Foreign debt and colonisation in Egypt and Tunisia, 1862-1882

This paper explores two interlinked questions: why Tunisia and Egypt were faced with the international financial control after their default in 1868 and 1876, and why the international financial control eventually led to the colonization of these two polities by France and Britain in 1881 and 1882. The chapter maintains that the emergence of international financial control was a multilateral solution to a range of private financial claims against the Egyptian and Tunisian governments following defaults. Yet, international financial control organizations were unable to successfully address the conflicting interests among foreign bondholders, as the existence of foreign bondholders from different European powers acted as a check over the concentration of the power in the hands of a single European country. Only after colonization, when the legal pluralism and multilateral nature of the financial control organizations came to an end, the creditworthiness of Egypt and Tunisia started recovering in international financial markets. At odds with other cases of international financial control in the region, this chapter shows that the success of multilateral international financial control organizations in the first age of financial globalization was not unconditional. Although other cases of international financial control before 1914 offered a solution to competing imperial and bondholder interests, in the case of Egypt and Tunisia, international financial control organizations became obstacles to the ongoing colonization process by Britain and France

Eurobonds past and present: a comparative review on debt mutualization in Europe

This paper reviews the economic and historical literature on debt mutualization in Europe with reference to pre-1914 guaranteed bonds and current Eurobonds debate. We emphasize that, notwithstanding the differences in scale and nature, debt mutualization solutions similar to Eurobonds were tried before, and the closest historical examples to the present debate are the pre-1914 guaranteed bonds. We highlight three key characteristics of debt mutualization, which are apparent both in the current debate and in history: moral hazard, debt dilution and conditionality. We show that the fears about short-run dilution and moral hazard were not unknown to pre-1914 market participants. These problems were partly addressed by mechanisms of conditionality such as international financial control. The historical evidence suggests that the dilution of outstanding obligations may be overplayed in the current debate. On the contrary, creditors’ moral hazard (ignored in current debt mutualization proposals) was as problematic as the usual debtor’s moral hazard –especially when the groups of countries guaranteeing the bonds and the creditor nations did not overlap entirely

Economic policy during the long 19th century

This chapter provides an overview of the political decision-making process and the modernisation of the state apparatus during the 19th century. It discusses the legal capacity of the states which acted either as a constraint on policymakers or enabled them to pursue and enforce a certain set of economic decisions. At the beginning of the 19th century, the region was divided up among the Austrian Empire, the Ottoman Empire, and the Russian Empire. The late 19th century and the remaining time up to the war saw a rise in protectionism, a growing share of state ownership in infrastructure, and a growing government share in gross domestic product (GDP). In Russia, where serfs belonged either to the state or to private persons and accounted for more than half the population at the beginning of the 19th century, the emancipation of state serfs started in the 1840s, and that of serfs in the private sector followed in 1861

Effect of final irrigation protocols on microhardness reduction and erosion of root canal dentin

Abstract This study aimed to evaluate the effect of final irrigation protocols on microhardness reduction and erosion of root canal dentin. Sixty root canals from mandibular incisors were instrumented and randomly divided into six groups (n = 10) according to the irrigant used: QMiX, 17% EDTA, 10% citric acid (CA), 1% peracetic acid (PA), 2.5% NaOCl (solution control), and distilled water (negative control). The chelating solutions were used to irrigate the canal followed by 2.5% NaOCl as a final flush. After the irrigation protocols, all specimens were rinsed with 10 mL of distilled water to remove any residue of the chemical solutions. Before and after the final irrigation protocols, dentin microhardness was measured with a Knoop indenter. Three indentations were made at 100 µm and 500 µm from the root canal lumen. Afterwards, the specimens were prepared for scanning electron microscopic analysis and the amount of dentin erosion was examined. Wilcoxon and Kruskal-Wallis tests were used to analyze the results with a significance level set at 5%. At 100 µm, all protocols significantly reduced dentin microhardness (p < .05), while at 500 µm, this effect was detected only in the EDTA and QMiX groups (p < .05). CA was the irrigant that caused more extensive erosion in dentinal tubules, followed by PA and EDTA. QMiX opened dentinal tubules, but did not cause dentin erosion. Results suggest that QMiX and 17% EDTA reduced dentin microhardness at a greater depth. Additionally, QMiX did not cause dentin erosion

Feeling the blues. Moral hazard and debt dilution in Eurobonds before 1914

Debt mutualisation through Eurobonds has been proposed as a solution to the Euro crisis. Although this proposal found some support, it also attracted strong criticisms as it risks raising the spreads for strong countries, diluting legacy debt and promoting moral hazard by weak countries. Because Eurobonds are a new addition to the policy toolkit, there are many untested hypotheses in the literature about the counterfactual behaviour of markets and sovereigns. This paper offers some tests of the issues by drawing from the closest historical parallel–five guaranteed bonds issued in Europe between 1833 and 1913. The empirical evidence suggests that contemporary concerns about fiscal transfers and debt dilution may be overblown, whilst creditors’ moral hazard may be as much of a problem as debtors’

Eurobonds past and present: a comparative review on debt mutualization in Europe

This paper reviews the economic and historical literature on debt mutualization in Europe with reference to pre-1914 guaranteed bonds and current Eurobonds debate. We emphasize that, notwithstanding the differences in scale and nature, debt mutualization solutions similar to Eurobonds were tried before, and the closest historical examples to the present debate are the pre-1914 guaranteed bonds. We highlight three key characteristics of debt mutualization, which are apparent both in the current debate and in history: moral hazard, debt dilution and conditionality. We show thatthe fears about short-run dilution and moral hazard were not unknown to pre-1914 market participants. These problems were partly addressed by mechanisms of conditionality such as international financial control. The historical evidence suggests that the dilution of outstanding obligations may be overplayed in the current debate. On the contrary, creditors’ moral hazard (ignored in current debt mutualization proposals) was as problematic as the usual debtor’s moral hazard –especially when the groups of countries guaranteeing the bonds and the creditor nations did not overlap entirely