Economic interests and the origins of electoral systems

Die gängige Begründung – basierend auf der bahnbrechenden Arbeit Rokkans – dafür, dass ein spezifisches Wahlsystem bevorzugt wird, ist, dass die Verhältniswahl („proportional respresentation“ oder „PR“) von einer zersplitterten Rechte eingeführt wurde, um ihre Klasseninteressen gegenüber denen einer wachsenden Linken zu verteidigen. Neue Erkenntnisse zeigen jedoch, dass PR tatsächlich die Linke und das Konzept der Umverteilung stärkt. Wir behaupten daher, dass die allgemein akzeptierte Sichtweise historisch, analytisch und empirisch falsch ist. Unsere Erklärung für die Einführung der PR ist eine grundlegend andere: Durch die Integration zweier gegensätzlicher Interpretationen von PR – das Konzept der minimal erfolgreichen Koalitionen [minimum winning coalition] gegenüber dem Konzept des Konsens – gehen wir davon aus, dass die Rechte PR übernommen hat, als ihre Unterstützung für konsensuelle rechtliche Rahmenbedingungen (besonders im Arbeitsmarkt und in der Ausbildung neuer Arbeitskräfte, wo spezifische Investitionen wichtig waren) wichtiger wurde als ihre Abneigung gegen die Umverteilungsauswirkungen; dies passierte in den Ländern, die vorher eine eng organisierte kommunale Wirtschaft hatten. In Ländern mit relativ schlechten Arbeitgeber- Arbeitnehmer-Beziehungen und einer schwach ausgeprägten Koordination zwischen Wirtschaft und Gewerkschaften hatte die Beibehaltung von Mehrheitssystemen die Funktion, die Linke in Schach zu halten. Diese Tatsache erklärt die enge Beziehung zwischen den bestehenden Varianten von Kapitalismus und Wahlsystemen und warum diese weiterhin fortbestehen. -- The standard explanation for the choice of electoral institutions, building on Rokkan’s seminal work, is that proportional representation (PR) was adopted by a divided right to defend its class interests against a rising left. But new evidence shows that PR strengthens the left and redistribution, and we argue the standard view is wrong historically, analytically, and empirically. We offer a radically different explanation. Integrating two opposed interpretations of PR – minimum winning coalitions versus consensus – we propose that the right adopted PR when their support for consensual regulatory frameworks, especially of labor markets and skill formation where co-specific investments were important, outweighed their opposition to the redistributive consequences; this occurred in countries with previously densely organized local economies. In countries with adversarial industrial relations, and weak coordination of business and unions, keeping majoritarian institutions helped contain the left. This explains the close association between current varieties of capitalism and electoral institutions, and why they persist over time.Economic Models of Political Processes,Government,War,Law,and Regulation (Comparative),Political Economy of Capitalism

The Partisan Politics of New Social Risks in Advanced Postindustrial Democracies: Social Protection for Labor Market Outsiders

Advanced postindustrialization generates numerous challenges for the European social model. Central among these challenges is declining income, unstable employment, and inadequate training of semi- and unskilled workers. In this chapter, I assess the partisan basis of support for social policies that address the needs of these marginalized workers. I specifically consider the impacts of postindustrial cleavages among core constituencies of social democratic parties on the capacity of these parties to pursue inclusive social policies. I argue – and find support for in empirical analyses – that encompassing labor organization is the most important factor in strengthening the ability of left parties to build successful coalitions in support of outsider-friendly policies. I go beyond existing work on the topic by considering the full array of postindustrial cleavages facing left parties, by more fully elaborating why encompassing labor organization is crucial, and by considering a more complete set of measures of outsider policies than extant work. I compare my arguments and findings to important new work that stresses coalition building and partisan politics but minimizes the role of class organization

Liberal market economies, business, and political finance: Britain under New Labour

The extent and nature of business financing of parties is an important feature of political finance. Britain’s transparent and permissive regulatory system provides an excellent opportunity to study business financing of parties. Business donations have been very important to the Conservative party over the last decade, and of only marginal importance to Labour. Unlike other Conservative contributors, business donors are more likely to contribute when the party is popular. In contrast to the previous period of Conservative government, the biggest British businesses tended to abstain from political finance under New Labour. However, their bias towards the Conservatives is affected by the party’s popularity and the closeness of an election. Britain shares the political importance of business financing of parties and its mixture of ideological and pragmatic motivations with other liberal market economies. However, in Britain the bias towards the right is much stronger and the role of big business more marginal

Economic Interests and the Origins of Electoral Systems

Die gängige Begründung – basierend auf der bahnbrechenden Arbeit Rokkans – dafür, dass ein spezifisches Wahlsystem bevorzugt wird, ist, dass die Verhältniswahl („proportional respresentation“ oder „PR“) von einer zersplitterten Rechte eingeführt wurde, um ihre Klasseninteressen gegenüber denen einer wachsenden Linken zu verteidigen. Neue Erkenntnisse zeigen jedoch, dass PR tatsächlich die Linke und das Konzept der Umverteilung stärkt. Wir behaupten daher, dass die allgemein akzeptierte Sichtweise historisch, analytisch und empirisch falsch ist. Unsere Erklärung für die Einführung der PR ist eine grundlegend andere: Durch die Integration zweier gegensätzlicher Interpretationen von PR – das Konzept der minimal erfolgreichen Koalitionen [minimum winning coalition] gegenüber dem Konzept des Konsens – gehen wir davon aus, dass die Rechte PR übernommen hat, als ihre Unterstützung für konsensuelle rechtliche Rahmenbedingungen (besonders im Arbeitsmarkt und in der Ausbildung neuer Arbeitskräfte, wo spezifische Investitionen wichtig waren) wichtiger wurde als ihre Abneigung gegen die Umverteilungsauswirkungen; dies passierte in den Ländern, die vorher eine eng organisierte kommunale Wirtschaft hatten. In Ländern mit relativ schlechten Arbeitgeber- Arbeitnehmer-Beziehungen und einer schwach ausgeprägten Koordination zwischen Wirtschaft und Gewerkschaften hatte die Beibehaltung von Mehrheitssystemen die Funktion, die Linke in Schach zu halten. Diese Tatsache erklärt die enge Beziehung zwischen den bestehenden Varianten von Kapitalismus und Wahlsystemen und warum diese weiterhin fortbestehen.The standard explanation for the choice of electoral institutions, building on Rokkan’s seminal work, is that proportional representation (PR) was adopted by a divided right to defend its class interests against a rising left. But new evidence shows that PR strengthens the left and redistribution, and we argue the standard view is wrong historically, analytically, and empirically. We offer a radically different explanation. Integrating two opposed interpretations of PR – minimum winning coalitions versus consensus – we propose that the right adopted PR when their support for consensual regulatory frameworks, especially of labor markets and skill formation where co-specific investments were important, outweighed their opposition to the redistributive consequences; this occurred in countries with previously densely organized local economies. In countries with adversarial industrial relations, and weak coordination of business and unions, keeping majoritarian institutions helped contain the left. This explains the close association between current varieties of capitalism and electoral institutions, and why they persist over time

Missense variants in FRS3 affect body mass index in populations of diverse ancestries

Obesity is associated with adverse effects on health and quality of life. Improved understanding of its underlying pathophysiology is essential for developing counteractive measures. To search for sequence variants with large effects on BMI, we perform a multi-ancestry meta-analysis of 13 genome-wide association studies on BMI, including data derived from 1,534,555 individuals of European ancestry, 339,657 of Asian ancestry, and 130,968 of African ancestry. We identify an intergenic 262,760 base pair deletion at the MC4R locus that associates with 4.11 kg/m2 higher BMI per allele, likely through downregulation of MC4R. Moreover, a rare FRS3 missense variant, p.Glu115Lys, only found in individuals from Finland, associates with 1.09 kg/m2 lower BMI per allele. We also detect three other low-frequency FRS3 missense variants that associate with BMI with smaller effects and are enriched in different ancestries. We characterize FRS3 as a BMI-associated gene, encoding an adaptor protein known to act downstream of BDNF and TrkB, which regulate appetite, food intake, and energy expenditure through unknown signaling pathways. The work presented here contributes to the biological foundation of obesity by providing a convincing downstream component of the BDNF-TrkB pathway, which could potentially be targeted for obesity treatment.</p

Missense variants in FRS3 affect body mass index in populations of diverse ancestries

Obesity is associated with adverse effects on health and quality of life. Improved understanding of its underlying pathophysiology is essential for developing counteractive measures. To search for sequence variants with large effects on BMI, we perform a multi-ancestry meta-analysis of 13 genome-wide association studies on BMI, including data derived from 1,534,555 individuals of European ancestry, 339,657 of Asian ancestry, and 130,968 of African ancestry. We identify an intergenic 262,760 base pair deletion at the MC4R locus that associates with 4.11 kg/m2 higher BMI per allele, likely through downregulation of MC4R. Moreover, a rare FRS3 missense variant, p.Glu115Lys, only found in individuals from Finland, associates with 1.09 kg/m2 lower BMI per allele. We also detect three other low-frequency FRS3 missense variants that associate with BMI with smaller effects and are enriched in different ancestries. We characterize FRS3 as a BMI-associated gene, encoding an adaptor protein known to act downstream of BDNF and TrkB, which regulate appetite, food intake, and energy expenditure through unknown signaling pathways. The work presented here contributes to the biological foundation of obesity by providing a convincing downstream component of the BDNF-TrkB pathway, which could potentially be targeted for obesity treatment.</p