50 research outputs found
Preference Uncertainty, Voter Participation and Electoral Efficiency: An Experimental Study
We experimentally study the impact of preference uncertainty on voter turnout and electoral efficiency in a participation game. We find higher participation rates when the electorate is informed about the level of support for various candidates than when group sizes remain uncertain. Moreover, despite higher free riding incentives majorities win more often than minorities. In aggregate, whether or not group sizes are known hardly affects welfare. We also distinguish between allied and floating voters and our data show that the lower turnout under uncertainty can be attributed to floating voters participating less. Finally, our results match better the predictions by quantal response (logit) equilibria than by (Bayesian-) Nash equilibria.
Are Groups more Rational than Individuals? A Review of Interactive Decision Making in Groups
Many decisions are interactive; the outcome of one party depends not only on its decisions or on acts of nature but also on the decisions of others. In the present article, we review the literature on decision making made by groups of the past 25 years. Researchers have compared the strategic behavior of groups and individuals in many games: prisoner’s dilemma, dictator, ultimatum, trust, centipede and principal-agent games, among others. Our review suggests that results are quite consistent in revealing that groups behave closer to the game-theoretical assumption of rationality and selfishness than individuals. We conclude by discussing future research avenues in this area.group decision making, interactive decision making, rationality, discontinuity effect
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Back to the basics: how feelings of anger affect cooperation
Purpose - The authors propose that angry individuals are much more likely to consider the emotional state of their partner than are neutral individuals. They then apply a lay theory dictating that anger decreases cooperation and react accordingly by lowering their own level of cooperation. Design/methodology/approach - The authors report four experiments involving different samples, manipulations, payment schemes and interfaces. The methodological approach was to capitalize on the positives of experimental research (e.g. establishing causality) while also trying to conceptually replicate the findings in different settings. Findings - The authors found evidence for a lay theory (i.e. expectation) that anger decreases cooperation, but that actual cooperation was lowest when angry individuals were paired with other angry individuals, supporting the hypotheses. Research limitations/implications - Anger can spill over from unrelated contexts to affect cooperation, and incidental anger by itself is not enough to decrease cooperation. However, the findings are limited to anger and cannot necessarily be used to understand the effects of other emotions. Practical implications - Before entering into a context that requires cooperation, such as a negotiation, be wary of the emotional state of both yourself and of your partner. This paper suggests that only if both parties are angry, then the likelihood of cooperation is low. Originality/value - To the best of the authors' knowledge, they are the first researchers to address the question of how incidental anger affects single-round cooperation. By going back to the basics, the authors believe that the findings fill a gap in existing research and offer a building block for future research on anger and cooperation.10/10/2016; 24 month embargo.This item from the UA Faculty Publications collection is made available by the University of Arizona with support from the University of Arizona Libraries. If you have questions, please contact us at [email protected]
One Team Must Win, the Other Need Only Not Lose: An Experimental Study of an Asymmetric Participation Game
opposition members. The opposition needs a strict majority to pass a motion, whereas for the coalition a tie is sufficient to block the motion and maintain the status quo. Passing or blocking the motion is a public good shared equally by all members of the winning group, and voting is voluntary and costly. The members of which group are more likely to vote? To answer this question, we studied an asymmetric participation game where a tie favors one prespecified group over the other. The theoretical analysis of this game yielded two qualitatively different predictions, one in which members of the coalition are slightly more likely to participate than members of the opposition, and another in which members of the opposition are much more likely to participate than members of the coalition. The experimental results clearly support the first prediction
Personality traits and strategic behavior: Anxiousness and aggressiveness in entry games
We demonstrate that personality has a systematic effect on strategic behavior. We focus on two personality traits: anxiousness and aggressiveness, and consider a 2-player entry game, where each player can guarantee a payoff by staying out, a higher payoff if she is the only player to enter, but a lower payoff if both players enter. We find that: anxious players enter less; aggressive players enter more; players are more likely to enter against anxious than non-anxious players; and players are less likely to enter against aggressive than non-aggressive players. We discuss the possible mechanism through which personality affects strategic behavior
Markets versus Negotiations: An Experimental Investigation
We consider the consequences of competition between two types of experimental exchange mechanisms, a “decentralized bargaining” market, and a “centralized” market. It is shown that decentralized bargaining is subject to a process of “unraveling” in which relatively high value traders (buyers with a high willingness to pay and sellers with low costs) continuously find trading in the centralized markets more attractive until few opportunities for mutually beneficial trade remain outside the centralized marketplace