When at Loggerheads With Customary International Law: The Right to Run for Public Office and the Right to Vote

Many populist demagogues in America and Europe have spoken; and continue to speak; against human rights in their campaigns for political office. This article discusses the factors that have contributed to the current wave of populism; and the nature of the challenges that are presented by populism to democracy; human rights; and constitutionalism from an international human rights law perspective. It also focuses on President Donald Trump; who was voted President of the United States; even after he clearly and publicly indicated his support for torture and his intentions to approve it in the United States. To that end; the article asks what a state should do when faced with such populist demagogues; arguing that international law authorizes states to disqualify such candidates from running for public office. In certain circumstances; especially those involving human rights norms that are part of customary international law; there is a state obligation to exclude those who plan to violate them. Of course; such exclusion limits certain rights; such as freedom of expression; the right to vote; and the right to run for public office. Such limitations are not only justifiable for their pursuance of a legitimate aim; but also necessary and proportionate

Are U.S drone targeted killings within the confines of the law?

Equally discomforting is the PlayStation mentality that surrounds drone killings. Young military personnel raised on a diet of video games now kill real people remotely using joysticks. Far removed from the human consequences of their actions, how will this generation of fighters value the right to life? How will commanders and policy makers keep themselves immune from the deceptively antiseptic nature of drone killings? Will killing be a more attractive option than capture? Will the standards of intelligence gathering justify a killing slip? Will the number of acceptable collateral civilian deaths increase?Prepared under the supervision of Mr Gus Waschefort at the International criminal court, The Hague, NetherlandsThesis (LLM (Human Rights and Democratisation in Africa)) -- University of Pretoria, 2011.http://www.chr.up.ac.za/nf2012Centre for Human RightsLL

The international law framework regulating the use of armed drones

This article provides a holistic examination of the international legal frameworks which regulate targeted killings by drones. The article argues that for a particular drone strike to be lawful, it must satisfy the legal requirements under all applicable international legal regimes, namely: the law regulating the use of force (ius ad bellum); international humanitarian law and international human rights law. It is argued that the legality of a drone strike under the ius ad bellum does not preclude the wrongfulness of that strike under international humanitarian law or international human rights law, and that since those latter obligations are owed to individuals, one State cannot consent to their violation by another State. The article considers the important legal challenges that the use of armed drones poses under each of the three legal frameworks mentioned above. It considers the law relating to the use of force by States against non-State groups abroad. This part examines the principles of self-defence and consent, in so far as they may be relied upon to justify targeted killings abroad. The article then turns to some of the key controversies in the application of international humanitarian law to drone strikes. It examines the threshold for non-international armed conflicts, the possibility of a global non-international armed conflict and the question of who may be targeted in a non-international armed conflict. The final substantive section of the article considers the nature and application of the right to life in armed conflict, as well as the extraterritorial application of that right particularly in territory not controlled by the State conducting the strike

Populist candidates and the fitness for public office rule: an international human rights law perspective

The twenty-first century has seen the rise of populist leaders who do not respect human rights. The rise of such leaders has been explained in terms of current world problems like terrorism, migration, influx of refugees, economic stagnation, and cultural backlash against liberties that come with human rights, education, and other freedoms. Populists promise to rectify such problems at any cost, making it clear that nothing will stand in their way—not even fundamental human rights. They publicly support racial discrimination, torture and other violations of jus cogens norms of human rights. Despicable as they may seem, such populist demagogues often have the support of the electorate. This Article discusses whether such “anti-human rights candidates” (defined here as candidates whose record, conduct or proposed plans or policies are inconsistent with fundamental rights) are fit for public office. It further addresses the question whether a state that allows an “anti-human rights candidate” to run for public office violates its international obligations

What level of human control over autonomous weapon systems is required by international law

Autonomous weapon systems [AWS] raise profound legal, ethical and moral concerns. Scholars have asked, for example, whether AWS can comply with international humanitarian law [IHL]; whether their use will lower the threshold on the use of force and undermine jus ad bellum rules and whether their deployment will create an accountability gap in violation of victims’ rights to remedy. While there is no agreed definition of AWS, the United Kingdom House of Lords’ recent report carries definitions that generally describe AWS as robots that, once activated, are able to make targeting decisions without further human intervention.In the recent United Nations Group of Governmental Experts [GGE] meeting [9-13 April] on Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems, States reiterated the need to maintain human control over AWS. Notwithstanding the general consensus on maintaining human control over AWS, there is no agreement on the nature of that human control or how it should be defined