Entrant Experience and Plant Exit

Producers entering a market can differ widely in their prior production experience, ranging from none to extensive experience in related geographic or product markets. In this paper, we quantify the nature of prior plant and firm experience for entrants into a market and measure its effect on the plant's decision to exit the market. Using plant-level data for seven regional manufacturing industries in the U.S., we find that a producer's experience at the time it enters a market plays an important role in the subsequent exit decision, affecting both the overall probability of exit and the method of exit. After controlling for observable plant and market profit determinants, there remain systematic differences in failure patterns across three groups of plants distinguished by their prior experience: de novo entrants, experienced plants that enter by diversifying their product mix, and new plants owned by experienced firms. The results indicate that the exit decision cannot be treated as determined solely by current and future plant, firm, and market conditions, but that the plant's history plays an important independent role in conditioning the likelihood of survival.

The dynamics of market structure and market size in two health services industries

The relationship between the size of a market and the competitiveness of the market has been of long-standing interest to IO economists. Empirical studies have used the relationship between the size of the geographic market and both the number of firms in the market and the average sales of the firms to draw inferences about the degree of competition in the market. This paper extends this framework to incorporate the analysis of entry and exit flows. A key implication of recent entry and exit models is that current market structure will likely depend upon the history of past participation. The paper explores these issues empirically by examining producer dynamics for two health service industries, dentistry and chiropractic services.Markets ; Industrial organization ; Service industries

Entry, exit and the determinants of market structure

Market structure is determined by the entry and exit decisions of individual producers. These decisions are driven by expectations of future profits which, in turn, depend on the nature of competition within the market. In this paper we estimate a dynamic, structural model of entry and exit in an oligopolistic industry and use it to quantify the determinants of market structure and long-run firm values for two U.S. service industries, dentists and chiropractors. We find that entry costs faced by potential entrants, fixed costs faced by incumbent producers, and the toughness of short-run price competition are all important determinants of long run firm values and market structure. As the number of firms in the market increases, the value of continuing in the market and the value of entering the market both decline, the probability of exit rises, and the probability of entry declines. The magnitude of these effects differ substantially across markets due to differences in exogenous cost and demand factors and across the dentist and chiropractor industries. Simulations using the estimated model for the dentist industry show that pressure from both potential entrants and incumbent firms discipline long-run profits. We calculate that a seven percent reduction in the mean sunk entry cost would reduce a monopolist's long-run profits by the same amount as if the firm operated in a duopoly.Markets ; Competition ; Service industries

Entry, Exit, and the Determinants of Market Structure

Market structure is determined by the entry and exit decisions of individual producers. These decisions are driven by expectations of future profits which, in turn, depend on the nature of competition within the market. In this paper we estimate a dynamic, structural model of entry and exit in an oligopolistic industry and use it to quantify the determinants of market structure and long-run firm values for two U.S. service industries, dentists and chiropractors. We find that entry costs faced by potential entrants, fixed costs faced by incumbent producers, and the toughness of short-run price competition are all important determinants of long run firm values and market structure. As the number of firms in the market increases, the value of continuing in the market and the value of entering the market both decline, the probability of exit rises, and the probability of entry declines. The magnitude of these effects differ substantially across markets due to differences in exogenous cost and demand factors and across the dentist and chiropractor industries. Simulations using the estimated model for the dentist industry show that pressure from both potential entrants and incumbent firms discipline long-run profits. We calculate that a seven percent reduction in the mean sunk entry cost would reduce a monopolist's long-run profits by the same amount as if the firm operated in a duopoly.

Iron is a ligand of SecA-like metal-binding domains in vivo

Funding: JEL thanks the Royal Society for a University Research Fellowship and the Wellcome Trust for the Q-band EPR spectrometer (099149/Z/12/Z).The ATPase SecA is an essential component of the bacterial Sec machinery, which transports proteins across the cytoplasmic membrane. Most SecA proteins contain a long C-terminal tail (CTT). In Escherichia coli, the CTT contains a structurally flexible linker domain and a small metal-binding domain (MBD). The MBD coordinates zinc via a conserved cysteine-containing motif and binds to SecB and ribosomes. In this study, we screened a high-density transposon library for mutants that affect the susceptibility of E. coli to sodium azide, which inhibits SecA-mediated translocation. Results from sequencing this library suggested that mutations removing the CTT make E. coli less susceptible to sodium azide at subinhibitory concentrations. Copurification experiments suggested that the MBD binds to iron and that azide disrupts iron binding. Azide also disrupted binding of SecA to membranes. Two other E. coli proteins that contain SecA-like MBDs, YecA and YchJ, also copurified with iron, and NMR spectroscopy experiments indicated that YecA binds iron via its MBD. Competition experiments and equilibrium binding measurements indicated that the SecA MBD binds preferentially to iron and that a conserved serine is required for this specificity. Finally, structural modelling suggested a plausible model for the octahedral coordination of iron. Taken together, our results suggest that SecA-like MBDs likely bind to iron in vivo.PostprintPeer reviewe

Tele-branding in TVIII: the network as brand and the programme as brand

In the era of TVIII, characterized by deregulation, multimedia conglomeration, expansion and increased competition, branding has emerged as a central industrial practice. Focusing on the case of HBO, a particularly successful brand in TVIII, this article argues that branding can be understood not simply as a feature of television networks, but also as a characteristic of television programmes. It begins by examining how the network as brand is constructed and conveyed to the consumer through the use of logos, slogans and programmes. The role of programmes in the construction of brand identity is then complicated by examining the sale of programmes abroad, where programmes can be seen to contribute to the brand identity of more than one network. The article then goes on to examine programme merchandising, an increasingly central strategy in TVIII. Through an analysis of different merchandising strategies the article argues that programmes have come to act as brands in their own right, and demonstrates that the academic study of branding not only reveals the development of new industrial practices, but also offers a way of understanding the television programme and its consumption by viewers in a period when the texts of television are increasingly extended across a range of media platforms