Embedded Analog Physical Unclonable Function System to Extract Reliable and Unique Security Keys

Internet of Things (IoT) enabled devices have become more and more pervasive in our everyday lives. Examples include wearables transmitting and processing personal data and smart labels interacting with customers. Due to the sensitive data involved, these devices need to be protected against attackers. In this context, hardware-based security primitives such as Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) provide a powerful solution to secure interconnected devices. The main benefit of PUFs, in combination with traditional cryptographic methods, is that security keys are derived from the random intrinsic variations of the underlying core circuit. In this work, we present a holistic analog-based PUF evaluation platform, enabling direct access to a scalable design that can be customized to fit the application requirements in terms of the number of required keys and bit width. The proposed platform covers the full software and hardware implementations and allows for tracing the PUF response generation from the digital level back to the internal analog voltages that are directly involved in the response generation procedure. Our analysis is based on 30 fabricated PUF cores that we evaluated in terms of PUF security metrics and bit errors for various temperatures and biases. With an average reliability of 99.20% and a uniqueness of 48.84%, the proposed system shows values close to ideal

Inkjet Printed True Random Number Generator based on Additive Resistor Tuning

Printed electronics (PE) is a fast growing technology with promising applications in wearables, smart sensors and smart cards since it provides mechanical flexibility, low-cost, on-demand and customizable fabrication. To secure the operation of these applications, True Random Number Generators (TRNGs) are required to generate unpredictable bits for cryptographic functions and padding. However, since the additive fabrication process of PE circuits results in high intrinsic variation due to the random dispersion of the printed inks on the substrate, constructing a printed TRNG is challenging. In this paper, we exploit the additive customizable fabrication feature of inkjet printing to design a TRNG based on electrolyte-gated field effect transistors (EGFETs). The proposed memory-based TRNG circuit can operate at low voltages (≤ 1 V ), it is hence suitable for low-power applications. We also propose a flow which tunes the printed resistors of the TRNG circuit to mitigate the overall process variation of the TRNG so that the generated bits are mostly based on the random noise in the circuit, providing a true random behaviour. The results show that the overall process variation of the TRNGs is mitigated by 110 times, and the simulated TRNGs pass the National Institute of Standards and Technology Statistical Test Suite

An Inkjet-Printed Full-Wave Rectifier for Low-Voltage Operation Using Electrolyte-Gated Indium-Oxide Thin-Film Transistors

Rectifiersare vital electronic circuits for signal and power conversion in various smart sensor applications. The ability to process low input voltage levels, for example, from vibrational energy harvesters is a major challenge with existing passive rectifiers in printed electronics, stemming mainly from the built-in potential of the diode's p-njunction. To address this problem, in this work, we design, fabricate, and characterize an inkjet-printed full-wave rectifier using diode-connected electrolyte-gated thin-film transistors (EGTs). Using both experimental and simulation approaches, we investigate how the rectifier can benefit from the near-zero threshold voltage of transistors, which can be enabled by proper channel geometry setting in EGT technology. The presented circuit can be operated at 1-V input voltage, featuring a remarkably small voltage loss of 140 mV and a cutoff frequency of ~300 Hz. Below the cutoff frequency, more than 2.6-μW dc power is obtained over the load resistances ranging from 5 to 20 kQ. Furthermore, experiments show that the circuit can work with an input amplitude down to 500 mV. This feature makes the presented design highly suitable for a variety of energy-harvesting applications

Printed Low- Voltage Crossbar-PUF for Identification

Physically Unclonable Functions (PUFs) are hardware-based security primitives, which allow for inherent device fingerprinting. Therefore, intrinsic variation of imperfect manufactured systems is exploited to generate device-specific, unique identifiers. With printed electronics (PE) joining the internet of things (IoT), hardware-based security for novel PE-based systems is of increasing importance. Furthermore, PE offers the possibility for split-manufacturing, which mitigates the risk of PUF response readout by third parties, before commissioning. In this paper, we investigate a printed PUF core as intrinsic variation source for the generation of unique identifiers from a crossbar architecture. The printed crossbar PUF is verified by simulation of a 8×8-cells crossbar, which can be utilized to generate 32-bit wide identifiers. Further focus is on limiting factors regarding printed devices, such as increased parasitics, due to novel materials and required control logic specifications. The simulation results highlight, that the printed crossbar PUF is capable to generate close-to-ideal unique identifiers at the investigated feature size. As proof of concept a 2×2-cells printed crossbar PUF core is fabricated and electrically characterized

Hardware-Intrinsic Security with Printed Electronics for Identification of IoE Devices

Novel manufacturing technologies, such as printed electronics, may enable future applications for the Internet of Everything like large-area sensor devices, disposable security, and identification tags. Printed physically unclonable functions (PUFs) are promising candidates to be embedded as hardware security keys into lightweight identification devices. We investigate hybrid PUFs based on a printed PUF core. The statistics on the intra- and inter-hamming distance distributions indicate a performance suitable for identification purposes. Our evaluations are based on statistical simulations of the PUF core circuit and the thereof generated challenge-response pairs. The analysis shows that hardware-intrinsic security features can be realized with printed lightweight devices