Impressions of science and healthcare professionals who share anti-science conspiracy theories

Background: The majority of science and healthcare professionals agree with the scientific consensus on issues such as anthropogenic climate change and the safety and efficacy of vaccines. However, a small number of professionals diverge from this consensus and espouse conspiracy theories arguing, for example, that climate change is a hoax and that the dangers of vaccines are being hidden by greedy pharmaceutical companies. What impressions do people make of conspiracy-sharing professionals and, importantly, would people follow their advice? We aimed to answer these questions in a brief report comprising of two preregistered experiments. Methods: In Experiment 1 (N = 296) participants rated their impressions of a scientist who endorsed (vs. refuted) climate change conspiracy theories, and indicated their willingness to follow the scientist’s advice. Experiment 2 (N = 280) followed a similar method but focused on a healthcare professional who endorsed (vs. refuted) mRNA vaccine conspiracy theories. In a control condition, the professional provided neutral information. Results: In both experiments, people formed negative impressions of the conspiracy-sharing professional, perceiving them to be less trustworthy, honest, brave (Experiment 1 only), credible, intelligent, less able to effect change, and more of an outsider and a fraud. They also showed less willingness to follow the professionals’ advice. However, participants’ own conspiracy beliefs shaped these impressions, with stronger negative impressions found among participants with weaker conspiracy beliefs. Notably, higher conspiracy believers perceived the conspiracy-sharing professionals as braver. Conclusions: These findings suggest that scientific and healthcare professionals who share conspiracy theories are perceived negatively, and people are less willing to follow advice. However, this is moderated by participants’ own conspiracy beliefs

Ambivalence and interpersonal liking: The expression of ambivalence as social validation of attitudinal conflict

Literature on attitude similarity suggests that sharing similar attitudes enhances interpersonal liking, but it remains unanswered whether this effect also holds for ambivalent attitudes. In the present research, we shed light on the role attitudinal ambivalence plays in interpersonal liking. Specifically, we examine whether people express ambivalence strategically to generate a positive or negative social image, and whether this is dependent on the attitudinal ambivalence of their perceiver. We test two alternative hypotheses. In line with the attitude-similarity effect, people should express ambivalence toward ambivalent others to enhance interpersonal liking, as sharing ambivalence might socially validate the latter’s experience of attitudinal conflict. On the other hand, people might express more univalence, as ambivalence may drive ambivalent others toward the resolution of their attitudinal conflict, and univalent stances could help to achieve that goal. In two studies (N = 449, 149), people expressed similar attitudes to those of their perceivers, even when the latter experienced attitudinal conflict (Studies 1 and 2). Moreover, they composed an essay, the message of which validated their perceiver’s attitudinal conflict (Study 2). In line with these results, we further observe that the more people experienced their ambivalence as conflicting, the more they liked others who similarly experienced attitudinal conflict (Study 1). These findings suggest that the expression of ambivalence can have important interpersonal functions, as it might lead to an enhanced social image when interacting with those coping with attitudinal conflict

Gender disparities in social and personality psychology awards from 1968 to 2021

Gender disparities persist in academic psychology. The present study extended previous investigations to social and personality psychology award recipients. We collated publicly available data on award winners (N = 2700) from 17 international societies from 1968 to 2021. Features of the award, including year given, type of award, seniority level, whether the award was shared with more than one winner, and gender/sex of the recipient were coded. Overall, men were more likely to be recognized with awards than women, but the proportion of awards won by women has increased over time. Despite this increased share of awards, women were more likely to win awards for service and teaching (which are generally viewed as less prestigious) rather than research contributions. These differences were moderated by year - women were more likely to win service or teaching awards, compared to research awards, after 1999 and 2007, respectively. Women were more likely to win awards at postgraduate/early career levels or open to all levels compared to senior awards. Findings suggest that women’s greater representation in academic psychology in recent years has not been accompanied by parity in professional recognition and eminence

Where do early career researchers stand on Open Science practices? A survey within the Max Planck Society

Open science (OS) is of paramount importance for the improvement of science worldwide and across research fields. Recent years have witnessed a transition toward open and transparent scientific practices, but there is still a long way to go. Early career researchers (ECRs) are of crucial relevance in the process of steering toward the standardization of OS practices, as they will become the future decision makers of the institutional change that necessarily accompanies this transition. Thus, it is imperative to gain insight into where ECRs stand on OS practices. Under this premise, the Open Science group of the Max Planck PhDnet designed and conducted an online survey to assess the stance toward OS practices of doctoral candidates from the Max Planck Society. As one of the leading scientific institutions for basic research worldwide, the Max Planck Society provides a considerable population of researchers from multiple scientific fields, englobed into three sections: biomedical sciences, chemistry, physics and technology, and human and social sciences. From an approximate total population of 5,100 doctoral candidates affiliated with the Max Planck Society, the survey collected responses from 568 doctoral candidates. The survey assessed self-reported knowledge, attitudes, and implementation of different OS practices, namely, open access publications, open data, preregistrations, registered reports, and replication studies. ECRs seemed to hold a generally positive view toward these different practices and to be interested in learning more about them. Furthermore, we found that ECRs’ knowledge and positive attitudes predicted the extent to which they implemented these OS practices, although levels of implementation were rather low in the past. We observed differences and similarities between scientific sections. We discuss these differences in terms of need and feasibility to apply these OS practices in specific scientific fields, but additionally in relation to the incentive systems that shape scientific communities. Lastly, we discuss the implications that these results can have for the training and career advancement of ECRs, and ultimately, for the consolidation of OS practices

La ciudad como experiencia de conocimiento: nuevas metodologías de aprendizaje, iniciación a la investigación y extensión universitaria a partir de la historia urbana

Memoria que recoge las actividades desarolladas en el proyecto de Innovación docente 327 de 2020 con título La ciudad como experiencia de conocimiento: nuevas metodologías de aprendizaje, iniciación a la investigación y extensión universitaria a partir de la historia urbana y dirigido por Rubén Pallol Trigueros

“Proof under reasonable doubt”: Ambiguity of the Norm Violation as Boundary Condition of Third-Party Punishment

In six studies, we consistently observed costly third-party punishment (3PP) to decrease under ambiguity of the norm violation. Our research suggests that, under ambiguity, some people experience concerns about punishing unfairly. Those with higher (vs. lower) other-oriented justice sensitivity (Observer JS) reduced 3PP more pronouncedly (in Studies 1-3 and 4b, but not replicated in Studies 4-5). Moreover, those who decided to resolve the ambiguity (hence, removing the risk of punishing unfairly) exceeded the 3PP observed under no ambiguity (Study 4). However, we did not consistently observe these concerns about punishing unfairly to affect 3PP (Study 4-5). We further considered whether people could use ambiguity as justification for remaining passive – thus, avoiding the costs of 3PP. We did not find conclusive evidence supporting this notion. Taken together, ambiguity entails a situational boundary of 3PP that sheds light on the prevalence of this behavior and, potentially, on its preceding decision-making

“Proof Under Reasonable Doubt”: Ambiguity of the Norm Violation as Boundary Condition of Third-Party Punishment

In six studies, we consistently observed costly third-party punishment (3PP) to decrease under ambiguity of the norm violation. Our research suggests that, under ambiguity, some people experience concerns about punishing unfairly. Those with higher (vs. lower) other-oriented justice sensitivity (Observer JS) reduced 3PP more pronouncedly (in Studies 1–3 and 4b, but not replicated in Studies 4–5). Moreover, those who decided to resolve the ambiguity (hence, removing the risk of punishing unfairly) exceeded the 3PP observed under no ambiguity (Study 4). However, we did not consistently observe these concerns about punishing unfairly to affect 3PP (Studies 4–5). We further considered whether people could use ambiguity as justification for remaining passive—thus, avoiding the costs of 3PP. We did not find conclusive evidence supporting this notion. Taken together, ambiguity entails a situational boundary of 3PP that sheds light on the prevalence of this behavior and, potentially, on its preceding decision-making

Ambivalence and interpersonal liking: The expression of ambivalence as social validation of attitudinal conflict

Literature on attitude similarity suggests that sharing similar attitudes enhances interpersonal liking, but it remains unanswered whether this effect also holds for ambivalent attitudes. In the present research, we shed light on the role attitudinal ambivalence plays in interpersonal liking. Specifically, we examine whether people express ambivalence strategically to generate a positive or negative social image, and whether this is dependent on the attitudinal ambivalence of their perceiver. We test two alternative hypotheses. In line with the attitude-similarity effect, people should express ambivalence towards ambivalent others to enhance interpersonal liking, as sharing ambivalence might socially validate the latter’s experience of attitudinal conflict. On the other hand, people might express more univalence, as ambivalence may drive ambivalent others towards the resolution of their attitudinal conflict and univalent stances could help to achieve that goal. In two studies (N = 449, 149), people expressed similar attitudes to those of their perceivers, even when the latter experienced attitudinal conflict (Study 1 and 2). Moreover, they composed an essay, the message of which validated their perceiver’s attitudinal conflict (Study 2). In line with these results, we further observe that the more people experienced their ambivalence as conflicting, the more they liked others who similarly experienced attitudinal conflict (Study 1). These findings suggest that the expression of ambivalence can have important interpersonal functions, as it might lead to an enhanced social image when interacting with those coping with attitudinal conflict

Conspiracy Believers Act More Dishonestly and Overestimate Others’ Dishonesty

Conspiracy theories typically assert that others have engaged in dishonest actions. However, existing research indicates that individuals who believe in conspiracy theories may themselves be more inclined to engage in dishonest behavior. We conducted two pre-registered multi-site studies— in one WEIRD (Canada, N = 835) and in two non-WEIRD countries (Turkey, N = 706; South Africa, N = 867)— testing the hypotheses that (i) stronger conspiracy believers would be more likely to engage in dishonest behavior during a monetary incentivized lying task and (ii) they would overestimate the prevalence of dishonesty among others. Overall, we found that stronger conspiracy believers were indeed more likely to behave dishonestly. Across the board, participants tended to overestimate dishonesty among their peers, but this tendency was significantly more pronounced among stronger conspiracy believers

How Are Conspiracy Beliefs Associated with Generosity?

Conspiracy believers tend to trust people less, exhibit greater antisocial tendencies, and are more self-centered. In the current research, we investigate whether conspiracy believers are also less likely to be generous. In Study 1 (N = 45,073 from 52 countries), in the context of COVID-19, we found that participants with higher COVID-19 conspiracy beliefs were less likely to donate to national and international charities, and that this negative association was stronger for donations to national charities. In Study 2 (N = 850; UK sample), using an economic game with real monetary incentives, we replicated this negative association between more general conspiracy beliefs and donations to charities for childhood cancer, a less politicized issue. However, contrary to Study 1, the negative association was stronger for donations to international charities. These findings suggest that both the issue and the recipient of donations influence whether conspiracy believers exhibit less generosity