22 research outputs found

    Splendide Mendax: False Label Claims about High and Rising Alcohol Content of Wine

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    Many economists and others are interested in the phenomenon of rising alcohol content of wine and its potential causes. Has the alcohol content of wine risen—and if so, by how much, where, and when? What roles have been played by climate change and other environmental factors compared with evolving consumer preferences and expert ratings? In this paper we explore these questions using international evidence, combining time-series data on the alcohol content of wine from a large number of countries that experienced different patterns of climate change and influences of policy and demand shifts. We also examine the relationship between the actual alcohol content of wine and the alcohol content stated on the label. The systematic patterns here suggest that rising alcohol content of wine may be a nuisance by-product of producer responses to perceived market preferences for wines having riper, more-intense flavors, possibly in conjunction with evolving climate.wine grapes, alcohol percentage, climate change, labeling errors, Agricultural and Food Policy, Crop Production/Industries, Demand and Price Analysis, Food Consumption/Nutrition/Food Safety, Marketing,

    Pierce’s disease costs California $104 million per year

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    Pierce’s disease of grapevines, caused by a strain of the bacteria Xylella fastidiosa, threatens an industry with a farm value of production exceeding 3billionperyear.Thegrapeindustryincurssubstantialcostsfromlossesofvinestothediseaseandeffortstomitigatedamage.Additionalcostsarebornebythepublicinprovidingprogramsthataimtocontainthediseaseanddeveloplonger−termsolutions,andbythecitrus,nurseryandgrapeindustriesincomplyingwiththoseprograms.Aggregatingthecostsofvinelosses,industryassessments,compliancecosts,andexpendituresbygovernmententities,weestimatethecostofPierce’sdiseaseinCaliforniaisapproximately3 billion per year. The grape industry incurs substantial costs from losses of vines to the disease and efforts to mitigate damage. Additional costs are borne by the public in providing programs that aim to contain the disease and develop longer-term solutions, and by the citrus, nursery and grape industries in complying with those programs. Aggregating the costs of vine losses, industry assessments, compliance costs, and expenditures by government entities, we estimate the cost of Pierce’s disease in California is approximately 104.4 million per year. Of that, 48.3millionfundsPierce’sdiseaseactivitiesundertakenbyvariousgovernmentagencies,thenurseryandcitrusindustriesandtheUCsystem,and48.3 million funds Pierce’s disease activities undertaken by various government agencies, the nursery and citrus industries and the UC system, and 56.1 million is the cost of lost production and vine replacement borne by grape growers

    The Economic Returns to Public Agricultural Research in Uruguay

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    We use newly constructed data to model and measure agricultural productivity growth and the returns to public agricultural research conducted in Uruguay over the period 1961–2010. We pay attention specifically to the role of levy-based funding under INIA, which was established in 1990. Our results indicate that the creation of INIA was associated with a revitalization of funding for agricultural R&D in Uruguay, which spurred sustained growth in agricultural productivity during the past two decades when productivity growth was stagnating in many other countries. The econometric results were somewhat sensitive to specification choices. The preferred model includes two other variables with common trends, a time-trend variable and a proxy for private research impacts, as well as a variable representing the stock of public agricultural knowledge that entailed a lag distribution with a peak impact at year 24 of the 25- year lag. It implies a marginal benefit-cost ratio of 48.2, using a real discount rate of 5 percent per annum and a modified internal rate of return of 24% per annum. The benefit-cost ratio varied significantly across models with different lag structures or that omitted the trend or the private research variable, but across the same models the modified internal rate of return was very stable, ranging from 23% per annum to 27% per annum. These results suggest that the revitalized investment in research spending under INIA has been very profitable for Uruguay, and that a greater rate of investment would have been justified

    The benefits from public agricultural research in Uruguay

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    We use newly constructed data to model and measure agricultural productivity growth and the returns to public agricultural research conducted in Uruguay over the period 1961–2010. We pay attention specifically to the role of levy-based funding under INIA, which was established in 1990. Our results indicate that the creation of INIA was associated with a revitalization of funding for agricultural R&D in Uruguay, which spurred sustained growth in agricultural productivity during the past two decades when productivity growth was stagnating in many other countries. The econometric results were somewhat sensitive to specification choices. The preferred model includes two other variables with common trends, a time-trend variable and a proxy for private research impacts, as well as a variable representing the stock of public agricultural knowledge that entailed a lag distribution with a peak impact at year 24 of the 25-year lag. It implies a marginal benefit-cost ratio of 48.2, using a real discount rate of 5 per cent per annum and a modified internal rate of return of 24 per cent per annum. The benefit-cost ratio varied significantly across models with different lag structures or that omitted the trend or the private research variable, but across the same models, the modified internal rate of return was very stable, ranging from 23 per cent per annum to 27 per cent per annum. These results suggest that the revitalized investment in research spending under INIA has been very profitable for Uruguay and that a greater rate of investment would have been justified

    Assessing the returns to R&D on perennial crops: the costs and benefits of Pierce’s disease research in the California winegrape industry

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    Several complicating issues arise in evaluating the returns to research into varietal improvements for perennial crops compared with annual crops. We elucidate and address these issues in the context of a case study of research aiming to develop varieties that are resistant to Pierce’s disease (PD) of grapevines. PD imposes costs of over 100millionperyearontheCaliforniagrapeindustry,evenwithpublicPDcontrolprogramsinplace.ResearchprojectstodevelopPDresistantvarietiesofgrapevinesareatvariousstagesofcompletion.WedescribetheeconomicproblemsposedbyPD,documenttheresearchprogramsundertakentoaddressthediseaseandpresentaneconomicassessmentofthereturnstotheinvestment,whichareconditionalonotherpolicies.UsingasimulationmodelofthemarketforCaliforniawinegrapes,weestimatethebenefitsfromresearch,developmentandadoptionofPDresistantvinesasrangingfrom100 million per year on the California grape industry, even with public PD control programs in place. Research projects to develop PD resistant varieties of grapevines are at various stages of completion. We describe the economic problems posed by PD, document the research programs undertaken to address the disease and present an economic assessment of the returns to the investment, which are conditional on other policies. Using a simulation model of the market for California wine grapes, we estimate the benefits from research, development and adoption of PD resistant vines as ranging from 4 million to $129 million annually over a 50-year horizon, depending on the length of the R&D lag and the rate of adoption. In addition to these specific quantitative results the paper offers insight into the broader question of economic evaluation of damage-mitigation technology for perennial crops

    The Economic Consequences of Pierce's Disease and Related Policy in the California Winegrape Industry

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    Since 2000, the California Department of Food and Agriculture (CDFA), has spent approximately 40millionperyeartocontainandcontroltheGlassyWingedSharpshooter(GWSS),whichspreadsPierce’sDisease(PD).Compliancewiththeprogramhascostthenurseryindustryapproximately40 million per year to contain and control the Glassy Winged Sharpshooter (GWSS), which spreads Pierce’s Disease (PD). Compliance with the program has cost the nursery industry approximately 7 million per year in recent years. Using a simulation model of the market for California winegrapes, we estimate PD costs winegrape growers and consumers 61millionannually,withthecurrentprograminplace.IfthePDControlProgramended,andtheGWSSwasdistributedfreelythroughoutCalifornia,theannualcosttothewinegrapeindustrywouldincreaseby61 million annually, with the current program in place. If the PD Control Program ended, and the GWSS was distributed freely throughout California, the annual cost to the winegrape industry would increase by 261 million
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