The Effect of Bank Competition on the Bank's Incentive to Collateralize

It has been argued that competing banks make inefficiently frequent use of collateralization in situations where they are better able to evaluate a project's risk than entrepreneurs. We study the bank's choice between screening and collateralization in a model where banks do not have this superior screening skill. In particular, we study the effect of bank competition on this choice. We find that competing banks use collateral less often than a monopolistic bank because competition will intensify if both banks collateralize. Moreover, bank competition is welfare improving if collateralization is rather costly

Buyer power and the coordination of demand in bilateral oligopolies with price competition

SIGLEAvailable from Bibliothek des Instituts fuer Weltwirtschaft, ZBW, Duesternbrook Weg 120, D-24105 Kiel C 160184 / FIZ - Fachinformationszzentrum Karlsruhe / TIB - Technische InformationsbibliothekDEGerman

The role of active monitoring in markets with asymmetric information

SIGLEAvailable from Bibliothek des Instituts fuer Weltwirtschaft, ZBW, Duesternbrook Weg 120, D-24105 Kiel A 172693 / FIZ - Fachinformationszzentrum Karlsruhe / TIB - Technische InformationsbibliothekDEGerman

Lump sum license fee arrangements are the arm's length equivalent of cost sharing arrangements

SIGLEAvailable from Bibliothek des Instituts fuer Weltwirtschaft, ZBW, Duesternbrook Weg 120, D-24105 Kiel W 45 (458) / FIZ - Fachinformationszzentrum Karlsruhe / TIB - Technische InformationsbibliothekDEGerman

On the strategic relevance of the financial structure of firms in a two-period Cournot duopoly

SIGLEAvailable from Bibliothek des Instituts fuer Weltwirtschaft, ZBW, Duesternbrook Weg 120, D-24105 Kiel C 161244 / FIZ - Fachinformationszzentrum Karlsruhe / TIB - Technische InformationsbibliothekDEGerman

Credit-Worthiness Tests and Interbank Competition.

This paper analyzes a competitive credit market where banks use imperfect and independent tests to assess the ability of a potential creditor to repay credit. The banks compete by announcing interest rates at which they will provide credit to those applicants who pass the banks' tests. The proportion of applicants who pass the test of at least one bank increases with the number of banks providing credit, so the average credit-worthiness decreases. It is then shown that in a situation where all banks charge the same interest rate, a bank always has the incentive to undercut in order to improve the average credit-worthiness of its own clientele. This feature represents the major difference from the situations in standard Bertrand and Bertrand-Edgeworth models. Copyright 1990 by The Econometric Society.

Temporal changes in North Atlantic circulation constrained by planktonic foraminiferal shell weights

Records of planktonic foraminiferal shell weights for Globigerina bulloides, covering Termination I from four proximal sites at waters depths from 1150 to 4045 m in the northeast Atlantic, demonstrate the influence of dissolution superimposed upon initial shell weight variability. Records of shell weight, unaffected by dissolution, may be used as a reference for interpreting deeper records in terms of preservation history. Combining records of planktonic shell weight (and benthic δ13C) from shallow and deep sites suggests that maximum oceanic stratification and incursion of southern sourced deep waters in the North Atlantic occurred at about 18–20 ka, defining the glacial mode of Atlantic circulation. Reduced stratification and enhanced preservation in deeper waters reflect conditions during Heinrich event 1. A state similar to the modern mode of Atlantic circulation was attained by about 10 ka