Economic interests and the origins of electoral systems

Die gängige Begründung – basierend auf der bahnbrechenden Arbeit Rokkans – dafür, dass ein spezifisches Wahlsystem bevorzugt wird, ist, dass die Verhältniswahl („proportional respresentation“ oder „PR“) von einer zersplitterten Rechte eingeführt wurde, um ihre Klasseninteressen gegenüber denen einer wachsenden Linken zu verteidigen. Neue Erkenntnisse zeigen jedoch, dass PR tatsächlich die Linke und das Konzept der Umverteilung stärkt. Wir behaupten daher, dass die allgemein akzeptierte Sichtweise historisch, analytisch und empirisch falsch ist. Unsere Erklärung für die Einführung der PR ist eine grundlegend andere: Durch die Integration zweier gegensätzlicher Interpretationen von PR – das Konzept der minimal erfolgreichen Koalitionen [minimum winning coalition] gegenüber dem Konzept des Konsens – gehen wir davon aus, dass die Rechte PR übernommen hat, als ihre Unterstützung für konsensuelle rechtliche Rahmenbedingungen (besonders im Arbeitsmarkt und in der Ausbildung neuer Arbeitskräfte, wo spezifische Investitionen wichtig waren) wichtiger wurde als ihre Abneigung gegen die Umverteilungsauswirkungen; dies passierte in den Ländern, die vorher eine eng organisierte kommunale Wirtschaft hatten. In Ländern mit relativ schlechten Arbeitgeber- Arbeitnehmer-Beziehungen und einer schwach ausgeprägten Koordination zwischen Wirtschaft und Gewerkschaften hatte die Beibehaltung von Mehrheitssystemen die Funktion, die Linke in Schach zu halten. Diese Tatsache erklärt die enge Beziehung zwischen den bestehenden Varianten von Kapitalismus und Wahlsystemen und warum diese weiterhin fortbestehen. -- The standard explanation for the choice of electoral institutions, building on Rokkan’s seminal work, is that proportional representation (PR) was adopted by a divided right to defend its class interests against a rising left. But new evidence shows that PR strengthens the left and redistribution, and we argue the standard view is wrong historically, analytically, and empirically. We offer a radically different explanation. Integrating two opposed interpretations of PR – minimum winning coalitions versus consensus – we propose that the right adopted PR when their support for consensual regulatory frameworks, especially of labor markets and skill formation where co-specific investments were important, outweighed their opposition to the redistributive consequences; this occurred in countries with previously densely organized local economies. In countries with adversarial industrial relations, and weak coordination of business and unions, keeping majoritarian institutions helped contain the left. This explains the close association between current varieties of capitalism and electoral institutions, and why they persist over time.Economic Models of Political Processes,Government,War,Law,and Regulation (Comparative),Political Economy of Capitalism

The Partisan Politics of New Social Risks in Advanced Postindustrial Democracies: Social Protection for Labor Market Outsiders

Advanced postindustrialization generates numerous challenges for the European social model. Central among these challenges is declining income, unstable employment, and inadequate training of semi- and unskilled workers. In this chapter, I assess the partisan basis of support for social policies that address the needs of these marginalized workers. I specifically consider the impacts of postindustrial cleavages among core constituencies of social democratic parties on the capacity of these parties to pursue inclusive social policies. I argue – and find support for in empirical analyses – that encompassing labor organization is the most important factor in strengthening the ability of left parties to build successful coalitions in support of outsider-friendly policies. I go beyond existing work on the topic by considering the full array of postindustrial cleavages facing left parties, by more fully elaborating why encompassing labor organization is crucial, and by considering a more complete set of measures of outsider policies than extant work. I compare my arguments and findings to important new work that stresses coalition building and partisan politics but minimizes the role of class organization

Economic Interests and the Origins of Electoral Systems

Die gängige Begründung – basierend auf der bahnbrechenden Arbeit Rokkans – dafür, dass ein spezifisches Wahlsystem bevorzugt wird, ist, dass die Verhältniswahl („proportional respresentation“ oder „PR“) von einer zersplitterten Rechte eingeführt wurde, um ihre Klasseninteressen gegenüber denen einer wachsenden Linken zu verteidigen. Neue Erkenntnisse zeigen jedoch, dass PR tatsächlich die Linke und das Konzept der Umverteilung stärkt. Wir behaupten daher, dass die allgemein akzeptierte Sichtweise historisch, analytisch und empirisch falsch ist. Unsere Erklärung für die Einführung der PR ist eine grundlegend andere: Durch die Integration zweier gegensätzlicher Interpretationen von PR – das Konzept der minimal erfolgreichen Koalitionen [minimum winning coalition] gegenüber dem Konzept des Konsens – gehen wir davon aus, dass die Rechte PR übernommen hat, als ihre Unterstützung für konsensuelle rechtliche Rahmenbedingungen (besonders im Arbeitsmarkt und in der Ausbildung neuer Arbeitskräfte, wo spezifische Investitionen wichtig waren) wichtiger wurde als ihre Abneigung gegen die Umverteilungsauswirkungen; dies passierte in den Ländern, die vorher eine eng organisierte kommunale Wirtschaft hatten. In Ländern mit relativ schlechten Arbeitgeber- Arbeitnehmer-Beziehungen und einer schwach ausgeprägten Koordination zwischen Wirtschaft und Gewerkschaften hatte die Beibehaltung von Mehrheitssystemen die Funktion, die Linke in Schach zu halten. Diese Tatsache erklärt die enge Beziehung zwischen den bestehenden Varianten von Kapitalismus und Wahlsystemen und warum diese weiterhin fortbestehen.The standard explanation for the choice of electoral institutions, building on Rokkan’s seminal work, is that proportional representation (PR) was adopted by a divided right to defend its class interests against a rising left. But new evidence shows that PR strengthens the left and redistribution, and we argue the standard view is wrong historically, analytically, and empirically. We offer a radically different explanation. Integrating two opposed interpretations of PR – minimum winning coalitions versus consensus – we propose that the right adopted PR when their support for consensual regulatory frameworks, especially of labor markets and skill formation where co-specific investments were important, outweighed their opposition to the redistributive consequences; this occurred in countries with previously densely organized local economies. In countries with adversarial industrial relations, and weak coordination of business and unions, keeping majoritarian institutions helped contain the left. This explains the close association between current varieties of capitalism and electoral institutions, and why they persist over time

Liberal market economies, business, and political finance: Britain under New Labour

The extent and nature of business financing of parties is an important feature of political finance. Britain’s transparent and permissive regulatory system provides an excellent opportunity to study business financing of parties. Business donations have been very important to the Conservative party over the last decade, and of only marginal importance to Labour. Unlike other Conservative contributors, business donors are more likely to contribute when the party is popular. In contrast to the previous period of Conservative government, the biggest British businesses tended to abstain from political finance under New Labour. However, their bias towards the Conservatives is affected by the party’s popularity and the closeness of an election. Britain shares the political importance of business financing of parties and its mixture of ideological and pragmatic motivations with other liberal market economies. However, in Britain the bias towards the right is much stronger and the role of big business more marginal

Germline variation at 8q24 and prostate cancer risk in men of European ancestry

Chromosome 8q24 is a susceptibility locus for multiple cancers, including prostate cancer. Here we combine genetic data across the 8q24 susceptibility region from 71,535 prostate cancer cases and 52,935 controls of European ancestry to define the overall contribution of germline variation at 8q24 to prostate cancer risk. We identify 12 independent risk signals for prostate cancer (p < 4.28 × 10−15), including three risk variants that have yet to be reported. From a polygenic risk score (PRS) model, derived to assess the cumulative effect of risk variants at 8q24, men in the top 1% of the PRS have a 4-fold (95%CI = 3.62–4.40) greater risk compared to the population average. These 12 variants account for ~25% of what can be currently explained of the familial risk of prostate cancer by known genetic risk factors. These findings highlight the overwhelming contribution of germline variation at 8q24 on prostate cancer risk which has implications for population risk stratification

Dynamic Responsiveness in the U.S. Senate

I develop a theory of dynamic responsiveness that suggests that parties that win elections choose candidates who are more extreme and parties that lose elections choose candidates who are more moderate. Moreover, the size of past victories matters. Close elections yield little change, but landslides yield larger changes in the candidates offered by both parties. I test this theory by analyzing the relationship between Republican vote share in U.S. Senate elections and the ideology of candidates offered in the subsequent election. The results show that Republican (Democratic) victories in past elections yield candidates who are more (less) conservative in subsequent elections, and the effect is proportional to the margin of victory. This suggests that parties or candidates pay attention to past election returns. One major implication is that parties may remain polarized in spite of their responsiveness to the median voter