Mutual optimism and war

W hy do states fight costly wars when less costly negotiated settlements are possible? Must there not be some mutually agreeable alternative to war that can produce the same result without incurring the social loss? Could not decision makers agree to distribute the disputed territory or assets in a way consistent with their beliefs about the likely outcome of conflict, saving both sides significant death and destruction? In this article, we address one specific rationalist answer to these questions. As Blainey (1988) intimates, the high hopes on the eve of war suggest a sad conclusion: wars only occur when both rivals believe they can achieve more through fighting than through peaceful means. How might this be so? Obviously, when two countries are involved in a war, if one side wins then the other loses. We might then conclude that at least one side, in particular the loser, would prefer some peaceful method of resolving the dispute if she were certain of the outcome. But war is an uncertain process. Given this uncertainty, the leaders of the two countries must each form expectations about the results of a conflict to guide their decision making. The Mark Fey is associate professor of political science, 109E Harkness Hall, University of Rochester, Rochester, NY 14627 (mark.fey@ rochester.edu). Kristopher W. Ramsay is assistant professor of politics, 033 Corwin Hall, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ 08544 ([email protected]). Earlier versions of this article were presented at the University of Rochester, Columbia University, and NYU. We thank Scott Ashworth, Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, Songying Fang, Tanisha Fazal, Erik Gartzke, Shigeo Hirano, Adam Meirowitz, John Patty, Pablo Pinto, Robert Powell, Quinn Ramsay, Anne Sartori, Curt Signorino, Branislav Slantchev, Allan Stam, Randy Stone, and Robert Walker, as well as other seminar participants. We would also like to thank the editor of the AJPS and two anonymous reviewers for helpful comments. Any remaining errors are our own. Kris Ramsay acknowledges financial support from NSF grant SES-0413381

PTSD and Verteran\u27s Benefits in the United States: A Historical Backgrounder

That war and psychological trauma go together has always been known but not always well understood or popularly accepted. More accepted, at least in US history, has been the notion that military veterans should be thanked for their service on a long-term basis, with a system of benefits that has historically included some combination of compensation, pensions, and health care. How, though, has the veterans’ benefits system dealt with veterans who suffer from war-induced psychological trauma—some version of what is today called post-traumatic stress disorder—over time? This report provides a brief overview of the history of how the US military and veterans’ benefits programs have approached war-induced psychological trauma, with the aim of raising questions about both the causes and the consequences of these changes

State Death in the International System

Under what conditions do states die? Survival is often assumed to be the primary goal of states. Yet international relations scholars have not previously examined the rate or the causes of state death in a systematic way. I argue that buffer states states caught between two rivals are particularly vulnerable to being coerced out of existence. Each rival is afraid that its opponent will conquer the buffer that lies between them, gaining strength and strategic advantage. The rivals inability to credibly commit to preserving the buffer state s sovereignty means that buffer states are extremely vulnerable to conquest. Using event history analysis, I test this argument while controlling for traditional realist variables such as power and alliances, as well as for changes in the post World War II era. The analysis generates three major findings: buffer states are significantly more likely to die than are nonbuffer states; violent state death (conquest and occupation) virtually ceases after 1945; and the relationship between power and state survival is tenuous.For their valuable comments and suggestions, I thank James Fearon, Page Fortna, Erik Gartzke, Hein Goemans, Simon Jackman, Stephen Krasner, David Lewis, Scott Sagan, Erik Voeten, the editor of IO, two anonymous reviewers, as well as seminar participants at Stanford University, Harvard University, the University of Chicago, and the University of Virginia Law School. Earlier versions of this article were presented at the 2000 Annual Meetings of the International Studies Association and the American Political Science Association. Jessica Stanton provided valuable research assistance. I gratefully acknowledge the support of the Center for International Security and Cooperation and the John M. Olin Institute for Strategic Studies. Any errors are my own.

The political and security dimensions of the humanitarian health response to violent conflict

The nature of armed conflict throughout the world is intensely dynamic. Consequently, the protection of non-combatants and the provision of humanitarian services must continually adapt to this changing conflict environment. Complex political affiliations, the systematic use of explosive weapons and sexual violence, and the use of new communication technology, including social media, have created new challenges for humanitarian actors in negotiating access to affected populations and security for their own personnel. The nature of combatants has also evolved as armed, non-state actors might have varying motivations, use different forms of violence, and engage in a variety of criminal activities to generate requisite funds. New health threats, such as the COVID-19 pandemic, and new capabilities, such as modern trauma care, have also created new challenges and opportunities for humanitarian health provision. In response, humanitarian policies and practices must develop negotiation and safety capabilities, informed by political and security realities on the ground, and guidance from affected communities. More fundamentally, humanitarian policies will need to confront a changing geopolitical environment, in which traditional humanitarian norms and protections might encounter wavering support in the years to come

The political and security dimensions of the humanitarian health response to violent conflict

© 2021 Elsevier Ltd The nature of armed conflict throughout the world is intensely dynamic. Consequently, the protection of non-combatants and the provision of humanitarian services must continually adapt to this changing conflict environment. Complex political affiliations, the systematic use of explosive weapons and sexual violence, and the use of new communication technology, including social media, have created new challenges for humanitarian actors in negotiating access to affected populations and security for their own personnel. The nature of combatants has also evolved as armed, non-state actors might have varying motivations, use different forms of violence, and engage in a variety of criminal activities to generate requisite funds. New health threats, such as the COVID-19 pandemic, and new capabilities, such as modern trauma care, have also created new challenges and opportunities for humanitarian health provision. In response, humanitarian policies and practices must develop negotiation and safety capabilities, informed by political and security realities on the ground, and guidance from affected communities. More fundamentally, humanitarian policies will need to confront a changing geopolitical environment, in which traditional humanitarian norms and protections might encounter wavering support in the years to come

Mutual optimism and war

Abstract Working with the definition of mutual optimism as war due to inconsistent beliefs, we formalize the mutual optimism argument to test the theory's logical validity. We find that in the class of strategic situations where mutual optimism is a necessary condition for war-i.e., where war is known to be inefficient, war only occurs if both sides prefer it to a negotiated settlement, and on the eve of conflict war is self-evident-then there is no Bayesian-Nash equilibrium where wars are fought because of mutual optimism. The fundamental reason that mutual optimism cannot lead to war is that if both sides are willing to fight, each side should infer that they have either underestimated the strength of the opponent or overestimated their own strength. In either case, these inferences lead to a peaceful settlement of the dispute. We also show that this result extends to situations in which there is bounded rationality and/or non-common priors