Political Disagreement and Delegation in a Multi-Level Governance Setting

A large share of delegation models takes into account the effect of political disagreement when explaining delegation. Yet, delegation models make sharply contrasting predictions on how political disagreement translates into the level of discretion delegated to agencies. Moreover, empirical findings are contradictory. The current paper addresses this puzzle by disentangling mechanisms driving the effect of political disagreement on delegation. Furthermore, we distinguish conditions interacting with the effect of political disagreement on discretion. We apply the conditions to the research context of the present paper: economic restructuring in the UK under New Labour, which took place in a multi-level governance setting. We derive hypotheses on the effect of political disagreement on discretion and explore our theoretical predictions with the use of a novel dataset on economic restructuring in the UK under New Labour (Bennett and Payne 2000). Our analysis show that political disagreement leads to lower levels of discretion delegated.

The Power of the Presidency in EU Council Decision-making

Research on the presidency of the EU shows mixed results. Although most scholars agree that the EU presidency is not able to advance its domestic interests in the European forum, Tallberg (2006) provides evidence for presidency effects. In the present paper, we empirically estimate presidency-based power in the Council of the European Union on the DEU data — a large-scale data set containing EU policy issues from various policy areas. We show that holding the presidency does significantly and positively contribute to the bargaining power of member states, but only in the final stages of decision-making

Nonprofit contracting and partnership in elderly care : a comparison between China and the Netherlands

This paper offers an empirical account of the engagement and success of nonprofits in contracting for elderly care in China and the Netherlands as two contrasting contexts. While contracting as an innovation demonstrates a state-centered approach in China, its Dutch counterpart has sought a balance between state and professional influences. The paper argues that public sector reforms, civil society development and social regulation support schemes contextualize the engagement and success of nonprofits in contracting for elderly care. Surveys among the managers of 176 elderly care organizations in Shanghai and 70 elderly care organizations in the Netherlands shows that the fundamental elements of nonprofit contracting in elderly care are strikingly similar between both contexts, although their manifestation is shaped by each specific institutional context.Peer reviewe