

conspicuously absent, so that it cannot properly fall within either definition of intervention.²¹ It is in respect to diplomatic asylum that the authors' whole conception of intervention as "any action of a State designed to influence the will of another" breaks down altogether and loses all its force; for though the Latin American governments and writers were greatly instrumental in establishing the principle of non-intervention, they have been similarly instrumental in establishing diplomatic asylum as a doctrine *sui generis*. This further illustrates the proposition that intervention is a technical term and that the absence of dictatorial interference removes an action from the category of intervention. Moreover, the authors' statement, in dealing with the celebrated *Haya de la Torre Cases*, that "as for diplomatic asylum, the Court concluded that it was an illegal intervention,"²² although not inaccurate *per se*, fails to bring out the true position. Actually, the International Court of Justice was limiting its ruling to the unilateral qualification of the offense by the State granting asylum, which would be an act of intervention unless its legal basis were clearly established in each specific case.²³

The foregoing observations are not intended to detract in any way from the merits of the work. There can be no doubt that Professor and Mrs. Thomas have dealt exhaustively with the law of intervention and non-intervention. One should look upon the book as a valuable contribution to the solution of a problem that has greatly disturbed the development of international law.

MANUEL R. GARCIA-MORA†

STERLING-DOLLAR DIPLOMACY, ANGLO-AMERICAN COLLABORATION IN THE RECONSTRUCTION OF MULTILATERAL TRADE. By Richard N. Gardner. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1956. Pp. xxiv, 424. \$6.75.

It is a rare joy to come across a book as appealing to the layman as it is to the specialist. This is such a book. Historians, economists, political scientists and lawyers will learn more from it than from many an esoteric volume on the same subject. And the layman will begin to understand the intricacies of international economic negotiations and the monotonous succession of high hopes and bitter disillusionment which have marked the bewildering proliferation of international economic agreements and institutions in the postwar era.

The curtain rises with the blazing trumpets of the Atlantic Charter in August 1941 and falls on the quiet burial of the proposed Charter for an In-

21. GARCIA-MORA, *INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ASYLUM AS A HUMAN RIGHT* c. 4 (1956).

22. P. 397.

23. *The Colombian-Peruvian Asylum Case*, [1950] I.C.J. Rep. 275. See also Garcia-Mora, *The Colombian-Peruvian Asylum Case and The Doctrine of Human Rights*, 37 VA. L. REV. 927 (1951).

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ternational Trade Organization in the fall of 1950. The story centers on three major episodes of Anglo-American negotiation: the creation of the twin Bretton Woods institutions—the International Monetary Fund and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the Anglo-American Financial Agreement, and the Charter for an International Trade Organization. The main, and rare, originality of the book is well described in the preface:

“[This] is not a book of economic theory. . . . Still less is it a statistical analysis. . . . It is rather a book about the making of international economic policy and the shaping of institutions to implement that policy. It places special emphasis on the interaction between official policy and public opinion. . . . Thus it is a hybrid work on the borderline of history, international relations, political science, and even international law. Perhaps it can best be described as ‘a study in international economic diplomacy.’”¹

A single, and highly illuminating, technique is used in all three cases—Bretton Woods, the Anglo-American loan and the ITO—to depict and explain the rise and fall of Anglo-American collaboration. A high-level conference between Roosevelt and Churchill concludes with a joint declaration expressing in broad and high-sounding terms the agreement of both countries with some idealistic formulation of postwar aims. The second act of the play shifts from the statesmen to the technicians, who attempt to couch their statesmen’s declaration in more concrete terms that may serve as a basis for actual negotiation of a draft agreement. In the third act the negotiators are called in, and conflicting viewpoints and interests are reconciled into some hybrid compromise, preserved by escape clauses or “transitional” arrangements, or hidden behind platitudinous statements of intention susceptible of divergent interpretations on both sides of the Atlantic. The fourth act follows the wearisome process of parliamentary or congressional ratification in each of the two countries. The experts are disappointed at the compromises, the interests threatened by the escape clauses rise against ratification, and public opinion must be wooed by extreme and conflicting commentaries by government administrators about the agreement’s significance and expected consequences. Ratification is finally won, but the initial enthusiasm has been dissipated and replaced by mutual weariness and suspicion. And in the fifth act both governments find themselves plagued by their previous pronouncements and trapped into rigid formulas unfit to solve the problems of a fast-changing world. Doom comes: spectacularly for the Anglo-American Agreement with the dazzling collapse of sterling convertibility in August 1947; obscurely for the International Monetary Fund scuttled into oblivion by its persistent impotence; ingloriously for the ITO Charter quietly withdrawn by the Administration from a hopeless congressional debate.

Mr. Gardner brilliantly summarizes the lesson of this triple failure under three headings: economism, universalism and legalism. Excessive stress on economic tools and objectives led to the initial neglect of noneconomic factors

1. P. xiii.

vital to the ultimate success or failure of international cooperation. Concentration on universal rules and institutions failed to exploit the greater potentialities, and indispensable role, of closer collaboration among like-minded countries, particularly between Britain and the United States as the two key countries in the world economy. Finally, our hankering for the false security of precise legal agreements and commitments resulted in unwanted rigidity and detracted from day-to-day efforts to reach a genuine agreement on devising and implementing the flexible policies needed to meet ever-changing problems in a highly fluid economic and political environment.²

The book is sprinkled with numerous illuminating observations well worth pondering by future planners and negotiators. I cannot resist quoting one of these, whose wisdom is too rarely appreciated by blueprinters in government as well as in academic life.

"National policy is rarely influenced as much by impressive blueprints for future action as by daily expedients contrived to cope with current problems. . . . Looking back from our present vantage point we can see that the measures adopted to bridge the transition from war to peace did more to influence the quest for multilateralism than all the planning in advance of permanent institutions for post-war collaboration."³

Observations such as these are given their full meaning by the way the story is told. They do not emerge from abstract reasoning but flow naturally from the narrative itself. The style succeeds in recapturing the high drama of the events described. The clash of leading personalities—such as Lord Keynes and Harry Dexter White—is vividly illustrated by aptly chosen anecdotes. Excerpts from congressional hearings or newspaper editorials plunge the reader back into the atmosphere of the times, essential for a sympathetic understanding of illusions and errors of judgment easy to criticize from hindsight, but which will be as difficult to avoid tomorrow as they were yesterday.

ROBERT TRIFFIN†

2. The reviewer expresses the heartiest agreement with these conclusions, which go a long way to explain the far greater success of the "new approach" embodied in the European Recovery Program, the Organization for European Economic Cooperation, etc. Mr. Gardner alludes only briefly to this shift of emphasis (see pp. 299-305), which provides one of the main themes of a volume on *Europe and the Money Muddle* to be published in May of this year by the Yale University Press.

3. P. 165.

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