The Law and Psychology of Jury Instructions

I. Introduction II. Types of Jury Instructions ... A. Charging Instructions ... B. Admonitions III. The Psychology of Jury Instructions ... A. Empirical Research about Charging Instructions ... 1. General Comprehensibility ... 2. Timing and Repetition ... 3. Cautionary Instructions ... B. Empirical Research about Admonitions IV. Sense and Nonsense in the Courtroom ... A. The Supreme Court ... B. Jury Instruction Practices Generally ... 1. Charging Instructions ... 2. Admonitions ... a. Instructions to Disregard ... b. Limiting Instructions ... c. Procedural Default Doctrine ... d. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Rule ... V. Suggestions for Law Reform ... A. Rewritten Pattern Instructions ... B. Abandoning Admonitions ... 1. In the Trial Court ... 2. On Appeal ... 3. The Problem That Won\u27t Go Away: The Defendant\u27s Criminal Record VI. Conclusio

Evidence: Survey of Recent Developments in Indiana Law

With rare exceptions, Indiana evidence law progresses slowly and holds closely to the traditional concepts of the common law. This Survey Article collects the several important cases decided during the past year that continue this development of Indiana\u27s common law of evidence. A general word of caution is in order concerning the Indiana appellate courts\u27 evidence cases. Most evidence issues arise in criminal cases, in which convicted defendants allege error in the admission of evidence against them or in the exclusion of evidence offered in their defense. A ruling in favor of the defendant could result in the reversal of the conviction and the release of the accused, something the courts seem loath to allow. Thus, many rulings on points of evidence, particularly those where the court disposes of the issue in a paragraph or two, should probably be interpreted as harmless error cases-cases in which the evidence against the defendant is so strong that the effect of the disputed evidence is negligible. Although the court does not treat these as harmless error cases, many seemingly contradictory opinions, upholding both trial courts that allow the state to introduce disputed evidence and those that prevent the defendant from introducing such evidence, can only be explained rationally in this way

Law Reform by Courts, Legislatures, and Commissions Following Empirical Research on Jury Instructions

Empirical research demonstrates that jurors have difficulty understanding and following traditional instructions about the law. The social science literature recommends several procedural reforms, including giving important instructions at the start of the trial and providing jurors with written instructions. This article examines changes in the law following the publication of this social science research, comparing courts, legislatures and rule-making commissions. Analysis reveals that although all three institutions are dominated by lawyers, they have acted differently. Commissions have made substantial changes in the law consistent with the recommendations of social scientists, legislatures have made few changes, and courts have changed case law in the opposite direction, suggesting support for a theory of institutional context