MARTIN OF ZADAR ALIAS JOHN BLUND: AN (UN)KNOWN MEDIEVAL TEXT ABOUT THE SOUL AND ITS POWERS

Članak izvještava o srednjovjekovnom rukopisu pronađenom u kaptolskoj knjižnici talijanskoga gradića Urbania, nedaleko od Urbina. Rukopis se sastoji od dva nejednaka i sadržajno neovisna dijela: prvi je dio komentar na teološki nauk Petra Lombardskog (Abstractiones de Libro Sententiarum), a drugi filozofsko-psihologijski spis »O duši i njezinim moćima« (De anima et de potentiis animae). Temeljem nekih povijesnih izvora i indicija oba su teksta pripisana dominikanskomu opatu iz Zadra, stanovitomu Martinu, koji je živio krajem 13. i početkom 14. stoljeća. Prvi je dio rukopisa 2006. doživio kritičko izdanje, a drugi je tek nedavno transkribiran. Otkriveno je da se »Martinov« spis o duši sastoji isključivo od fragmenata djela nastalog čitavo stoljeće prije (oko godine 1200.), čiji je autor Ivan (John) Blund (Johannes Blundus), jedan od prvih srednjovjekovnih komentatora Aristotelovih prirodoznanstvenih spisa i posrednik u recepciji grčke i arapske psihologije na kršćanskom Zapadu. Usporedna analiza dvaju tekstova otvara zanimljiva pitanja i o recepciji Blundova djela u visokoj skolastici i o namjeni Martinove kompilacije.The author reports on a manuscript, held in the capitol library in Urbania, near Urbino in Italy, consisting of two separate texts: the first being a commentary on Peter Lombard’s Sententiae (Abstractiones de Libro Sententiarum) and the second a psychological treatise on the soul and its powers (De anima et de potentiis animae). Leaning on bibliographical notes left by two distinguished historians of the Dominican order (one by Herman D. Christianopulo from the end of the 18th century and the other by Thomas M. Kaeppeli from the second part of the 20th century) and two notes from a notary office in Split dating from the 14 century, Croatian scholar Franjo Šanjek (as far back as 1981) has attributed both texts to a Dominican friar Martin of Zadar (Martinus de Jadra). A paleographical analysis of the manuscript confirmed that it originates from the end of the 13th or the beginning of the 14th century. In the year 2006 a critical edition of the first part of the manuscript, Martin’s comments on the Sententiae, has been published. The analysis of the second (and much shorter) part of the manuscript (comprising 18 folia) revealed that its text consists of larger excerpts from John Blund’s (Johannes Blundus’) Tractatus de anima, an important piece of Aristotelian-Avicennian philosophical psychology that was most probably written between year 1200 and 1204. Parallel presentation of the two texts, the critical edition of Blund’s treatise (edited by D. A. Callus, R. W. Hunt and M. W. Dunne) and the transcribed text of the second part of the manuscript from Urbania, shows interesting similarities and dissimilarities which might prove useful both for the study of the reception of Blund’s philosophy in the 13th and 14th centuries and for the critical edition of his only preserved work (hitherto based on three known manuscripts: from Cambridge, Prague and Vatican). A plausible assumption concerning the purpose of Martin’s compilation of parts of Blund’s Treatise is that it was used for teaching (perhaps in a Dominican monastery school, either in Zadar or in Northern Italy). However, even if this assumption proves right, there remains a baffling question: Why did Martin, among an abundance of psychological works from the 13th and the beginning of the 14th centuries, of which some were written by greatest Dominican thinkers (like Albert the Great or Thomas Aquinas), picked out a more than a century old text which – as one might plausibly assume – was not even among the more popular representatives of its kind. The choice ofBlund’s Treatise appears even more peculiar knowing that its author draws extensively on natural-philosophical sources – not only Greek and Arabic, but also medieval ones (e.g. Quaestiones Salernitanae or Adelard of Bath)

Connection Principle, Searle, and Unconscious Intentionality

U tekstu se želimo kritički osvrnuti na Searleovo (1992, 1995) “načelo vezanosti” (connection principle) – načelo prema kojemu su svojstvo intencionalnosti i svojstvo fenomenalnosti (svjesnosti) nužno koinstancirana. Svaka teorija uma koja uključuje neku varijantu tog načela polazi od pretpostavke da su sva intencionalna (a onda i mentalna) stanja ili svjesna ili potencijalno svjesna. Riječ je o stajalištu koje je polariziralo filozofe uma i u posljednjih petnaestak godina bilo predmetom zanimljivih rasprava. Moglo bi se reći da se prema stavu – bilo eksplicitnom bilo implicitnom – koji neki filozof uma zauzima prema načelu vezanosti može prepoznati opći istraživački program kojemu pripada. I za zagovornike i za protivnike načela vezanosti – doduše iz različitih razloga – osobiti izazov predstavlja objašnjenje intencionalnosti nesvjesnih mentalnih stanja. Cilj nam je ukazati na neke nedostatke Searleova pokušaja da riješi taj problem – pokušaja kojemu u osnovi leži zamisao da nesvjesna mentalna stanja zadržavaju svoju aspektualnost (aspectual shape) dok su nesvjesna. Konkretno, pokazat ćemo zašto pojam aspektualnosti ne može igrati eksplanatornu ulogu koju mu je Searle namijenio te zašto bi trebalo pronaći neki drugi, restriktivniji i konzistentniji kriterij pripisivanja intencionalnosti potencijalno svjesnim stanjima. Taj bi kriterij, prema našem shvaćanju, trebao biti kompatibilan s pučkopsihološkom intuicijom o postojanju dispozicijskih stanja koja igraju neizostavnu kauzalnu ulogu u našem mentalnom funkcioniranju i koja, kao takva, čine autentičan podskup svih nesvjesnih (tj. čisto neurofizioloških) stanja našeg mozga/uma.The present article is a critical assessment of the “Connection Principle” (Searle, 1992, 1995) – the principle according to which the two key properties of mental states, intentionality and phenomenality (consciousness), are necessarily co-instantiated. A theory of mind endorsing some version of this principle assumes that all intentional (and therefore mental) states are either conscious or otherwise potentially conscious. The Connection Principle, being a subject of much controversy in the past 15 years, has divided the community of philosophers of mind in two, as it were, irreconcilable camps. What poses a special challenge to both friends and foes of the Connection Principle – albeit for different reasons – is a plausible explanation of intentional character of unconscious mental states. We want to point to and comment on certain weaknesses of Searle’s attempt to solve this problem – an attempt drawing on the idea that unconscious mental states “retain” its “aspectual shape” while unconscious. Eventually, we will venture to show why the notion of aspectual shape cannot play the explanatory role assigned to it by Searle, and why a more restrictive and a more consistent criterion for ascribing intentionality to unconscious states is needed. This new criterion should be sensible to our folk-psychological intuition suggesting that there are dispositional states that play an indispensable causal role in our mental economy and, as such, build a genuine subset of all nconscious, i.e., purely neurophysiological states of our mind/brain

Empathy, Communication, Deception

Empathy is understood as a mode of understanding operating on a subconscious level of mental processing. The cognitive element can only abstractly be distinguished from its affective expression. When recognizing a fellow creature we involuntarily sympathize with it. Recognition of covert motivations of overt behavior is the first step in formation of a communication channel between two (or more) empathizing agents. Yet, since communication evolved in variably complex social environments it was subject to pressure of conflicting individual interests. Deception thus evolved as an adaptive evolutionary strategy. Empathic understanding does not necessarily entail recognition of agent’s real intentions. Deception may be achieved on both conscious and unconscious processing levels. A sufficient degree of biopsychosocial maturity must be reached for a child to be able to independently recognize verbal and non-verbal communication finesses. Once this level has been attained, the prevailing emotional orientation determines his/her degree of empathizing competence

Empathy, Communication, Deception

Empathy is understood as a mode of understanding operating on a subconscious level of mental processing. The cognitive element can only abstractly be distinguished from its affective expression. When recognizing a fellow creature we involuntarily sympathize with it. Recognition of covert motivations of overt behavior is the first step in formation of a communication channel between two (or more) empathizing agents. Yet, since communication evolved in variably complex social environments it was subject to pressure of conflicting individual interests. Deception thus evolved as an adaptive evolutionary strategy. Empathic understanding does not necessarily entail recognition of agent’s real intentions. Deception may be achieved on both conscious and unconscious processing levels. A sufficient degree of biopsychosocial maturity must be reached for a child to be able to independently recognize verbal and non-verbal communication finesses. Once this level has been attained, the prevailing emotional orientation determines his/her degree of empathizing competence

Damir Mladić: Mind, Consciousness, and Qualia

Tekst je kritički prikaz knjige Damira Mladića Um, svijest i qualia, objavljene: Klanjec: HZKD, 2007. ; 317 str

Damir Mladić: Mind, Consciousness, and Qualia

Tekst je kritički prikaz knjige Damira Mladića Um, svijest i qualia, objavljene: Klanjec: HZKD, 2007. ; 317 str