Delegation and commitment in durable goods monopolies

This paper studies a simultaneous-move infinite-horizon delegation game in which the principal of a durable goods monopoly entrusts pricing decisions to a manager who enjoys consuming her monetary rewards but dislikes production effort. The delegation contract allows for continual interference with managerial incentives: in each period the principal rewards the manager according to her performance. We show that when the cost of delegation is low relative to profits, the principal can attain the precommitment price plan in a perfect rational expectations equilibrium. The paper analyzes the robustness of this result under alternative specifications of timing and objectives. We also provide a numerical characterization of the equilibrium strategies for the case of linear-quadratic payoffs

Belief heterogeneity and survival in incomplete markets

In complete markets economies (Sandroni [16]), or in economies with Pareto optimal outcomes (Blume and Easley [10]), the market selection hypothesis holds, as long as traders have identical discount factors. Traders who survive must have beliefs that merge with the truth. We show that in incomplete markets, regardless of traders’ discount factors, the market selects for a range of beliefs, at least some of which do not merge with the truth. We also show that impatient traders with incorrect beliefs can survive and that these incorrect beliefs impact prices. These beliefs may be chosen so that they are far from the truth

Belief Heterogeneity and Survival in Incomplete Markets

In complete markets economies (Sandroni [15]), or in economies with Pareto optimal outcomes (Blume and Easley [9]), the market selection hypothesis holds, as long as traders have identical discount factors. Traders who survive must have beliefs that merge with the truth. We show that in incomplete markets, regardless of traders’ discount factors, the market selects for a range of beliefs, at least some of which do not merge with the truth. We also show that impatient traders with incorrect beliefs can survive and that these incorrect beliefs impact prices. These beliefs may be chosen so that they are far from the truth.Incomplete markets, market selection hypothesis, belief selection

"Hyperbolic" discounting: A recursive formulation and an application to economic growth

We axiomatize decreasing impatience (DI) in a discrete-time setting, as originally discussed by Prelec, and formulate a class of recursively-defined discounting functions that conform to DI. The recursive formulation is used to analyze the Ramsey growth problem using dynamic programming techniques.Hyperbolic discounting Quasi-hyperbolic discounting Decreasing impatience Markov perfect equilibrium Economic growth