Eliciting temptation and self-control through menu choices: a lab experiment

Unlike present‐biased individuals, agents who suffer self‐control costs as in Gul and Pesendorfer, 2001 may choose to restrict their choice set even when they expect to resist temptation. To identify these self‐control types, I design an experiment in which the temptation was to read a story during a tedious task. The identification strategy relies on a two‐step procedure. First, I measure commitment demand by eliciting subjects' preferences over menus that did or did not allow access to the story. I then implement preferences using a random mechanism, allowing to observe subjects who faced the choice yet preferred commitment. A quarter to a third of subjects can be classified as self‐control types according to their menu preferences. When confronted with the choice, virtually all of them behaved as they anticipated and resisted temptation. These findings suggest that policies restricting the availability of tempting options could have larger welfare benefits than predicted by standard models of present bias

Intention-based reciprocity and signaling of intentions

Many experiments find that trust intentions are a key determinant of prosociality. If intentions matter, then prosociality should depend on whether trust intentions can be credibly conveyed. This conjecture is formalized and tested in a noisy trust game where I vary the extent to which trust can be credibly signaled. I find that the introduction of noise threatens the onset of trust relations and induces players to form more pessimistic beliefs. Therefore policies that increase transparency of the decision-making environment may foster prosociality. However, the potential impact of such policies could be limited by a large heterogeneity in how individuals respond to changes in their information environment

Choice deferral, indecisiveness and preference for flexibility

In a standard model of menu choice, we examine the behavior of an agent who applies the following Cautious Deferral rule: “Whenever in doubt, don't commit; just leave options open.” Our primitive is a complete preference relation ≽ that represents the agent's choice behavior. The agent's indecisiveness is captured by means of a possibly incomplete (but otherwise rational) preference relation ≽ˆ. We ask when ≽ can be viewed as a Cautious Deferral completion of some incomplete ≽ˆ. Under the independence and continuity assumptions commonly used in the menu choice literature, we find that even the smallest amount of indecisiveness is enough to force ≽, through the above deferral rule, to exhibit preference for flexibility on its entire domain. Thus we highlight a fundamental tension between non-monotonic preferences, such as preferences for self-control, and tendency to defer choice due to indecisiveness

Are people equally other-regarding when selecting a match vs choosing an allocation?

First published: 14 April 2018There are many assignment processes in which agents are given the opportunity to unilaterally select a match. Resulting allocations can be inefficient if agents do not internalize the consequences of their choice on others. To test this formally, we study how other-regarding behaviors vary across two decision contexts: when subjects make a pure allocation decision and when they select a partner. In both settings each subject's decision is final and it affects their payoff and that of other subjects in the same way. We find that subjects are more likely to sacrifice their own material well-being to increase that of others when dividing a pie than when selecting a partner in a large anonymous settingeven though the consequences on the material payoffs of others are identical. These findings suggest that in assignment processes with unilateral selection, efficiency can be improved by presenting the selection process as a choice between outcomes involving multiple individuals, instead of simply selecting a match for themselves.University of Oxfor

Upping uptake of COVID contact tracing apps

To contain the COVID-19 pandemic, many countries around the world rushed to develop digital contact tracing apps. However, the low rates of app installation have undermined the efficacy of such tools. A study by Munzert et al. shines light on potential barriers to adoption, as well as levers that could be used to increase uptake

L. Th. Maes, Costumen van de Stad Mechelen. Ontwerp-Costumen van 1527, 1960, XVII. (Commission Royale des Anciennes Lois et Ordonnances de Belgique, Coutumes de la Seigneurie de Malines, Ville de Malines, 2e partie)

Toussaert J. L. Th. Maes, Costumen van de Stad Mechelen. Ontwerp-Costumen van 1527, 1960, XVII. (Commission Royale des Anciennes Lois et Ordonnances de Belgique, Coutumes de la Seigneurie de Malines, Ville de Malines, 2e partie). In: Revue du Nord, tome 44, n°173, Janvier-mars 1962. pp. 158-159

E. K. Kossmann, Politieke Théorie in het zeventiende-eeuwse Nederland, 1960

Toussaert J. E. K. Kossmann, Politieke Théorie in het zeventiende-eeuwse Nederland, 1960. In: Revue du Nord, tome 44, n°176, Octobre-décembre 1962. pp. 462-463

Andriessen (Dr J., S. J.), De Jezuieten en let samenhorigheiisbesej der Nederlanden, 1383-1648, 1957

Toussaert J. Andriessen (Dr J., S. J.), De Jezuieten en let samenhorigheiisbesej der Nederlanden, 1383-1648, 1957. In: Revue du Nord, tome 41, n°164, Octobre-décembre 1959. pp. 323-328

SMID, Menno. - Ostfriesische Kirchengeschichte. Deichdracht Krummhörn ( Comité de surveillance des digues du Krummhörn, avec siège in Pewsum, Mùhlenstrasse, 6), juin 1975

Toussaert J. SMID, Menno. - Ostfriesische Kirchengeschichte. Deichdracht Krummhörn ( Comité de surveillance des digues du Krummhörn, avec siège in Pewsum, Mùhlenstrasse, 6), juin 1975. In: Revue du Nord, tome 60, n°236, Janvier-mars 1978. pp. 197-202