Indonesia as a growing maritime power: possible implications for Australia

Indonesia’s experience in growing its maritime power will not be of interest to Australia solely in terms of the possible product, but also as a particular illustration of the process of becoming a maritime power. Executive summary There are two reasons why Australia should be interested in the new but now much-discussed maritime aspirations of Indonesia and the trials and tribulations Indonesia faces in turning those aspirations into reality. The first and most obvious is that the maritime performance of its nearest and potentially most powerful neighbour are bound to play an important role in shaping the context in which Australia itself defines its own maritime interests and acts to defend them. The emergence of a new and significant maritime power in Australia’s immediate strategic vicinity is bound to be a matter of major interest. The second reason is perhaps a little less obvious, and is the focus of this paper. Indonesia and Australia are alike in being Indo-Pacific countries that are growing their maritime and naval forces. All around the region - from China to Brunei - naval modernisation is proceeding apace, such that for the first time in 400 years, Asian naval spending exceeds that of Western Europe. In sharp distinction to their European counterparts, Asian navies are making use of expanding budgets to develop new operational aspirations, to go further afield and to perform increasingly ambitious tasks. Because some of these tasks imply competition rather than cooperation between navies, there are even probably exaggerated fears of a naval arms race developing in the region with unforeseeable but portentous implications for regional stability. Given the current level of dispute in the South and East China seas, it is perhaps unsurprising that the focus of most current discussion should be on the causes, prospects and possible consequences of growing maritime power and naval expansion in the region, rather than on the problems that countries face in turning such plans into reality. But in fact there are a great many hurdles and challenges to be overcome before this can be done. Although every country is unique in its geostrategic setting, cultural expectation, economic requirements and resources, they all face similar challenges. Accordingly, Indonesia’s experience in growing its maritime power will not be of interest to Australia solely in terms of the possible product, but also as a particular illustration of the process of becoming a maritime power. An exercise in contrast and comparison between different countries in how they set about a common task like building a bigger navy may well provide a better understanding of the problems that each faces in doing so. But, first, a short excursion into definitions seems necessary. This paper draws a sharp distinction between ‘being maritime’ and ‘being a maritime power’. Being maritime - or not - is often a matter of circumstance, something over which a country has little or no control. It means simply having maritime interests that derive from the international context in which countries find themselves, whether they like it or not. These maritime interests may derive from simple geography and the economic imperatives it sets. They may be determined by experience, habits of thought, culture and practice that are the consequence of long years of responding to these maritime circumstances. Some of these interests bear a distinct similarity to Mahan’s famous conditions for sea power. But the point is that they are interests only. They do not imply the capability to defend or develop them. Being a maritime power, on the other hand, means having just such a capability to some extent or other. Most, perhaps all, countries will naturally want to become maritime powers in this sense, because it means being able to turn having maritime interests into an advantage and to greater control over one’s destiny. It requires an enhanced willingness and capacity to respond actively to one’s circumstances. But Indonesia’s recent and current experience shows that growing maritime power in this way is not easy. That experience has lessons to teach

The Hattendorf Prize Lecture, 2018

“History, Truth Decay, and the Naval Profession” Why in this age of constant technological, economic, social, and political change should navies actively concern themselves with the naval past? Herein I will try to answer this question, one often asked by skeptics anxious to insert into the developing courses of professional military education (PME) material that seems so much more relevant to the contemporary problems they face

New Directions in Maritime Strategy?—Implications for the U.S. Navy

The defense of the system requires a range of naval tasks that covers much of the spectrum of conflict, a range that seems to be getting ever wider. The resultant strategies are a blend of cooperative and competitive approaches in policy, since the two are no more mutually exclusive in maritime-strategy making than they are in international political life

Great Britain Gambles with the Royal Navy

British defense policy makers have taken a risky gamble for the future of the Royal Navy—they have undertaken the most ambitious program of fleet recapitalization for perhaps forty years, at a time when naval defense spending is less than half of what it was in the Cold War era. This gamble will only have paid off if and when current programs complete

The New U.S. Maritime Strategy: Another View from Outside

The refreshed “Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower” raises a number of questions: What is this new “strategy,” whom is it for, what has changed, and how will other navies and their nations react

A New Type of Great Power Relationship between the United States and China: The Military Dimension

View the Executive SummaryThe relative economic and military rise of China is likely to lead a major shift in the world’s strategic architecture. The form that China\u27s new role takes will have a decisive impact on the interests of the United States and its allies and partners in the region. For the outcome to be generally beneficial, China needs to be dissuaded from hegemonic aspirations and retained as a cooperative partner in the world system. President Xi Jinping\u27s recent suggestion that a newly empowered China and the United States adopt a relationship that is new and different from previous relations between the great powers provides an ideal opportunity for the United States to consider its strategic options in the region. Given the importance of the issues at stake, and the difficulty of the task, all of the levers of American power, both “hard” and “soft” will need to be brought into play. Since the Asia-Pacific Region is primarily a maritime theater, a leading role wi1ll need to be played by the U.S. Navy, Marines, and Air Force. The U.S. Army will have a substantial supporting and facilitating role in shaping the new relationship with an emergent China.https://press.armywarcollege.edu/monographs/1482/thumbnail.jp

UK air-sea integration in Libya, 2011: a successful blueprint for the future?

This is an English version of the chapter written in March 2012 and which appeared in ‘Integration der britischen Luft- und Seestreitkräfte im Libyenkrieg 2011: Erfolgreiche Blaupause für die Zukunft?’ in S. Bruns, K. Petretto, D. Petrovic (eds), Maritime Sicherheit, Globale Gesellschaft und internationale Beziehungen, (VS-Verlag, Wiesbaden, 2013), ISBN: 978-3-531-18479-1. The Corbett Centre would like to thank the publishers for permission to reproduce it as a Corbett Paper.Libya was a successful operation fought in a manner Sir Julian Corbett would have immediately recognised as being typically British. Operational success was based upon the successful integration of UK air and sea assets. As a time, scope and geographically limited operation based on air and sea integration as part of an existing alliance framework (NATO), UK participation in the 2011 Libya operation seems likely to help set the course for British defence in the short-term. Sea based forces were crucial to ensure sea control as an enabler for projecting force ashore from the sea through TLAM and NGS and carrier based aviation. They also enforced a UN arms embargo on the Libyan regime while allowing supplies to reach the Libyan rebel forces