, and personnel services. They had a long tradition of independence and did not yield to intrusion from the general staff readily. Each of the technical services performed intelligence functions. All were responsible for technical intelligence, that is, intelligence concerning weapons and equipment used by foreign forces. For example, the Ordnance Intelligence Agency was concerned with the small arms, artillery, armored fighting vehicles, and ammunition used by foreign forces. In addition, some had area intelligence functions concerned with the geography, industrial base, infrastructure, agriculture, etc. of foreign countries where US forces might be expected to operate. The Signal Corps Intelligence Agency had been tasked with producing intelligence on the civilian power and communications infrastructure of the Soviet Bloc. The Medical Information and Intelligence Agency produced intelligence about the medical infrastructure, sanitary conditions, epidemiology, etc. in foreign countries. The Corps of Engineers supervised organizations concerned with mapping and geographic intelligence, foreign ports and harbors, and potential landing beaches. Since, in theory, ACSI supervised intelligence activities and DCSLOG supervised activities related to supplies and equipment, this directive attempted to spell out the responsibilities of each official and of the chiefs of the technical services. Organizational conflicts within the army in the 1950s are discussed at length in From Root to McNamara by James E. Hewes, Jr., which is available online at: http://www.history.army.mil/html/books/040/40-1/index.html Eventually, the army was radically reorganized in 1962 with the functions of the army technical services redistributed to centralized organizations like the newly created Army Materiel Command. The intelligence functions of the technical services were divided. Technical intelligence responsibilities were transferred to the newly created Army Foreign Science and Technology Center and area analysis functions were transferred to the newly organized Defense Intelligence Agency, Production Center

CSR 381-1, Military Intelligence, Technical Intelligence Relationships, 12 November 1958.

This document was issued by the Chief of Staff to prescribe relationships between different officers in the Army staff. Specifically, it was inteded to “prescribe relationships between the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence (ACSI), the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics (DCSLOG), and the technical Services in the field of intelligence activities.” It was published as part of an attempt to solve an ongoing organizational problem: how to coordinate the intelligence activities of the US government. In the 1950s, military intelligence was decentralized. There was no national-level military intelligence agency. In theory, the Chief of Staff and the army general staff directed the activities of the army. However, much of the work of the army was done by the special staff, a set of special-purpose bureaus. Within the special staff, the army technical services – the Army Medical Service, the Corps of Engineers, the Chemical Corps, the Ordnance Corps, the Quartermaster Corps, and the Transportation Corps – supplied the army with weapons and equipment, services, training, and personnel services. They had a long tradition of independence and did not yield to intrusion from the general staff readily. Each of the technical services performed intelligence functions. All were responsible for technical intelligence, that is, intelligence concerning weapons and equipment used by foreign forces. For example, the Ordnance Intelligence Agency was concerned with the small arms, artillery, armored fighting vehicles, and ammunition used by foreign forces. In addition, some had area intelligence functions concerned with the geography, industrial base, infrastructure, agriculture, etc. of foreign countries where US forces might be expected to operate. The Signal Corps Intelligence Agency had been tasked with producing intelligence on the civilian power and communications infrastructure of the Soviet Bloc. The Medical Information and Intelligence Agency produced intelligence about the medical infrastructure, sanitary conditions, epidemiology, etc. in foreign countries. The Corps of Engineers supervised organizations concerned with mapping and geographic intelligence, foreign ports and harbors, and potential landing beaches. Since, in theory, ACSI supervised intelligence activities and DCSLOG supervised activities related to supplies and equipment, this directive attempted to spell out the responsibilities of each official and of the chiefs of the technical services. Organizational conflicts within the army in the 1950s are discussed at length in From Root to McNamara by James E. Hewes, Jr., which is available online at: http://www.history.army.mil/html/books/040/40-1/index.html Eventually, the army was radically reorganized in 1962 with the functions of the army technical services redistributed to centralized organizations like the newly created Army Materiel Command. The intelligence functions of the technical services were divided. Technical intelligence responsibilities were transferred to the newly created Army Foreign Science and Technology Center and area analysis functions were transferred to the newly organized Defense Intelligence Agency, Production Center

CSR 381-1, Military Intelligence, Technical Intelligence Relationships, 12 May 1960.

This document was issued by the Chief of Staff to prescribe relationships between different officers in the Army staff. Particularly, it was intended to “prescribe relationships between the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence (ACSI), the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics (DCSLOG), and the technical Services in the field of intelligence activities.” This is essentially the same as the 1958 version. It was published as part of an attempt to solve an ongoing organizational problem: how to coordinate the intelligence activities of the US government. In the 1950s, military intelligence was decentralized. There was no national-level military intelligence agency. In theory, the Chief of Staff and the army general staff directed the activities of the army. However, much of the work of the army was done by the special staff, a set of special-purpose bureaus. Within the special staff, the army technical services – the Army Medical Service, the Corps of Engineers, the Chemical Corps, the Ordnance Corps, the Quartermaster Corps, and the Transportation Corps – supplied the army with weapons and equipment, services, training, and personnel services. They had a long tradition of independence and did not yield to intrusion from the general staff readily. Each of the technical services performed intelligence functions. All were responsible for technical intelligence, that is, intelligence concerning weapons and equipment used by foreign forces. For example, the Ordnance Intelligence Agency was concerned with the small arms, artillery, armored fighting vehicles, and ammunition used by foreign forces. In addition, some had area intelligence functions concerned with the geography, industrial base, infrastructure, agriculture, etc. of foreign countries where US forces might be expected to operate. The Signal Corps Intelligence Agency had been tasked with producing intelligence on the civilian power and communications grids of the Soviet Bloc. The Medical Information and Intelligence Agency produced intelligence about the medical infrastructure, sanitary conditions, epidemiology, etc. in foreign countries. The Corps of Engineers supervised subordinate organizations concerned with mapping and geographic intelligence, foreign ports and harbors, and potential landing beaches. Since, in theory, ACSI supervised intelligence activities and DCSLOG supervised activities related to supplies and equipment, this directive attempted to spell out the responsibilities of each official and of the chiefs of the technical services. Organizational conflicts within the army in the 1950s are discussed at length in From Root to McNamara by James E. Hewes, Jr., which is available online at: http://www.history.army.mil/html/books/040/40-1/index.html Eventually, the army was radically reorganized in 1962 with the functions of the army technical services redistributed to centralized organizations like the newly created Army Materiel Command. The intelligence functions of the technical services were divided. Technical intelligence responsibilities were transferred to the newly created Army Foreign Science and Technology Center and area analysis functions were transferred to the newly organized Defense Intelligence Agency, Production Center

CSR 381-1, Military Intelligence, Technical Intelligence Relationships, 12 May 1960.

This document was issued by the Chief of Staff to prescribe relationships between different officers in the Army staff. Particularly, it was intended to “prescribe relationships between the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence (ACSI), the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics (DCSLOG), and the technical Services in the field of intelligence activities.” This is essentially the same as the 1958 version. It was published as part of an attempt to solve an ongoing organizational problem: how to coordinate the intelligence activities of the US government. In the 1950s, military intelligence was decentralized. There was no national-level military intelligence agency. In theory, the Chief of Staff and the army general staff directed the activities of the army. However, much of the work of the army was done by the special staff, a set of special-purpose bureaus. Within the special staff, the army technical services – the Army Medical Service, the Corps of Engineers, the Chemical Corps, the Ordnance Corps, the Quartermaster Corps, and the Transportation Corps – supplied the army with weapons and equipment, services, training, and personnel services. They had a long tradition of independence and did not yield to intrusion from the general staff readily. Each of the technical services performed intelligence functions. All were responsible for technical intelligence, that is, intelligence concerning weapons and equipment used by foreign forces. For example, the Ordnance Intelligence Agency was concerned with the small arms, artillery, armored fighting vehicles, and ammunition used by foreign forces. In addition, some had area intelligence functions concerned with the geography, industrial base, infrastructure, agriculture, etc. of foreign countries where US forces might be expected to operate. The Signal Corps Intelligence Agency had been tasked with producing intelligence on the civilian power and communications grids of the Soviet Bloc. The Medical Information and Intelligence Agency produced intelligence about the medical infrastructure, sanitary conditions, epidemiology, etc. in foreign countries. The Corps of Engineers supervised subordinate organizations concerned with mapping and geographic intelligence, foreign ports and harbors, and potential landing beaches. Since, in theory, ACSI supervised intelligence activities and DCSLOG supervised activities related to supplies and equipment, this directive attempted to spell out the responsibilities of each official and of the chiefs of the technical services. Organizational conflicts within the army in the 1950s are discussed at length in From Root to McNamara by James E. Hewes, Jr., which is available online at: http://www.history.army.mil/html/books/040/40-1/index.html Eventually, the army was radically reorganized in 1962 with the functions of the army technical services redistributed to centralized organizations like the newly created Army Materiel Command. The intelligence functions of the technical services were divided. Technical intelligence responsibilities were transferred to the newly created Army Foreign Science and Technology Center and area analysis functions were transferred to the newly organized Defense Intelligence Agency, Production Center

Process Mapping a Diminishing Manufacturing Sources and Materiel Shortages Reactive Management Strategy: A Case Study

In order to handle its obligations, the Brazilian Ministry of Defense (MoD) will need an information system capable of managing logistics information from all military services. A project to develop an integrated information system to fit the requirements of different, but connected, organizations has inherent challenges. Differences in the organizational structures, cultures and political aspects, are key issues to be observed before the development to assure the project\u27s success. The same is applicable when trying to adapt an already existing information system to fill the needs of another organization. In the new organization, it is mandatory to assess the feasibility of the software\u27s alternatives available. Alternatives can be to adapt an existing information system or to develop a completely new system. This research sought to develop a method for assessing the organizational, cultural, and political considerations affecting the insertion of the Integrated Logistics Information System (SILOMS), developed by the Brazilian Air Force, into the MoD. The research develops a method for assisting decision makers in assessing the risks involved in the implementation of an information system in the MoD

An Analysis of Class II Supplies Requisitions in the Korean Army\u27s Organizational Supply

Timely supply support is critical to sustaining military readiness and operations. In order to improve user satisfaction and to ensure supply support in a timely manner, the supply management paradigm is changing from supplier (supporting unit) focused management to customer (combat unit) focused management. This research focuses on improvements to the requisition process in Organizational Supply to reduce Customer Wait Time (CWT) in the Korean Army Supply Chain (KASC). The causes leading to requisition problems in seven key areas of Organizational Supply were examined, and seventeen solutions for the problems were suggested. Solutions that can be executed immediately without cost and expert’s aid are emphasized. Solutions related to information technology, such as developing a Web based system, were strongly recommended. To reduce requisition processing time in the KASC, the Requisition Management Program was developed and suggested. It can be applied to current requisition tasks, and it would be a useful tool to reduce time and effort to manage requisitions in Organizational Supply

Analysis and evaluation of forecasting methods and tools to predict future demand for secondary chemical-biological configuration items

As the Engineering Support Activity (ESA) for numerous consumable Chemical Biological items managed by the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA), Edgewood Chemical Biological Center (ECBC) must be able to complete reviews of all procurement packages within 15 calendar days. With such little lead time, it would be very beneficial if ECBC had the ability to forecast when DLA procurement actions will occur. This thesis presents an evaluation of the effectiveness of Simple Regression and Exponentially Weighted Moving Average (EWMA) forecasting models to predict the demand of Chemical Biological consumable items using the procurement history data for four specific items. Neither forecasting model proved effective at predicting the demand for the items due in large part to large variation in demand patterns. The inventory policies and supply issues which currently exist at an Army production site were investigated and it was recommended to consider Economic Order Quantity (EOQ) or Just-in-Time (JIT) inventory management models as possible alternatives to achieve smoother demand patterns. Additionally, recommendations were made to examine the integrity of the historical demand data as well as using a Multiple Regression forecast model with several causal effects in addition to time.http://archive.org/details/analysisndevalua1094534729Civilian, United States ArmyApproved for public release; distribution is unlimited