Empirical Coordination with Two-Sided State Information and Correlated Source and State

The coordination of autonomous agents is a critical issue for decentralized communication networks. Instead of transmitting information, the agents interact in a coordinated manner in order to optimize a general objective function. A target joint probability distribution is achievable if there exists a code such that the sequences of symbols are jointly typical. The empirical coordination is strongly related to the joint source-channel coding with two-sided state information and correlated source and state. This problem is also connected to state communication and is open for non-causal encoder and decoder. We characterize the optimal solutions for perfect channel, for lossless decoding, for independent source and channel, for causal encoding and for causal decoding.Comment: 5 figures, 5 pages, presented at IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory (ISIT) 201

Empirical Coordination with Channel Feedback and Strictly Causal or Causal Encoding

In multi-terminal networks, feedback increases the capacity region and helps communication devices to coordinate. In this article, we deepen the relationship between coordination and feedback by considering a point-to-point scenario with an information source and a noisy channel. Empirical coordination is achievable if the encoder and the decoder can implement sequences of symbols that are jointly typical for a target probability distribution. We investigate the impact of feedback when the encoder has strictly causal or causal observation of the source symbols. For both cases, we characterize the optimal information constraints and we show that feedback improves coordination possibilities. Surprisingly, feedback also reduces the number of auxiliary random variables and simplifies the information constraints. For empirical coordination with strictly causal encoding and feedback, the information constraint does not involve auxiliary random variable anymore.Comment: 5 pages, 6 figures, presented at IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory (ISIT) 201

Correlation between Channel State and Information Source with Empirical Coordination Constraint

Correlation between channel state and source symbol is under investigation for a joint source-channel coding problem. We investigate simultaneously the lossless transmission of information and the empirical coordination of channel inputs with the symbols of source and states. Empirical coordination is achievable if the sequences of source symbols, channel states, channel inputs and channel outputs are jointly typical for a target joint probability distribution. We characterize the joint distributions that are achievable under lossless decoding constraint. The performance of the coordination is evaluated by an objective function. For example, we determine the minimal distortion between symbols of source and channel inputs for lossless decoding. We show that the correlation source/channel state improves the feasibility of the transmission.Comment: Conference IEEE ITW 201

Information Design for Strategic Coordination of Autonomous Devices with Non-Aligned Utilities

In this paper, we investigate the coordination of autonomous devices with non-aligned utility functions. Both encoder and decoder are considered as players, that choose the encoding and the decoding in order to maximize their long-run utility functions. The topology of the point-to-point network under investigation, suggests that the decoder implements a strategy, knowing in advance the strategy of the encoder. We characterize the encoding and decoding functions that form an equilibrium, by using empirical coordination. The equilibrium solution is related to an auxiliary game in which both players choose some conditional distributions in order to maximize their expected utilities. This problem is closely related to the literature on "Information Design" in Game Theory. We also characterize the set of posterior distributions that are compatible with a rate-limited channel between the encoder and the decoder. Finally, we provide an example of non-aligned utility functions corresponding to parallel fading multiple access channels.Comment: IEEE Proc. of the Fifty-fourth Annual Allerton Conference Allerton House, UIUC, Illinois, USA September 27 - 30, 201

Resilient Source Coding

This paper provides a source coding theorem for multi-dimensional information signals when, at a given instant, the distribution associated with one arbitrary component of the signal to be compressed is not known and a side information is available at the destination. This new framework appears to be both of information-theoretical and game-theoretical interest: it provides a new type of constraints to compress an information source; it is useful for designing certain types of mediators in games and characterize utility regions for games with signals. Regarding the latter aspect, we apply the derived source coding theorem to the prisoner's dilemma and the battle of the sexes

The price of re-establishing perfect, almost perfect or public monitoring in games with arbitrary monitoring

This paper establishes a connection between the notion of observation (or monitoring) structure in game theory and the one of communication channels in Shannon theory. One of the objectives is to know under which conditions an arbitrary monitoring structure can be transformed into a more pertinent monitoring structure. To this end, a mediator is added to the game. The objective of the mediator is to choose a signalling scheme that allows the players to have perfect, almost perfect or public monitoring and all of this, at a minimum cost in terms of signalling. Graph coloring, source coding, and channel coding are exploited to deal with these issues. A wireless power control game is used to illustrate these notions but the applicability of the provided results and, more importantly, the framework of transforming monitoring structures go much beyond this example.Comment: Proc. of the 4th ACM International Workshop on Game Theory in Communication Networks, 201

Transforming Monitoring Structures with Resilient Encoders. Application to Repeated Games

An important feature of a dynamic game is its monitoring structure namely, what the players effectively see from the played actions. We consider games with arbitrary monitoring structures. One of the purposes of this paper is to know to what extent an encoder, who perfectly observes the played actions and sends a complementary public signal to the players, can establish perfect monitoring for all the players. To reach this goal, the main technical problem to be solved at the encoder is to design a source encoder which compresses the action profile in the most concise manner possible. A special feature of this encoder is that the multi-dimensional signal (namely, the action profiles) to be encoded is assumed to comprise a component whose probability distribution is not known to the encoder and the decoder has a side information (the private signals received by the players when the encoder is off). This new framework appears to be both of game-theoretical and information-theoretical interest. In particular, it is useful for designing certain types of encoders that are resilient to single deviations and provide an equilibrium utility region in the proposed setting; it provides a new type of constraints to compress an information source (i.e., a random variable). Regarding the first aspect, we apply the derived result to the repeated prisoner's dilemma.Comment: Springer, Dynamic Games and Applications, 201

Joint Empirical Coordination of Source and Channel

In a decentralized and self-configuring network, the communication devices are considered as autonomous decision-makers that sense their environment and that implement optimal transmission schemes. It is essential that these autonomous devices cooperate and coordinate their actions, to ensure the reliability of the transmissions and the stability of the network. We study a point-to-point scenario in which the encoder and the decoder implement decentralized policies that are coordinated. The coordination is measured in terms of empirical frequency of symbols of source and channel. The encoder and the decoder perform a coding scheme such that the empirical distribution of the symbols is close to a target joint probability distribution. We characterize the set of achievable target probability distributions for a point-to-point source-channel model, in which the encoder is non-causal and the decoder is strictly causal i.e., it returns an action based on the observation of the past channel outputs. The objectives of the encoder and of the decoder, are captured by some utility function, evaluated with respect to the set of achievable target probability distributions. In this article, we investigate the maximization problem of a utility function that is common to both encoder and decoder. We show that the compression and the transmission of information are particular cases of the empirical coordination.Comment: accepted to IEEE Trans. on I

"To sense" or "not to sense" in energy-efficient power control games

A network of cognitive transmitters is considered. Each transmitter has to decide his power control policy in order to maximize energy-efficiency of his transmission. For this, a transmitter has two actions to take. He has to decide whether to sense the power levels of the others or not (which corresponds to a finite sensing game), and to choose his transmit power level for each block (which corresponds to a compact power control game). The sensing game is shown to be a weighted potential game and its set of correlated equilibria is studied. Interestingly, it is shown that the general hybrid game where each transmitter can jointly choose the hybrid pair of actions (to sense or not to sense, transmit power level) leads to an outcome which is worse than the one obtained by playing the sensing game first, and then playing the power control game. This is an interesting Braess-type paradox to be aware of for energy-efficient power control in cognitive networks.Comment: Proc. of the 2nd International Conference on Game Theory for Network (GAMENETS), 201