The Federal Advisory Committee Act and Public Participation in Environmental Policy

This paper discusses the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA) and how it affects public participation in environmental decision-making. Passed in 1972 as one of the "openness in government" laws, FACA governs how the federal government seeks outside advice. It has had a profound influence on who participates in government decision-making, when they participate, how they participate, and what influence participation has on policy. FACA has had a number of notable successes. Primary among these has been its role in limiting the unbalanced influence of special interests, acting through advisory committees, on public policy-making. The advisory committees which the law governs have also achieved a number of the "social goals" of public participation, including: (1) educating the public, (2) bringing public values into government decision-making, (3) improving the substantive quality of decisions, (4) increasing trust in government institutions, and (5) reducing conflict. Often, advisory committees have given government relatively inexpensive access to experts and stakeholders in order to achieve these goals. However, FACA has also created�directly and indirectly�a number of "chilling effects" on public participation in environmental decision-making. First are procedural requirements which make it difficult for groups outside of government to become advisory committees, and thereby gain access to decision-making. Second are ambiguities in the law and its regulations which limit the willingness of public agencies to engage the public outside of FACA. And third are Clinton Administration policies which limit the number of advisory committees that agencies are allowed to establish. Taken together, these chilling effects create a paradox wherein agencies are reluctant to engage the public in decision-making outside of FACA but significant barriers keep groups (and agencies) from forming advisory committees under the Act. The paper concludes by recommending a streamlining of FACA's procedural requirements, a clarification of regulations and policies regarding what type of participation falls under FACA, and an elimination of administrative ceilings on advisory committee formation.

Minuscule reverse plane partitions via quiver representations

A nilpotent endomorphism of a quiver representation induces a linear transformation on the vector space at each vertex. Generically among all nilpotent endomorphisms, there is a well-defined Jordan form for these linear transformations, which is an interesting new invariant of a quiver representation. If $Q$ is a Dynkin quiver and $m$ is a minuscule vertex, we show that representations consisting of direct sums of indecomposable representations all including $m$ in their support, the category of which we denote by $\mathcal{C}_{Q,m}$, are determined up to isomorphism by this invariant. We use this invariant to define a bijection from isomorphism classes of representations in $\mathcal{C}_{Q,m}$ to reverse plane partitions whose shape is the minuscule poset corresponding to $Q$ and $m$. By relating the piecewise-linear promotion action on reverse plane partitions to Auslander-Reiten translation in the derived category, we give a uniform proof that the order of promotion equals the Coxeter number. In type $A_n$, we show that special cases of our bijection include the Robinson-Schensted-Knuth and Hillman-Grassl correspondences.Comment: Comments welcom

Information Aggregation and Strategic Abstention in Large Laboratory Elections

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Efficiency, Equity, and Timing in Voting Mechanisms

We compare the behavior of voters, depending on whether they operate under sequential and simultaneous voting rules, when voting is costly and information is incomplete. In many real political institutions, ranging from small committees to mass elections, voting is sequential, which allows some voters to know the choices of earlier voters. For a styl- ized model, we characterize the equilibria for this rule, and compare it to simultaneous voting, and show how these equilibria vary for di¤erent voting costs. This generates a variety of predictions about the relative e¢ ciency and equity of these two systems, which we test using controlled laboratory experiments. Most of the qualitative predictions are supported by the data, but there are signi?cant departures from the predicted equilib- rium strategies, in both the sequential and sumultanous voting games. We ?nd a tradeo¤ between information aggregation, e¢ ciency, and equity in sequential voting: a sequential voting rule aggregates information better, and produces more e¢ cient outcomes on aver- age, compared to simultaneous voting, but sequential voting leads to signi?cant inequities, with later voters ben?tting at the expense of early voters.

Histone H1 is essential for mitotic chromosome architecture and segregation in Xenopus laevis egg extracts.

During cell division, condensation and resolution of chromosome arms and the assembly of a functional kinetochore at the centromere of each sister chromatid are essential steps for accurate segregation of the genome by the mitotic spindle, yet the contribution of individual chromatin proteins to these processes is poorly understood. We have investigated the role of embryonic linker histone H1 during mitosis in Xenopus laevis egg extracts. Immunodepletion of histone H1 caused the assembly of aberrant elongated chromosomes that extended off the metaphase plate and outside the perimeter of the spindle. Although functional kinetochores assembled, aligned, and exhibited poleward movement, long and tangled chromosome arms could not be segregated in anaphase. Histone H1 depletion did not significantly affect the recruitment of known structural or functional chromosomal components such as condensins or chromokinesins, suggesting that the loss of H1 affects chromosome architecture directly. Thus, our results indicate that linker histone H1 plays an important role in the structure and function of vertebrate chromosomes in mitosis