Flexibility Provisions in Multilateral Environmental Treaties

In international politics, intergovernmental treaties provide the rules of the game. Similar to private law, treaty designers face a trade-off between flexibility to adjust to unforeseen contingencies and the danger that the binding nature of the treaty and hence, the level of commitment by treaty members, is being undermined if the treaty can be amended too easily. In this paper, we address this problem in the analytical framework of institutional economics, drawing in particular on the incomplete contracts literature. Furthermore, we derive preliminary hypotheses and operational concepts for the measurement of flexibility in international treaties. Based on 400 treaties and supplementary agreements from the field of international environmental law, we provide new insights into the combined application of rules for adoption and entry into force of amendments, as well as provisions for conflict resolution and interpretative development. Using correspondence analysis, we show that treaty provisions can be represented in a two-dimensional property space, where treaties can be arrayed according to the degree of institutionalisation as well as along a flexibility dimension. --

Flexibility Provisions in Multilateral Environmental Treaties

In international politics, intergovernmental treaties provide the rules of the game. Similar to private law, treaty designers face a trade-off between flexibility to adjust to unforeseen contingencies and the danger that the binding nature of the treaty and hence, the level of commitment by treaty members, is being undermined if the treaty can be amended too easily. In this paper, we address this problem in the analytical framework of institutional economics, drawing in particular on the incomplete contracts literature. Furthermore, we derive preliminary hypotheses and operational concepts for the measurement of flexibility in international treaties. Based on 400 treaties and supplementary agreements from the field of international environmental law, we provide new insights into the combined application of rules for adoption and entry into force of amendments, as well as provisions for conflict resolution and interpretative development. Using correspondence analysis, we show that treaty provisions can be represented in a two-dimensional property space, where treaties can be arrayed according to the degree of institutionalisation as well as along a flexibility dimension

Agricultural Structure and the Rise of the Nazi Party reconsidered

There is widespread agreement within academic literature that the NSDAP systematically and effectively targeted the rural areas beginning with the agrarian crisis in 1927/8. However, one issue is left unresolved: were specific levels of agricultural strata differently attracted to the Nazis, and if so, how? In light of the economic and political incentives offered to German peasants with differing farm sizes, we expect that regions characterized by middle peasants were most likely to have electorally swung in a distinct, asymmetric and relevant way towards the Nazis. In order to test this hypothesis, we have used a country-wide data set, which includes the original categories of ‘parcel peasants’ (0-2 hectare), ‘small-sized’ (2-5 hectare) and ‘medium-sized’ farmers (5-20 hectare). These specific classifications were introduced and behaviorally legitimated by the Statistical Office of the Weimar Republic at that time. We present the first analysis applying generalised additive models (GAM) for the assessment of ecological relations. In order to account for the construction of political spaces – and therefore of spatial dependencies, we offer a new mechanism based on stipulations of the electoral system. Even after controlling for pre-established impact factors (protestantism, urbanization, etc.) and for spatial effects, we identify a clear impact of the agrarian middle classes (5-20 hectare) on the Nazi vote beginning with the election in July 1932

Global energy governance: trade, infrastructure, and the diffusion of international organizations

Why do states choose to join and form international governmental organizations (IGOs) that regulate energy policy? In this article we make three specific contributions to the literature on international cooperation and diffusion. First, we show that countries form and join energy IGOs in response to memberships previously gained by direct competitors among oil and gas producers and consumers. Moreover, we demonstrate that energy IGOs diffuse among countries that share oil and gas pipelines. Finally, we provide evidence that the institutional design of established energy IGOs impacts the development of their membership network. To test these hypotheses, we rely on original data on oil and gas pipelines and the design of energy IGOs as well as on a newly compiled dataset that includes 152 countries and covers 38 years (1970–2007). We employ both network analysis and spatial econometrics

Separable and semiparametric network-based counting processes applied to the international combat aircraft trades

We propose a novel tie-oriented model for longitudinal event network data. The generating mechanism is assumed to be a multivariate Poisson process that governs the onset and repetition of yearly observed events with two separate intensity functions. We apply the model to a network obtained from the number of international deliveries of combat aircraft trades between 1950 and 2017. Based on a modified trade gravity approach we identify economic and political factors impeding or lightening the number of transfers. Extensive dynamics as well as country heterogeneity require the specification of semiparametric time-varying effects as well as random effects

A dynamic separable network model with actor heterogeneity: An application to global weapons transfers

In this paper, we analyse the network of international major conventional weapons (MCW) transfers from 1950 to 2016, based on data from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). The dataset consists of yearly bilateral arms transfers between pairs of countries, which allows us to conceive of the individual relationships as part of an overall trade network. For the analysis, we extend the separable temporal exponential random graph model (STERGM) to account for time‐varying effects on both the network level (trade network) and the actor level (country effects). Our investigation enables the identification of potentially differing driving forces that influence the formation of new trade relationships versus the persistence of existing ones. In accordance with political economy models, we expect security‐ and network‐related covariates to be most important for the formation of transfers, whereas repeated transfers should prevalently be determined by the importers’ market size and military spending. Our proposed modelling approach corroborates the hypothesis and quantifies the corresponding effects. Additionally, we subject the time‐varying heterogeneity effects to a functional principal component analysis. This analysis serves as an exploratory tool and allows us to identify countries with exceptional increases or decreases in their tendency to import and export weapons

Deontological and consequentialist preferences towards arms exports

Despite fierce politicization in arms-exporting democracies, we lack systematic research on mass public preferences on arms transfers. We propose that citizens either apply a deontologist (rejecting transfers categorically) or consequentialist (trading-off economic, strategic and normative aspects) calculus of preference formation. Conducting population-representative survey experiments (mathematical equation) in Germany and France, two global top-five major arms exporters, we find that 10–15 per cent of respondents follow deontologist considerations, a preference structure potentially relevant for all foreign policies involving the use of military force. Still, a majority shows differentiated preferences, giving largest weight to normative considerations, with assessments affected by moderating features (e.g., scenarios of just war). Principled rejection of arms trade and a large consequentialist weight for normative factors are more pronounced in Germany compared to France, indicating that public opinion might pose a stronger constraint for government policy in this country. Respondents' preferences match opinion polls on post-Russian invasion Ukraine armament, indicating high external validity of our experiments

The Role of Governmental Weapons Procurements in Forecasting Monthly Fatalities in Intrastate Conflicts: A Semiparametric Hierarchical Hurdle Model

Accurate and interpretable forecasting models predicting spatially and temporally fine-grained changes in the numbers of intrastate conflict casualties are of crucial importance for policymakers and international non-governmental organisations (NGOs). Using a count data approach, we propose a hierarchical hurdle regression model to address the corresponding prediction challenge at the monthly PRIO-grid level. More precisely, we model the intensity of local armed conflict at a specific point in time as a three-stage process. Stages one and two of our approach estimate whether we will observe any casualties at the country- and grid-cell-level, respectively, while stage three applies a regression model for truncated data to predict the number of such fatalities conditional upon the previous two stages. Within this modelling framework, we focus on the role of governmental arms imports as a processual factor allowing governments to intensify or deter from fighting. We further argue that a grid cell's geographic remoteness is bound to moderate the effects of these military buildups. Out-of-sample predictions corroborate the effectiveness of our parsimonious and theory-driven model, which enables full transparency combined with accuracy in the forecasting process