Understanding Effectiveness of International Sanctions

Thomas Biersteker took part in 2019 Gerda Henkel Forum: Values and Interests in Communication Between Russia and The West held in MGIMO-University in late April this year and on the margins of the Forum he was kind enough to give an interview to our editor Vadim Belenkov on effectiveness of targeted international sanctions. Professor Biersteker is a renowned expert on this issue, he co-edited a book «Targeted Sanctions» recently published by Cambridge University Press. The interview shows that targeted sanctions involve restrictive measures against a narrowly-defined range of individuals and firms. Professor Biersteker explained in detail the difference between sanctions with the purpose of coercion, constraining and signaling. He reaffirmed his claim that effectiveness of sanctions should be studied separately for each type of purposes. In the interview professor Biersteker updated some of the findings published in his book three years ago. In 2016 constraining and signaling sanctions were effective at the same level, 27 % of the time. Today data reveal that effective constraining fell by 4 % points and effective signaling rose by 2 % points. Effectiveness of coercion remains at 10 %. The average effectiveness of sanctions across three types is about 20 %. Taking into consideration the difficulty of conflicts and issues over which sanctions are applied – North Korea’s nuclear program, Iran’s potential development of nuclear weapon program, ethnic and religious conflicts in Africa, the Middle East – 20 % should not be considered a small figure. Biersteker also reaffirmed the «sanctions paradox» found in 1999 by Daniel Drezner that very often the countries against which sanctions would be most likely effective are those that are most interdependent whereas sanctions are usually applied in situations when they are less likely to be effective

Explaining the transnational design of international organizations

Past decades have witnessed a shift in international cooperation toward growing involvement of transnational actors (TNAs), such as non-governmental organizations, multinational corporations, and philanthropic foundations. This article offers a comprehensive theoretical and empirical account of TNA access to IOs. The analysis builds on a novel dataset, covering formal TNA access to 298 organizational bodies from 50 IOs over the time period 1950 to 2010. We identify the most profound patterns in TNA access across time, issue areas, policy functions, and world regions, and statistically test competing explanations of the variation in TNA access. The central results are three-fold. First, the empirical data confirm the existence of a far-reaching institutional transformation of IOs over the past sixty years, pervading all issue areas, policy functions, and world regions. Second, variation in TNA access within and across IOs is mainly explained by a combination of three factors: functional demand for the resources of TNAs, domestic democratic standards in the membership of IOs, and state concerns with national sovereignty. Third, existing research suffers from a selection bias that has led it to overestimate the general importance of a new participatory norm in global governance for the openness of IOs

Negotiated Settlement through Sanctions Relief: Options for the Korean Peninsula

In this policy brief published by the Asia-Pacific Leadership Network for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament (APLN), Thomas J. Biersteker and David Lanz propose options for sanctions relief to achieve a negotiated settlement regarding the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. They make concrete suggestions for an incremental negotiation strategy, where some sanctions relief is granted in exchange for progress towards denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, with full termination of sanctions and the creation of a nuclear-free zone as the end goals

UN Sanctions: Liability or Asset in Mediation Processes?

In the publication UN sanctions: liability or asset in mediation processes? , released today by the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue (HD), Professor Thomas Biersteker, Dr Rebecca Brubaker and Dr David Lanz examine the impact on peacemaking of sanctions imposed by the United Nations (UN). Drawing on observations from cases in Afghanistan, Libya, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Sudan and Yemen, the authors address five preconceived ideas about those sanctions, namely that they do not work, are inflexible, prevent mediators from talking to sanctioned parties, enable leverage, and imperil mediators' impartiality

UN Sanctions and Mediation: Establishing Evidence to Inform Practice

Mediation and UN sanctions are two essential policy instruments used by the United Nations in its efforts to prevent and resolve conflict. These two tools are frequently deployed in conjunction, although the degree of their overlap in time and the sequencing of their application vary. Bodies of research exist on how best to use sanctions and on how best to mediate conflicts. Yet, relatively little is known about when and whether these tools work well or work poorly together. This report constitutes a first step in a long overdue effort to establish evidence that can be used to inform practice in the joint application of UN sanctions and mediation. It is based on an 18-month policy research project conducted by the United Nations University Centre for Policy Research, the Graduate Institute, Geneva, and swisspeace. The report is composed of four sections. The first section introduces the rationale and objectives of the research undertaking. The second section reviews the research questions posed, discusses the methodological approach taken, and offers a brief summary of the eleven case episodes. The third section presents the empirical and analytical findings of the project. The final section proposes a series of recommendations for member states, senior UN officials and scholars