Some Observations on the Geographical Structure of International Deficits and their Financing

I should note at the outset that many defects exist in the statistical estimates that are used in the field under discussion. The estimates most often cited come from the OECD, which purport to show, for December 1977, a discrepancy of more than $88 billion over the years 1974 -1977 ($22 billion a year) between the current account surpluses of the OPEC countries ($175 billion) and the accumulated deficits of the rest of the world ($264 billion) [4 , p. 64]. This discrepancy is almost equal to the total deficits of the OECD countries during that period ($98 billion). There appear to be discrepancies of the same order of magnitude in the estimates of the transfers of capital and monetary reserves between various countries

Credibility and adjustment: gold standards versus currency boards

It is often maintained that currency boards (CBs) and gold standards (GSs) are alike in that they are stringent monetary rules, the two basic features of which are high credibility of monetary authorities and the existence of automatic adjustment (non discretionary) mechanism. This article includes a comparative analysis of these two types of regimes both from the perspective of the sources and mechanisms of generating confidence and credibility, and the elements of operation of the automatic adjustment mechanism. Confidence under the GS is endogenously driven, whereas it is exogenously determined under the CB. CB is a much more asymmetric regime than GS (the adjustment is much to the detriment of peripheral countries) although asymmetry is a typical feature of any monetary regime. The lack of credibility is typical for peripheral countries and cannot be overcome completely even by “hard” monetary regimes.http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/40078/3/wp692.pd

The Political Economy of Failure: The Euro as an International Currency

How do international currencies get established and consolidated? What domestic and international political foundations support an international currency? And what kinds of macro-economic flows enable an international currency? In this essay we consider these perennial questions of modern IPE scholarship in reverse order to ask whether the euro could ever have become, or seek to become, a true international currency rivalling the US dollar, used not only for passive foreign exchange reserves but also as a major commercial currency outside the EU. We argue that the EU lacks the will, the ideas and the capacity to promote the euro into the status of an international currency. In this article, we concentrate on this final issue of capacity, as the will and ideas issues have already been well explored. Capacity is an issue coeval with, if not prior to, the first two issues. The EU's current institutional arrangements and its economic geography create macro-economic consequences that diminish the euro's capacity to operate as a top currency. These conflicts go beyond the well-recognized issue that the euro-zone is not an optimum currency area. Examining the euro's debilities sheds light not only on the euro's (in)capacity to rival the dollar as an international currency, but also on the future of both the euro and the dollar in the aftermath of the euro-zone crisis