Many economists and others are interested in the phenomenon of rising alcohol content of wine and its potential causes. Has the alcohol content of wine risen—and if so, by how much, where, and when? What roles have been played by climate change and other environmental factors compared with evolving consumer preferences and expert ratings? In this paper we explore these questions using international evidence, combining time-series data on the alcohol content of wine from a large number of countries that experienced different patterns of climate change and influences of policy and demand shifts. We also examine the relationship between the actual alcohol content of wine and the alcohol content stated on the label. The systematic patterns here suggest that rising alcohol content of wine may be a nuisance by-product of producer responses to perceived market preferences for wines having riper, more-intense flavors, possibly in conjunction with evolving climate.wine grapes, alcohol percentage, climate change, labeling errors, Agricultural and Food Policy, Crop Production/Industries, Demand and Price Analysis, Food Consumption/Nutrition/Food Safety, Marketing,
Pierce’s disease of grapevines, caused by a strain of the bacteria Xylella fastidiosa, threatens an industry with a farm value of production exceeding 3billionperyear.Thegrapeindustryincurssubstantialcostsfromlossesofvinestothediseaseandeffortstomitigatedamage.Additionalcostsarebornebythepublicinprovidingprogramsthataimtocontainthediseaseanddeveloplonger−termsolutions,andbythecitrus,nurseryandgrapeindustriesincomplyingwiththoseprograms.Aggregatingthecostsofvinelosses,industryassessments,compliancecosts,andexpendituresbygovernmententities,weestimatethecostofPierce’sdiseaseinCaliforniaisapproximately104.4 million per year. Of that, 48.3millionfundsPierce’sdiseaseactivitiesundertakenbyvariousgovernmentagencies,thenurseryandcitrusindustriesandtheUCsystem,and56.1 million is the cost of lost production and vine replacement borne by grape growers
Pierce’s disease of grapevines, caused by a strain of the bacteria Xylella fastidiosa, threatens an industry with a farm value of production exceeding 3billionperyear.Thegrapeindustryincurssubstantialcostsfromlossesofvinestothediseaseandeffortstomitigatedamage.Additionalcostsarebornebythepublicinprovidingprogramsthataimtocontainthediseaseanddeveloplonger−termsolutions,andbythecitrus,nurseryandgrapeindustriesincomplyingwiththoseprograms.Aggregatingthecostsofvinelosses,industryassessments,compliancecosts,andexpendituresbygovernmententities,weestimatethecostofPierce’sdiseaseinCaliforniaisapproximately104.4 million per year. Of that, 48.3millionfundsPierce’sdiseaseactivitiesundertakenbyvariousgovernmentagencies,thenurseryandcitrusindustriesandtheUCsystem,and56.1 million is the cost of lost production and vine replacement borne by grape growers
We use newly constructed data to model and measure agricultural
productivity growth and the returns to public agricultural research conducted in
Uruguay over the period 1961–2010. We pay attention specifically to the role of
levy-based funding under INIA, which was established in 1990. Our results
indicate that the creation of INIA was associated with a revitalization of funding
for agricultural R&D in Uruguay, which spurred sustained growth in agricultural
productivity during the past two decades when productivity growth was
stagnating in many other countries. The econometric results were somewhat
sensitive to specification choices. The preferred model includes two other
variables with common trends, a time-trend variable and a proxy for private
research impacts, as well as a variable representing the stock of public agricultural
knowledge that entailed a lag distribution with a peak impact at year 24 of the 25-
year lag. It implies a marginal benefit-cost ratio of 48.2, using a real discount rate
of 5 percent per annum and a modified internal rate of return of 24% per annum.
The benefit-cost ratio varied significantly across models with different lag
structures or that omitted the trend or the private research variable, but across the
same models the modified internal rate of return was very stable, ranging from
23% per annum to 27% per annum. These results suggest that the revitalized
investment in research spending under INIA has been very profitable for
Uruguay, and that a greater rate of investment would have been justified
We use newly constructed data to model and measure agricultural productivity growth
and the returns to public agricultural research conducted in Uruguay over the period
1961–2010. We pay attention specifically to the role of levy-based funding under
INIA, which was established in 1990. Our results indicate that the creation of INIA
was associated with a revitalization of funding for agricultural R&D in Uruguay,
which spurred sustained growth in agricultural productivity during the past two decades
when productivity growth was stagnating in many other countries. The econometric
results were somewhat sensitive to specification choices. The preferred model
includes two other variables with common trends, a time-trend variable and a proxy
for private research impacts, as well as a variable representing the stock of public agricultural
knowledge that entailed a lag distribution with a peak impact at year 24 of the
25-year lag. It implies a marginal benefit-cost ratio of 48.2, using a real discount rate
of 5 per cent per annum and a modified internal rate of return of 24 per cent per
annum. The benefit-cost ratio varied significantly across models with different lag
structures or that omitted the trend or the private research variable, but across the
same models, the modified internal rate of return was very stable, ranging from 23 per
cent per annum to 27 per cent per annum. These results suggest that the revitalized
investment in research spending under INIA has been very profitable for Uruguay and
that a greater rate of investment would have been justified
Several complicating issues arise in evaluating the returns to research into varietal improvements for perennial crops compared with annual crops. We elucidate and address these issues in the context of a case study of research aiming to develop varieties that are resistant to Pierce’s disease (PD) of grapevines. PD imposes costs of over 100millionperyearontheCaliforniagrapeindustry,evenwithpublicPDcontrolprogramsinplace.ResearchprojectstodevelopPDresistantvarietiesofgrapevinesareatvariousstagesofcompletion.WedescribetheeconomicproblemsposedbyPD,documenttheresearchprogramsundertakentoaddressthediseaseandpresentaneconomicassessmentofthereturnstotheinvestment,whichareconditionalonotherpolicies.UsingasimulationmodelofthemarketforCaliforniawinegrapes,weestimatethebenefitsfromresearch,developmentandadoptionofPDresistantvinesasrangingfrom4 million to $129 million annually over a 50-year horizon, depending on the length of the R&D lag and the rate of adoption. In addition to these specific quantitative results the paper offers insight into the broader question of economic evaluation of damage-mitigation technology for perennial crops
Since 2000, the California Department of Food and Agriculture (CDFA), has spent approximately 40millionperyeartocontainandcontroltheGlassyWingedSharpshooter(GWSS),whichspreadsPierce’sDisease(PD).Compliancewiththeprogramhascostthenurseryindustryapproximately7 million per year in recent years. Using a simulation model of the market for California winegrapes, we estimate PD costs winegrape growers and consumers 61millionannually,withthecurrentprograminplace.IfthePDControlProgramended,andtheGWSSwasdistributedfreelythroughoutCalifornia,theannualcosttothewinegrapeindustrywouldincreaseby261 million