How to resolve the class II common property problem? The case of British Columbia’s multi-species groundfish trawl fishery

It is 20 years since Munro and Scott identified the causes and possible remedies for the dissipation of rents in fisheries. We analyse one of the solutions proposed by Munro and Scott by using insights from the British Columbia multi-species groundfish trawl fishery that has used ITQs since 1997. The history of this fishery shows that even the most difficult management problems including by-catch, equity concerns, concentration of quota holdings and vessel overages can be mitigated with the appropriate mix of incentives, monitoring and enforcement

The Effects of Individual Vessel Quotas in the British Columbia Halibut Fishery

Implementation of Individual vessel quotas (IVQs) in the British Columbia halibut fishery has provided a unique opportunity to examine the effects of this management technique on a previously intense "derby" fishery. This paper describes the changes that have occurred in the fishery since the introduction of individual vessel quotas in 1991. The results presented here are largely based on the findings of two surveys. In September 1993, we conducted in-depth interviews with most of the major halibut processors in British Columbia. These processors reported significant changes in the processors and marketing of halibut. In Spring 1994, we conducted a mail survey of all 435 licensed halibut fishermen. The survey consisted of several series of questions designed to measure changes in fishing operations (crew size, fishing practices, etc.). quota leasing activities, changes in fishing income, and opinions about the effects of IVQs. The results presented here provide important information about the effects of the British Columbia halibut IVQ program to date and will be useful for comparison to similar management programs implemented elsewhere.fishery management, ITQs, Pacific Halibut, Environmental Economics and Policy, International Relations/Trade, Resource /Energy Economics and Policy,

Catch Shares, the Theory of Cooperative Games and the Spirit of Elinor Ostrom: A Research Agenda

This paper puts forth the proposition that all catch share schemes should be analysed primarily through the lens of cooperative game theory, which has now been developed to an advanced degree in the analysis of international fisheries management. If the fishers in a catch share scheme are playing cooperatively, the resource managers are at the same time to be seen as playing a leader-follower game with the fishers. While the proposition obviously applies to all catch share schemes, the focus of the paper will be on ITQ schemes. The basic rudiments of the required theory are to be found in a 2006 article by Lone Krønbak and Marko Lindroos, and carry with it the spirit of Elinor Ostrom. We will argue that much more needs to be done. We shall maintain that, if a given ITQ scheme constitutes a stable cooperative game, the various residual inefficiencies of ITQ schemes discussed in many articles should vanish. Needless to say, if a given ITQ scheme constitutes a stable cooperative game the distinction between it and other catch right schemes will blur. We shall also argue that, if ITQ schemes succeed as stable cooperative games, this will enable the fishers to bargain constructively with other stakeholders. Examples will be drawn, inter alia, from the evolving harvesting rights schemes off Canada’s Pacific coast

Application of Game Theory to Intra-EEZ Fisheries Management

The purpose of this paper is not to present new game theoretic results, but is rather to discuss a new and much needed research program, which is at an early stage.  Progress to date will be reported upon. It is the contention of the authors that, in stark contrast to the management of international fisheries, the application of game theory to intra-EEZ (intra-EU) fisheries management has been extremely limited. The need for game theoretic analysis arises from the fact that there is increasing evidence of attempts to foster cooperation among fishers in intra-EEZ fisheries, which involves self-management (in the spirit of Elinor Ostrom), co-management and blends of the two. A case study from Canada will be brought to bear to motivate the discussion. The case study involves an ITQed fishery, spread over a broad area and involving a large number of ITQ holders. Received wisdom would see prospects for achieving effective intra- industry cooperation in this case as being remote. Nonetheless, the industry initiated a cooperative undertaking with a coalition of environmental NGOs, with the resource manager (the government of Canada) playing a supportive but passive role, resulting in the world's first habitat bycatch limitation scheme. Representatives of the industry and of the NGOs were recently the joint recipients of a major aquatic conservation award. The relevance of the Canadian case to the rest of the world cannot be assessed, until it has been studied and analysed through the lens of game theory.Proceedings of the Eighteenth Biennial Conference of the International Institute of Fisheries Economics and Trade, held July 11-15, 2016 at Aberdeen Exhibition and Conference Center (AECC), Aberdeen, Scotland, UK

Incentive-based approaches to sustainable fisheries

The failures of traditional target-species management have led many to propose an ecosystem approach to fisheries to promote sustainability. The ecosystem approach is necessary, especially to account for fishery-ecosystem interactions, but by itself is not sufficient to address two important factors contributing to unsustainable fisheries — inappropriate incentives bearing on fishers, and the ineffective governance that frequently exists in commercial, developed fisheries managed primarily by total harvest limits and input-controls. We contend that much greater emphasis must be placed on fisher motivation when managing fisheries. Using evidence from more than a dozen ‘natural experiments’ in commercial fisheries, we argue that incentive-based approaches that better specify community, individual harvest, or territorial rights and also price ecosystem services — coupled with public research, monitoring and effective oversight — promote sustainable fisheries.incentives, sustainability, rights, fisheries management

Incentive-based approaches to sustainable fisheries (now replaced by EEN0508)

Using examples from more than a dozen fisheries, we highlight the failures of ‘command control’ management and show that approaches that empower fishers with the incentives and the mandate to be co-custodians of the marine environment can promote sustainability. Evidence is provided that where harvesters share well-defined management responsibilities over fish, and experience both the pain of overexploitation and the gains from conservation, they are much more likely to protect fish stocks and habitat. The key insight is that to maintain marine ecosystems for present and future generations, fishing incentives must be compatible with long-term goals of sustainability.incentives, sustainability, rights, fisheries management

A rejoinder to E. Pinkerton et al., the elephant in the room: The hidden costs of leasing individual transferable fishing quotas

The purpose of this rejoinder is to respond to and question the many assertions made by Pinkerton et al. in the recently published Marine Policy article entitled: "The elephant in the room: The hidden costs of leasing individual transferable fishing quotas". Particular attention is paid to the assertion that 79% of the British Columbia Pacific halibut TAC is being leased out by "armchair fishermen". The rejoinder also discusses how ITQs, when used with other fishery management tools, such as catch monitoring, creates incentives that align more closely the fishermen harvesting behaviour and practices with the objectives of the resource manager.Individual transferable quotas Fisheries management Fisheries policy Fisheries catch monitoring

The avoidance of unwanted catch and cooperation: the case of the British Columbia groundfish trawl fishery

This paper focuses on a particularly successful avoidance of unwanted catch of protected, endangered, and threatened (PET) species in the form of ecologically important sponge and coral, to be found off Canada's Pacific coast. The fishery causing the unwanted catch-the British Columbia groundfish trawl fishery. A campaign to protect the sponge/coral led by environmental NGOs (ENGOs) resulted in the industry's access to the key California market being threatened. For reasons explained, the national resource manager's ability to take effective direct action had become severely compromised. The groundfish trawl fishing industry responded to the economic threat with a bottom up approach to the unwanted catch problem, by negotiating a habitat agreement with a consortium of ENGOs, with the blessing and full support of the national resource manager. The agreement, now in its tenth year of operation, has proved to be a remarkable success in avoidance of unwanted catch. The paper argues that the success rests fundamentally upon the fact that the fishers have been and are playing a stand alone stable cooperative game, which has led them in turn to play stable cooperative games with both the national resource manager and the ENGO consortium. The paper analyses the factors leading to the stand alone stable cooperative fisher game, doing so by necessity through the lens of game theory.Peer reviewe

Incentive-based approaches to sustainable fisheries

The failures of traditional target-species management have led many to propose an ecosystem approach to fisheries to promote sustainability. The ecosystem approach is necessary, especially to account for fishery ecosystem interactions, but by itself is not sufficient to address two important factors contributing to unsustainable fisheries: inappropriate incentives bearing on fishers and the ineffective governance that frequently exists in commercial, developed fisheries managed primarily by total-harvest limits and input controls. We contend that much greater emphasis must be placed on fisher motivation when managing fisheries. Using evidence from more than a dozen natural experiments in commercial fisheries, we argue that incentive-based approaches that better specify community and individual harvest or territorial rights and price ecosystem services and that are coupled with public research, monitoring, and effective oversight promote sustainable fisheries.This article is from Canadian Journal of Fisheries and Aquatic Sciences, 2006, 63(3): 699-710, doi:10.1139/f05-247.</p