On Weber’s Types of Empirical and Scientifico-theoretical Legal Training, and his Partiality for ‘Logic’

Weber uses the term ‘logical’ with striking frequency: as a typical attribute of what is ‘rational’, but also in the definition of legal arrangements, where the ‘legally relevant components’ that characterise a legal relationship are ordered in a ‘manner which is itself logically free from contradiction’. Logic or logically significant characteristics are all features of the theoretical and academic doctrine of law, which stands as a contrasting type to the artisanal-empirical doctrine of the law of practitioners (represented by Roman and English law respectively). In this way logic or what is logical is an important sign of the difference between these two fundamental types of legal doctrine. Above all, logic and the logical play an outstanding role in Weber’s definition of a legal ‘system’ in the sense of ‘an assembly of all the legal propositions established by analysis in such a way that, taken all together, they form a system of rules that is itself logically free from contradiction and seamless in principle’. In this definition of ‘system’ Weber makes use of the postulates of so-called conceptual jurisprudence, something that did not exist in fact, but which originally signified a deliberate caricature (or criticism) of the science of the Pandects, of which Georg Friedrich Puchta (1798-1846) stood as the representative. He was selected because Rudolf von Jhering had Puchta mainly in mind when he framed the polemical idea of conceptual jurisprudence. Puchta was also singled out because he spoke, inter alia, of a ‘genealogy of concepts’, which encouraged the ascription of systemic qualities to his system of private law. Yet Weber omitted to test Puchta’s ‘system’ according to his own ideal-typical criterion of a system that ‘logically free from contradiction’ and ‘seamless in principle’. This deficiency will be remedied here

Critical reflections on Pollitt and Bouckaert’s construct of the neo-Weberian state (NWS) in their standard work on public management reform

Pollitt and Bouckaert and their neo-Weberian state (NWS) have been chosen as the subject for this essay because the book has become a standard work in the public management movement. It is frequently cited and has been re-published in multiple editions (most recently in 2017). The authors also refer explicitly to Max Weber. This contribution seeks to draw attention to three important aspects, which inevitably overlap with one another: 1. There is no Weber in the neo-Weberian State (introduction, 1; section II). Pollitt and Bouckaert fail to grasp that Weber’s understanding of the state [the state as an “institution” (Anstalt); and the state as an “idea of validity” (Geltungsvorstellung)] is not identical to his ideal type of modern bureaucracy; it is the features of the latter on which they draw. The ideal type is a standard measure constructed in order to establish how close any concrete, given instance of bureaucracy comes to it (introduction, 3). Meanwhile, the “neutral official” insisted upon by Weber has “taken their leave” in Germany from important positions (section III, 3). Furthermore, Weber did not address those structures and processes internal to the administration which are precisely the object of interest for the new public management reformers. Weber’s lack of interest arises from the fact the members of an Anstalt, whether it is the state or the Church (WuG, § 15, no. 2), are subject to imposed orders (oktroyierte Ordnungen) and, as such, do not enjoy the “right to have a say”. Scharpf (1973a) was the first to pay particular attention to the problems brought about by specialisation and by the division of labour within the administration that are responsible for an incremental form of politics (section III, 3); even if he later ascribes advantages to the combination of “negative” and “positive coordination” (Scharpf 1991: 18ff.). 2. The “legalistic culture” that characterises Germany will be considered in a more differentiated way, drawing on empirical studies which provide information, for example, on how laws (i.e. programmes) actually originate inside the ministerial apparatus (introduction, 2; section III, 2 and 3) or how use is made of the power of authority (Weisungsrecht) in practice (introduction, 2; section III, 2 and 3), even when, formally, it claims to have validity (section III). In this way, only empirical studies (Benz 1994; Bohne 1981; Dose 1997; Dose/Voigt 1995; Treiber 2007a) prove that the administration that implements laws has often, in practice, become a “negotiative administration” (introduction, 2). Such a phenomenon as a “co-operative administration”, which negotiates rather than rules, is a “foreign concept” in Weber’s discussion of the state and modern bureaucracy. Scharpf’s (1970) comparison between constitutional governance in Germany and legal relief in America is enlightening when it comes to the meaning of the constitutional state (Rechtsstaat) (introduction, 2; section III); the same applies to his discussion of the failed federalist reforms, which sought, among other things, to mitigate, if not entirely eliminate, the opportunities for blockades provided by political entanglement (Politikverflechtung) (section III). Neither was it possible to realise long overdue proposals to reform administrative law (Verwaltungsrecht) (section III, 1), which involved weakening or removing altogether three important assumptions in the dominant administrative doctrine (the “dogmatic normality”) and which also included the ambitious intention for the law to achieve tangible impact (Hoffmann-Riem 1994). Nonetheless, while no-one would dispute that reform of the federal government and administration remained “on the agenda” (Scharpf 1991, Mayntz/ Scharpf 1973), the priorities of such a reform were, and still are, different to those of new public management reform [the key terms here are Planung (“planning”) and the term that replaced it, Steuerung (“management”)]1. 3. Pollitt and Bouckaert ascribe to the neo-Weberian state extremely varied functions without providing any (theoretical) basis for them. In this way, the notion of public management reform that they present acquires the status of a “reformist philosophy” (introduction, 3; section IV). See Scharpf (1991) for a theoretically well-founded argumentation on the State’s ability to act in our days. Scharpf’s essay will be discussed briefly (section IV). Conclusion There is no Weber in the neo-Weberian state. According to the discussion presented here, the neo-Weberian state can only mean: how would a modern state constituted by Weber look today

État moderne et bureaucratie moderne chez Max Weber

Moderner Staat und moderne Bürokratie bei Max Weber I. Pour représenter les liens réciproques qui unissent l’État et la bureaucratie modernes, il semble que nous puissions prendre comme point de départ cette définition de l’État datant de la dernière période de l’existence et du travail de Weber, que l’on peut lire dans les Concepts fondamentaux de la sociologie : « Nous entendons par État une entreprise politique à caractère institutionnel [politischer Anstaltsbetrieb] lorsque et tant que s..

To what end is studied today, the “Protestant Ethic”

With reference to the Protestant Ethic by Max Weber it will be shown that Weber favoured an ambitious research program. In the first place, because he turned towards the research program in religious science proposed by the Usener school (under the heading of “philological tact”); next, because he came close to the then current explanatory model in the natural sciences of von Kries (Heidelberger), and responded in this way to the “challenge of the natural sciences” (Oexle). In line with F.W. Graf, attention will be drawn to the fact that Weber, due to his close reliance on Schneckenburger’s contrasting type-portraits of Lutheranism and Calvinism, harboured “implicit theological value-judgements” (Graf).With reference to the Protestant Ethic by Max Weber it will be shown that Weber favoured an ambitious research program. In the first place, because he turned towards the research program in religious science proposed by the Usener school (under the heading of “philological tact”); next, because he came close to the then current explanatory model in the natural sciences of von Kries (Heidelberger), and responded in this way to the “challenge of the natural sciences” (Oexle). In line with F.W. Graf, attention will be drawn to the fact that Weber, due to his close reliance on Schneckenburger’s contrasting type-portraits of Lutheranism and Calvinism, harboured “implicit theological value-judgements” (Graf)

Zum Tode des Soziologen Heinrich Popitz (1925-2002)

-No abstract availabl

Time, intersubjectivity, and musical relationship in Alfred Schutz

In questo lavoro, affronto alcuni aspetti della relazione tra tempo e intersoggettività in Alfred Schutz . Presento una sintesi dell’architettura metodologica del sociologo austriaco, delineando la specificità della relazione tra tempo e coscienza. Prendo in esame la trattazione dell’esperienza musicale come esempio di declinazione peculiare di una serie di dinamiche temporali connesse alla costituzione intersoggettiva dei significati. Infine, espongo alcune tesi di autori che si sono occupati della relazione tra tempo, intersoggettività e musica in Schutz. La relazione musicale è un esempio di contesto dotato di senso, non oggetto di concettualizzazione, che esemplifica la relazione tra senso soggettivo ed esperienza dell’altro. La teoria dell’appresentazione di Schutz è il centro del processo di costituzione dei significati della prensione dell’altro. L’emersione dei significati è legata alle dinamiche dei poli passivi e attivi della coscienza e alla costituzione, nella we-relation, di una dimensione radicalmente intersoggettiva nella quale si supera la distinzione cartesiana tra interno ed esterno.Time, intersubjectivity, and musical relationship in Alfred Schutz Riccardo Venturini In this work I tackle certain aspects of the relationship between time and intersubjectivity in Alfred Schutz. I present a summary of the methodological architecture of the Austrian sociologist, outlining the specificity of the relationship between time and consciousness. I discuss the treatment of the musical experience as an example of the peculiar declination of a series of temporal dynamics connected to the intersubjective creation of meanings. Finally, I set out some thoughts related to the debate on the relationship between time, intersubjectivity and music in Schutz. The musical relationship is a context endowed with meaning, not the object of conceptualization, that allows us to identify in a paradigmatic way the relationship between the subjective sense and experience of the other. The theory of appresentation of Schutz is the center of the process of constitution of meaning of the understanding of the other. The emergence of meaning is related to the dynamics of the passive and active poles of the consciousness and the constitution, in the we-relation, of a radically intersubjective dimension that exceeds the Cartesian distinction between inside and outside

La place de Max Weber dans la sociologie du droit allemande contemporaine

This contribution describes and analyses how Maw Weber's sociology of law was received by German post-war Rechtssoziologie. Since this discipline is covered both by jurists and social scientists, we outline the history of how Weber's sociology of law was received both by jurisprudence (including the history of law and comparative law) and by the social sciences. We begin with 1947, the year when the third edition of Economy and Society was published. Particular attention is paid to the present situation. It becomes clear that Weber is acknowledged as a classical thinker, even though little notice was taken of his sociology of law for a long time. It is only recently, since the Seventies, that a change has taken place in this respect. In the case of jurisprudence in such a way that, with the establishment of the sociology of law as a discipline in university teaching, textbooks and introductions to the sociology of law came on the market which acknowledged Weber and his sociology oflaw. It has also to be stated, however, that it is generally rare for jurists to "work" with Weber. Within the social sciences, Weber's sociology of law has received attention to the extent that the leading interpreters of Weber became involved with the reconstruction of Weber's theory of rationalisation. With a few exceptions, which deal directly with Weber's sociology of law (in the sense of a reconstruction of the legal process of rationalisation, the examination of the theses inherited from Weber, taking up again the questions that he prompted), Weber's sociology of law thus occupies a special place in the social sciences, since it is presented as being embedded in greater theoretical contexts (theories of rationalisation, theories concerning the origins of the modem age). This can be proved with the aid of the theoretical drafts of Habermas, Schluchter and Muench that are presented in this paper. We do not restrict ourselves exclusively to describing the history of its reception, but with the aid of the extensive material we also deal with the question of the conditions for the reception of this classic study by Weber. Attention is also paid to the question of which subjects (e.g. increasing legalization or "explosion of statutory law") have become independent through the reception of Weber's sociology oflaw, and which determine the present discussion in the Federal Republic of Germany.Cet article décrit et analyse la réception de la sociologie du droit de Max Weber par la sociologie du droit allemande d'après-guerre. Tant les juristes que les sociologues s'intéressant à cette discipline, nous soulignerons l'histoire de la réception de la sociologie du droit de Weber par la jurisprudence (y compris l'histoire du droit et du droit comparé), et par les sciences sociales. Nous prendrons comme point de départ pour notre étude l'année 1947, date de publication de la 3ème édition d'Economie et Société. Nous insisterons particulièrement sur la situation actuelle. La reconnaissance de Weber comme penseur classique devient évidente, même si sa sociologie du droit ne suscita, pendant longtemps, qu'un intérêt mineur. Ce n'est que depuis les années 70 qu'un changement s'est produit. Ainsi, l'introduction de la sociologie du droit comme discipline d'enseignement universitaire a, en ce qui concerne le domaine juridique, entraîné la publication de manuels et de présentations en sociologie juridique, marquant ainsi la reconnaissance de Weber et de sa sociologie du droit. Il faut également préciser, cependant, que rares sont les juristes à "travailler" sur Weber. D'un autre côté, la sociologie du droit de Weber a attiré l'attention des sociologues dans la mesure où ses principaux interprètes se sont intéressés à la reconstruction de sa théorie de la rationalisation. A part quelques exceptions, concernant directement la sociologie du droit de Weber (dans le sens d'une reconstruction du processus juridique de rationalisation, l'examen des thèses héritées de Weber soulevant encore les mêmes questions), cette dernière occupe ainsi une place particulière dans les sciences sociales, étant insérée dans de plus grands ensembles théoriques (théories de la rationalisation, théories sur l'origine de la modernité. . .). C'est ce qui apparaît à travers les théories de Habermas, Schluchter et Mûnch, présentées dans cet article. Nous ne nous limiterons pas uniquement à tracer l'histoire de la réception de Weber, mais nous aborderons aussi la question des conditions de cette réception. Nous évoquerons également les thèmes dont la réception de la sociologie du droit de Weber a favorisé l'émancipation (p. ex. l'inflation législative), et qui caractérisent le débat actuel en R.F.A.Treiber Hubert. La place de Max Weber dans la sociologie du droit allemande contemporaine. In: Droit et société, n°9, 1988. Max Weber. Réception, diffusion de sa sociologie du droit. pp. 203-254