Heterogeneity induces emergent functional networks for synchronization

We study the evolution of heterogeneous networks of oscillators subject to a state-dependent interconnection rule. We find that heterogeneity in the node dynamics is key in organizing the architecture of the functional emerging networks. We demonstrate that increasing heterogeneity among the nodes in state-dependent networks of phase oscillators causes a differentiation in the activation probabilities of the links. This, in turn, yields the formation of hubs associated to nodes with larger distances from the average frequency of the ensemble. Our generic local evolutionary strategy can be used to solve a wide range of synchronization and control problems

Models of Equilibrium Pricing with Internalized Powers of Independent Judgment Based on Autonomy

In this paper I want to describe one way of thinking about information. In effect, this paper relates to the notion that organizational or societal models of economic equilibrium incorporate a decision-making mechanism that is influenced by the independent judgment of each individual. This decision-making mechanism has nothing to do with the notion of acting to maximize one's expected utility under a set of exogenous prices or predictions, nor are the consequences of the decisions based on this mechanism related in any way to exogenous prices, predictions, or other parameters. In terms of information theory, the goal is to generate information and make more accurate predictions about a particular condition. However, the information itself can be fundamentally flawed. Another point is that information generated for this purpose has the feature of being irreversible. If communication is defined as a process of engaging in an economic activity while observing and analyzing information generated on the basis of the above mechanism, then it is worth considering whether communication so defined has any utility from an economic standpoint. To pursue this question, I will apply the concept postulated above to theories of economic organization and pricing, and also discuss the externality which information brings into an economy.Autonomy, Information, Interaction, Communication, Externality of Information, Herd behavior

One Proposition about Dynamic Portfolio Selection in an Open Economy and International Diversification

This paper describes one proposition about dynamic Markowitz portfolio selection in an open economy. Here it is proved that, assuming that two countries in an open economy share the same risk absolute aversion coefficient and the same information set with some conditions, the portfolio each country holds always attains the same rate of return, regardless of the characteristics of each country’s risky asset market, of the proportion in each country’s personal asset holdings, of the characteristics of the exchange rate price process, or of the risk free rate in each country. One basic implication of this proposition is that, when two countries share the common information set, each country might be, under these non-general conditions, indifferent, regarding the allocation of home/foreign risky assets, to the diffusion of exchange rate price process. Finally, I discuss another implication of this proposition in the relation with international portfolio diversification and so called “the home bias puzzle”.Dynamic portfolio selection; Open economy; Common information sharing; Home bias puzzle

Some Propositions on Intergenerational Risk Sharing, Social Security and Self-Insurance

This article describes, within a myopic intergenerational bargaining framework incorporating two discrete periods and binary states of risks, some new aspects regarding the mixture of intergenerational risk sharing and social security. Here, state-dependent utility under mortality risk proves to generate parents’ peculiar indifference curve regarding insurance contract, and self-insurance is shown to play a crucial role on the decision regarding social security holding and intergenerational transfer contract. This peculiar aspect, given for the first time in this article, also derives some novel features of insurance theory under lifetime uncertainty, where the current position in social security contract could adversely affect parents’ decision regarding intergenerational risk sharing with children. In addition, other basic results regarding the sensitivity to default risk and taxation in social security are summarized.Intergenerational Risk Sharing, Social Security, Self Insurance

One Proposition about Dynamic Portfolio Selection in an Open Economy and International Diversification

This paper describes one proposition about dynamic Markowitz portfolio selection in a two-country open economy. Here it is proved that, assuming that two countries in an open economy share the same risk absolute aversion coefficient and the same information set with some conditions, the portfolio each country holds always attains the same rate of return, regardless of any other symmetric/asymmetric characteristics of the open economy. One basic implication of this proposition is that, when two countries share the common information set, each country might be, under these non-general conditions, indifferent, regarding the allocation of home/foreign risky assets, to the diffusion of exchange rate price process. Finally, I discuss another implication of this proposition in the relation with international portfolio diversification and so calledÂgthe home bias puzzleÂh.International Diversification

One Proposition about Dynamic Portfolio Selection in an Open Economy and International Diversification

This paper describes one proposition about dynamic Markowitz portfolio selection in an open economy. Here it is proved that, assuming that two countries in an open economy share the same risk absolute aversion coefficient and the same information set with some conditions, the portfolio each country holds always attains the same rate of return, regardless of the characteristics of each country’s risky asset market, of the proportion in each country’s personal asset holdings, of the characteristics of the exchange rate price process, or of the risk free rate in each country. One basic implication of this proposition is that, when two countries share the common information set, each country might be, under these non-general conditions, indifferent, regarding the allocation of home/foreign risky assets, to the diffusion of exchange rate price process. Finally, I discuss another implication of this proposition in the relation with international portfolio diversification and so called “the home bias puzzle”

Models of Equilibrium Pricing with Internalized Powers of Independent Judgment Based on Autonomy

In this paper I want to describe one way of thinking about information. In effect, this paper relates to the notion that organizational or societal models of economic equilibrium incorporate a decision-making mechanism that is influenced by the independent judgment of each individual. This decision-making mechanism has nothing to do with the notion of acting to maximize one's expected utility under a set of exogenous prices or predictions, nor are the consequences of the decisions based on this mechanism related in any way to exogenous prices, predictions, or other parameters. In terms of information theory, the goal is to generate information and make more accurate predictions about a particular condition. However, the information itself can be fundamentally flawed. Another point is that information generated for this purpose has the feature of being irreversible. If communication is defined as a process of engaging in an economic activity while observing and analyzing information generated on the basis of the above mechanism, then it is worth considering whether communication so defined has any utility from an economic standpoint. To pursue this question, I will apply the concept postulated above to theories of economic organization and pricing, and also discuss the externality which information brings into an economy