The Privacy Cost of Currency

Banknotes, or cash, can be used continuously by any person for nearly every transaction and provide anonymity for the parties. However, as digitization increases, the role and form of money is changing. In response to pressure produced by the increase in new forms of money and the potential for a cashless society, states are exploring potential substitutes to cash. Governments have begun to investigate the intersection of digitization and fiat currency: Central Bank Digital Currencies (“CBDC”). States have begun researching and developing CBDCs to serve in lieu of cash. Central banks are analyzing the potential for a CBDC that could be made available to the public and serve as a substitute for cash by providing an alternate, safe, and robust payment instrument. However, the greatest attribute of cash is that it protects purchaser anonymity. Fully eliminating cash, without a substitute that safeguards anonymity, would undermine privacy of individuals. The creation of a CBDC in response to the potential cashless society raises the question whether the anonymity previously provided by cash must be safeguarded by the state. This note posits that a central bank in a cashless society must opt for the token-based form of CBDC, which provides the most privacy to individuals. States that choose an account-based CBDC will be in violation of fundamental international privacy principles. This note begins by drawing the crucial distinction between account-based and token-based currencies. Then, this note argues that the broad right to privacy in the digital age is inclusive of personal financial data; this data is subject to the lawful and arbitrary standards of article 17 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”). Applying the ICCPR framework, it becomes abundantly clear that the privacy of individuals must be protected, even in the rapidly changing landscape of payments in the digital age

The Fed of the Future: A Framework to Optimize Short-Term Lending Practices

Underbanked individuals currently face significant risk when accessing short-term credit. While payday loans are the least expensive short-term credit option when compared to alternatives like overdraft fees, they can also have an extraordinarily high cost of borrowing. Unable to pay the cost of the loan, borrowers often find themselves in a vicious cycle that drives them further into debt. This Note sets forth a proposal as to how payday loans can be better regulated to create affordable access to short-term credit. Specifically, this Note advocates for congressional and Federal Reserve intervention in the payday lending market. This Note first analyzes the current regulatory environment for payday loans. It concludes that the CFPB’s attempts to regulate payday loans at the federal level have largely fallen short, while state attempts to regulate payday loans are threatened by recent OCC rulemaking. Without intervention, underbanked consumers’ access to shortterm credit may be threatened by usurious payday lenders. The potential for an unregulated market has created a need for federal intervention. On this basis, the second half of this Note argues that congressional intervention in setting a federal usury rate is not only justified, but necessary. This approach is not without its difficulties; a congressional usury rate may drive existing lenders out of the payday lending market for want of profit. Thus, to preserve efficient access to short-term credit, this Note proposes that the Federal Reserve create a short-term lending framework through the layered use of FedAccounts and FedNow

Should Central Banks Use Distributed Ledger Technology and Digital Currencies to Advance Financial Inclusion?

This paper examines how central banks might use distributed ledger technology (“DLT”) to improve access to safe and affordable financial products and services. We consider how central banks might use DLT to advance objectives such as Anti-Money Laundering (“AML”) compliance and discuss both central bank digital currencies (“CBDC”) and private digital currencies. We consider implementation challenges for these new approaches relating to interoperability, privacy, and efficiency. We conclude that financial inclusion is far from an assured outcome: central banks must work to ensure that any new technologies they adopt or foster do not exclude marginalized groups and instead focus with intentionality on low-income households. Moreover, difficult issues with respect to financial disintermediation, credit availability, and financial stability would need to be addressed

Gammaretrovirus-mediated correction of SCID-X1 is associated with skewed vector integration site distribution in vivo

We treated 10 children with X-linked SCID (SCID-X1) using gammaretrovirus-mediated gene transfer. Those with sufficient follow-up were found to have recovered substantial immunity in the absence of any serious adverse events up to 5 years after treatment. To determine the influence of vector integration on lymphoid reconstitution, we compared retroviral integration sites (RISs) from peripheral blood CD3(+) T lymphocytes of 5 patients taken between 9 and 30 months after transplantation with transduced CD34(+) progenitor cells derived from 1 further patient and I healthy donor. Integration occurred preferentially in gene regions on either side of transcription start sites, was clustered, and correlated with the expression level in CD34(+) progenitors during transduction. In contrast to those in CD34(+) cells, RISs recovered from engrafted CD3(+)T cells were significantly overrepresented within or near genes encoding proteins with kinase or transferase activity or involved in phosphorus metabolism. Although gross patterns of gene expression were unchanged in transduced cells, the divergence of RIS target frequency between transduced progenitor cells and post-thymic T lymphocytes indicates that vector integration influences cell survival, engraftment, or proliferation

Awareness, Trial, and Use of Electronic Cigarettes Among 10 Countries: Findings from the ITC Project

Background: In recent years, electronic cigarettes (e-cigarettes) have generated considerable interest and debate on the implications for tobacco control and public health. Although the rapid growth of e-cigarettes is global, at present, little is known about awareness and use. This paper presents self-reported awareness, trial and current use of e-cigarettes in 10 countries surveyed between 2009 and 2013; for six of these countries, we present the first data on e-cigarettes from probability samples of adult smokers. Methods: A cross-sectional analysis of probability samples of adult (≥ 18 years) current and former smokers participating in the International Tobacco Control (ITC) surveys from 10 countries. Surveys were administered either via phone, face-to-face interviews, or the web. Survey questions included sociodemographic and smoking-related variables, and questions about ecigarette awareness, trial and current use. Results: There was considerable cross-country variation by year of data collection and for awareness of e-cigarettes (Netherlands (2013: 88%), Republic of Korea (2010: 79%), United States (2010: 73%), Australia (2013: 66%), Malaysia (2011: 62%), United Kingdom (2010: 54%), Canada (2010: 40%), Brazil (2013: 35%), Mexico (2012: 34%), and China (2009: 31%)), in self-reports of ever having tried ecigarettes (Australia, (20%), Malaysia (19%), Netherlands (18%), United States (15%), Republic of Korea (11%), United Kingdom (10%), Mexico (4%), Canada (4%), Brazil (3%), and China (2%)), and in current use (Malaysia (14%), Republic of Korea (7%), Australia (7%), United States (6%), United Kingdom (4%), Netherlands (3%), Canada (1%), and China (0.05%)). Conclusions: The cross-country variability in awareness, trial, and current use of e-cigarettes is likely due to a confluence of country-specific market factors, tobacco control policies and regulations (e.g., the legal status of e-cigarettes and nicotine), and the survey timing along the trajectory of e-cigarette awareness and trial/use in each country. These ITC results constitute an important snapshot of an early stage of what appears to be a rapid progression of global e-cigarette use

The Privacy Cost of Currency

Banknotes, or cash, can be used continuously by any person for nearly every transaction and provide anonymity for the parties. However, as digitization increases, the role and form of money is changing. In response to pressure produced by the increase in new forms of money and the potential for a cashless society, states are exploring potential substitutes to cash. Governments have begun to investigate the intersection of digitization and fiat currency: Central Bank Digital Currencies (“CBDC”). States have begun researching and developing CBDCs to serve in lieu of cash. Central banks are analyzing the potential for a CBDC that could be made available to the public and serve as a substitute for cash by providing an alternate, safe, and robust payment instrument. However, the greatest attribute of cash is that it protects purchaser anonymity. Fully eliminating cash, without a substitute that safeguards anonymity, would undermine privacy of individuals. The creation of a CBDC in response to the potential cashless society raises the question whether the anonymity previously provided by cash must be safeguarded by the state. This note posits that a central bank in a cashless society must opt for the token-based form of CBDC, which provides the most privacy to individuals. States that choose an account-based CBDC will be in violation of fundamental international privacy principles. This note begins by drawing the crucial distinction between account-based and token-based currencies. Then, this note argues that the broad right to privacy in the digital age is inclusive of personal financial data; this data is subject to the lawful and arbitrary standards of article 17 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”). Applying the ICCPR framework, it becomes abundantly clear that the privacy of individuals must be protected, even in the rapidly changing landscape of payments in the digital age

The Fed of the Future: A Framework to Optimize Short-Term Lending Practices

Underbanked individuals currently face significant risk when accessing short-term credit. While payday loans are the least expensive short-term credit option when compared to alternatives like overdraft fees, they can also have an extraordinarily high cost of borrowing. Unable to pay the cost of the loan, borrowers often find themselves in a vicious cycle that drives them further into debt. This Note sets forth a proposal as to how payday loans can be better regulated to create affordable access to short-term credit. Specifically, this Note advocates for congressional and Federal Reserve intervention in the payday lending market. This Note first analyzes the current regulatory environment for payday loans. It concludes that the CFPB’s attempts to regulate payday loans at the federal level have largely fallen short, while state attempts to regulate payday loans are threatened by recent OCC rulemaking. Without intervention, underbanked consumers’ access to shortterm credit may be threatened by usurious payday lenders. The potential for an unregulated market has created a need for federal intervention. On this basis, the second half of this Note argues that congressional intervention in setting a federal usury rate is not only justified, but necessary. This approach is not without its difficulties; a congressional usury rate may drive existing lenders out of the payday lending market for want of profit. Thus, to preserve efficient access to short-term credit, this Note proposes that the Federal Reserve create a short-term lending framework through the layered use of FedAccounts and FedNow

Should Central Banks Use Distributed Ledger Technology and Digital Currencies to Advance Financial Inclusion?

This paper examines how central banks might use distributed ledger technology (“DLT”) to improve access to safe and affordable financial products and services. We consider how central banks might use DLT to advance objectives such as Anti-Money Laundering (“AML”) compliance and discuss both central bank digital currencies (“CBDC”) and private digital currencies. We consider implementation challenges for these new approaches relating to interoperability, privacy, and efficiency. We conclude that financial inclusion is far from an assured outcome: central banks must work to ensure that any new technologies they adopt or foster do not exclude marginalized groups and instead focus with intentionality on low-income households. Moreover, difficult issues with respect to financial disintermediation, credit availability, and financial stability would need to be addressed