Multilateral development banks and environmental policymaking in Central and Eastern Europe

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Political Science, 1999.Includes bibliographical references (p. 298-312).The dissertation is a comparative study of three multilateral development banks (MDBs)-the World Bank, European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), and European Investment Bank (EIB)-and their struggles to operationalize and implement relatively new environmental mandates. MDBs are increasingly being relied upon to address environmental issues in their activities, while at the same time facing criticism for allegedly promoting serious environmental degradation in borrowing countries. The dissertation focuses on the activities of these banks in Central and Eastern Europe, where the fall of the Iron Curtain revealed the most polluted countries in Europe, and where these MDBs are among the top donors. There is significant variation in the degree to which these MDBs have incorporated environmental goals into their work. The World Bank has played an important role in providing policy support for environmental reform in the region, while financing the largest scope of "green" projects of the three banks. The EIB has responded to its environmental goals in minimal ways, and the EBRD has an intermediate position between the other two. I argue that external pressure from major shareholder countries, usually supported or pushed by NGOs, is a key factor determining the depth of an MDB's commitment to new mandates, such as the environment. However, shareholder commitment is a necessary but not sufficient condition in explaining the banks' environmental behavior. Governance structures for all three banks are diffuse, and, as a result, institutional design and incentive systems play critical roles in how environmental objectives are translated into activities. In all three cases, the banks' internal incentive systems are poorly aligned with their environmental goals, and even where institutional variables are structured to promote greater awareness of environmental issues within the banks, they do not always work as envisioned. Theoretically, the dissertation argues that different causal variables matter at different stages of the policy process. Neorealist approaches have the most explanatory power in accounting for how environmental ideas are brought to the MDBs, but are insufficient in explaining outcomes. Approaches drawn from institutionalist and organizational theories, in turn, provide guidance in analyzing the mechanisms by which environmental objectives are translated into practice. The argument calls for a better integration of international relations theories emphasizing the importance of shareholder politics with theories that focus on how institutional arrangements shape behavior.by Tamar L. Gutner.Ph.D

The political economy of food subsidy reform in Egypt

Egypt has a large food subsidy program that has created a relatively effective social safety net, but it has also drained budgetary resources and proved to be poorly targeted toward the poor. Discussions about reforming the system to improve its effectiveness have run into extreme political sensitivities surrounding the issue of food subsidies. Egypt, therefore, well illustrates the quandaries that policymakers and others contemplating food subsidy reform face in developing countries. This study examines the political economy of food subsidy reform in Egypt and discusses the economic and political advantages and disadvantages of nine possible reforms. The study concludes that the reforms that have the greatest chance of success are those that reduce the access of the wealthy while increasing the access of the truly needy, but the timing, sequence, and trade-offs of such reforms have to be taken into account before they are implemented.Non-PRIFPRI1FCN

World Bank Environmental Reform: Revisiting Lessons from Agency Theory

Daniel Nielson and Michael Tierney s article, Delegation to International Organizations: Agency Theory and World Bank Environmental Reform (International Organization, Spring 2003), makes a strong argument for ways in which principal-agent (P-A) models advance theoretical explanations of the behavior and performance of international organizations (IOs). Most IOs suffer from widely recognized gaps between their mandates and their performance, gaps not well explained by the major theories in our field. P-A models are premised on the assumption that performance problems naturally arise when one actor (the principal) delegates to another actor (the agent) the authority to act in the former s interests. The models seek to explain why and how the divergence of interests between the two parties may result in the agent s actions differing from the principal s intentions, how agents may be better controlled, and the costs of doing so.I would like to thank Barbara Connolly, Martha Finnemore, Jeffry Frieden, Dan Guttman, Patrick Jackson, Carmela Lutmar, and Melissa Moye for helpful comments.

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF FOOD SUBSIDY REFORM IN EGYPT

Egypt has a large food subsidy program that has created a relatively effective social safety net, but it has also drained budgetary resources and proved to be poorly targeted toward the poor. Discussions about reforming the system to improve its effectiveness have run into extreme political sensitivities surrounding the issue of food subsidies. Egypt, therefore, well illustrates the quandaries that policymakers and others contemplating food subsidy reform face in developing countries. This study examines the political economy of food subsidy reform in Egypt and discusses the economic and political advantages and disadvantages of nine possible reforms. The study concludes that the reforms that have the greatest chance of success are those that reduce the access of the wealthy while increasing the access of the truly needy, but the timing, sequence, and trade-offs of such reforms have to be taken into account before they are implemented

The politics of IO performance: A framework

International organizations, International relations, Institutions, Performance, F53, F55,