Application of Game Theory to Intra-EEZ Fisheries Management
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Abstract
The purpose of this paper is not to present new game theoretic results, but is rather to discuss a new and much needed research program, which is at an early stage. Progress to date will be reported upon. It is the contention of the authors that, in stark contrast to the management of international fisheries, the application of game theory to intra-EEZ (intra-EU) fisheries management has been extremely limited. The need for game theoretic analysis arises from the fact that there is increasing evidence of attempts to foster cooperation among fishers in intra-EEZ fisheries, which involves self-management (in the spirit of Elinor Ostrom), co-management and blends of the two. A case study from Canada will be brought to bear to motivate the discussion. The case study involves an ITQed fishery, spread over a broad area and involving a large number of ITQ holders. Received wisdom would see prospects for achieving effective intra- industry cooperation in this case as being remote. Nonetheless, the industry initiated a cooperative undertaking with a coalition of environmental NGOs, with the resource manager (the government of Canada) playing a supportive but passive role, resulting in the world's first habitat bycatch limitation scheme. Representatives of the industry and of the NGOs were recently the joint recipients of a major aquatic conservation award. The relevance of the Canadian case to the rest of the world cannot be assessed, until it has been studied and analysed through the lens of game theory.Proceedings of the Eighteenth Biennial Conference of the International Institute of Fisheries Economics and Trade, held July 11-15, 2016 at Aberdeen Exhibition and Conference Center (AECC), Aberdeen, Scotland, UK