Hidden Entities and Experimental Practice: Towards a Two-way Traffic Between History and Philosophy of Science

In this paper I investigate the prospects of integrated history and philosophy of science, by examining how philosophical issues concerning experimental practice and scientific realism can enrich the historical investigation of the careers of "hidden entities", entities that are not accessible to unmediated observation. Conversely, I suggest that the history of those entities has important lessons to teach to the philosophy of science. My overall aim is to illustrate the possibility of a fruitful two-way traffic between history and philosophy of science

CAN A HISTORIAN OF SCIENCE BE A SCIENTIFIC REALIST?

Abstract: In this paper I want to address the problems that the historical development of science poses for a realist and to discuss whether a realist construal of scientific activity is conducive to historiographical practice. My aim is to show that the realism problem is relevant to historiography and that the position one adopts with respect to this problem entails a particular historiographical strategy. I will argue that for historiographical purposes an agnostic attitude with respect to scientific theories and unobservable entities is the most appropriate

Hidden entities and experimental practice: towards a two-way traffic between history and philosophy of science

In this paper I investigate the prospects of integrated history and philosophy of science, by examining how philosophical issues concerning experimental practice and scientific realism can enrich the historical investigation of the careers of "hidden entities", entities that are not accessible to unmediated observation. Conversely, I suggest that the history of those entities has important lessons to teach to the philosophy of science. My overall aim is to illustrate the possibility of a fruitful two-way traffic between history and philosophy of science

Engaging philosophically with the history of science: two challenges for scientific realism

I raise two challenges for scientific realists. The first is a pessimistic meta-induction (PMI), but not of the more common type, which focuses on rejected theories and abandoned entities. Rather, the PMI I have in mind departs from conceptual change, which is ubiquitous in science. Scientific concepts change over time, often to a degree that is difficult to square with the stability of their referents, a sine qua non for realists. The second challenge is to make sense of successful scientific practice that was centered on entities that have turned out to be fictitiou

Representing electrons: a biographical approach to theoretical entities

Both a history and a metahistory, Representing Electrons focuses on the development of various theoretical representations of electrons from the late 1890s to 1925 and the methodological problems associated with writing about unobservable scientific entities. Using the electron-or rather its representation-as a historical actor, Theodore Arabatzis illustrates the emergence and gradual consolidation of its representation in physics, its career throughout old quantum theory, and its appropriation and reinterpretation by chemists. As Arabatzis develops this novel biographica