Game Theory of Social Distancing in Response to an Epidemic

Social distancing practices are changes in behavior that prevent disease transmission by reducing contact rates between susceptible individuals and infected individuals who may transmit the disease. Social distancing practices can reduce the severity of an epidemic, but the benefits of social distancing depend on the extent to which it is used by individuals. Individuals are sometimes reluctant to pay the costs inherent in social distancing, and this can limit its effectiveness as a control measure. This paper formulates a differential-game to identify how individuals would best use social distancing and related self-protective behaviors during an epidemic. The epidemic is described by a simple, well-mixed ordinary differential equation model. We use the differential game to study potential value of social distancing as a mitigation measure by calculating the equilibrium behaviors under a variety of cost-functions. Numerical methods are used to calculate the total costs of an epidemic under equilibrium behaviors as a function of the time to mass vaccination, following epidemic identification. The key parameters in the analysis are the basic reproduction number and the baseline efficiency of social distancing. The results show that social distancing is most beneficial to individuals for basic reproduction numbers around 2. In the absence of vaccination or other intervention measures, optimal social distancing never recovers more than 30% of the cost of infection. We also show how the window of opportunity for vaccine development lengthens as the efficiency of social distancing and detection improve

Erratic Flu Vaccination Emerges from Short-Sighted Behavior in Contact Networks

The effectiveness of seasonal influenza vaccination programs depends on individual-level compliance. Perceptions about risks associated with infection and vaccination can strongly influence vaccination decisions and thus the ultimate course of an epidemic. Here we investigate the interplay between contact patterns, influenza-related behavior, and disease dynamics by incorporating game theory into network models. When individuals make decisions based on past epidemics, we find that individuals with many contacts vaccinate, whereas individuals with few contacts do not. However, the threshold number of contacts above which to vaccinate is highly dependent on the overall network structure of the population and has the potential to oscillate more wildly than has been observed empirically. When we increase the number of prior seasons that individuals recall when making vaccination decisions, behavior and thus disease dynamics become less variable. For some networks, we also find that higher flu transmission rates may, counterintuitively, lead to lower (vaccine-mediated) disease prevalence. Our work demonstrates that rich and complex dynamics can result from the interaction between infectious diseases, human contact patterns, and behavior

Self-Interest versus Group-Interest in Antiviral Control

Antiviral agents have been hailed to hold considerable promise for the treatment and prevention of emerging viral diseases like H5N1 avian influenza and SARS. However, antiviral drugs are not completely harmless, and the conditions under which individuals are willing to participate in a large-scale antiviral drug treatment program are as yet unknown. We provide population dynamical and game theoretical analyses of large-scale prophylactic antiviral treatment programs. Throughout we compare the antiviral control strategy that is optimal from the public health perspective with the control strategy that would evolve if individuals make their own, rational decisions. To this end we investigate the conditions under which a large-scale antiviral control program can prevent an epidemic, and we analyze at what point in an unfolding epidemic the risk of infection starts to outweigh the cost of antiviral treatment. This enables investigation of how the optimal control strategy is moulded by the efficacy of antiviral drugs, the risk of mortality by antiviral prophylaxis, and the transmissibility of the pathogen. Our analyses show that there can be a strong incentive for an individual to take less antiviral drugs than is optimal from the public health perspective. In particular, when public health asks for early and aggressive control to prevent or curb an emerging pathogen, for the individual antiviral drug treatment is attractive only when the risk of infection has become non-negligible. It is even possible that from a public health perspective a situation in which everybody takes antiviral drugs is optimal, while the process of individual choice leads to a situation where nobody is willing to take antiviral drugs

Informed Switching Strongly Decreases the Prevalence of Antibiotic Resistance in Hospital Wards

Antibiotic resistant nosocomial infections are an important cause of mortality and morbidity in hospitals. Antibiotic cycling has been proposed to contain this spread by a coordinated use of different antibiotics. Theoretical work, however, suggests that often the random deployment of drugs (“mixing”) might be the better strategy. We use an epidemiological model for a single hospital ward in order to assess the performance of cycling strategies which take into account the frequency of antibiotic resistance in the hospital ward. We assume that information on resistance frequencies stems from microbiological tests, which are performed in order to optimize individual therapy. Thus the strategy proposed here represents an optimization at population-level, which comes as a free byproduct of optimizing treatment at the individual level. We find that in most cases such an informed switching strategy outperforms both periodic cycling and mixing, despite the fact that information on the frequency of resistance is derived only from a small sub-population of patients. Furthermore we show that the success of this strategy is essentially a stochastic phenomenon taking advantage of the small population sizes in hospital wards. We find that the performance of an informed switching strategy can be improved substantially if information on resistance tests is integrated over a period of one to two weeks. Finally we argue that our findings are robust against a (moderate) preexistence of doubly resistant strains and against transmission via environmental reservoirs. Overall, our results suggest that switching between different antibiotics might be a valuable strategy in small patient populations, if the switching strategies take the frequencies of resistance alleles into account

A Few Bad Apples:A Model of Disease Influenced Agent Behaviour in a Heterogeneous Contact Environment

For diseases that infect humans or livestock, transmission dynamics are at least partially dependent on human activity and therefore human behaviour. However, the impact of human behaviour on disease transmission is relatively understudied, especially in the context of heterogeneous contact structures such as described by a social network. Here, we use a strategic game, coupled with a simple disease model, to investigate how strategic agent choices impact the spread of disease over a contact network. Using beliefs that are based on disease status and that build up over time, agents choose actions that stochastically determine disease spread on the network. An agent’s disease status is therefore a function of both his own and his neighbours actions. The effect of disease on agents is modelled by a heterogeneous payoff structure. We find that the combination of network shape and distribution of payoffs has a non-trivial impact on disease prevalence, even if the mean payoff remains the same. An important scenario occurs when a small percentage (called noncooperators) have little incentive to avoid disease. For diseases that are easily acquired when taking a risk, then even when good behavior can lead to disease eradication, a small increase in the percentage of noncooperators (less than 5%) can yield a large (up to 25%) increase in prevalence

Modeling Transmission Dynamics and Control of Vector-Borne Neglected Tropical Diseases

Neglected tropical diseases affect more than one billion people worldwide. The populations most impacted by such diseases are typically the most resource-limited. Mathematical modeling of disease transmission and cost-effectiveness analyses can play a central role in maximizing the utility of limited resources for neglected tropical diseases. We review the contributions that mathematical modeling has made to optimizing intervention strategies of vector-borne neglected diseases. We propose directions forward in the modeling of these diseases, including integrating new knowledge of vector and pathogen ecology, incorporating evolutionary responses to interventions, and expanding the scope of sensitivity analysis in order to achieve robust results

The Impact of Different Antibiotic Regimens on the Emergence of Antimicrobial-Resistant Bacteria

Backgroud: The emergence and ongoing spread of antimicrobial-resistant bacteria is a major public health threat. Infections caused by antimicrobial-resistant bacteria are associated with substantially higher rates of morbidity and mortality compared to infections caused by antimicrobial-susceptible bacteria. The emergence and spread of these bacteria is complex and requires incorporating numerous interrelated factors which clinical studies cannot adequately address. Methods/Principal Findings: A model is created which incorporates several key factors contributing to the emergence and spread of resistant bacteria including the effects of the immune system, acquisition of resistance genes and antimicrobial exposure. The model identifies key strategies which would limit the emergence of antimicrobial-resistant bacterial strains. Specifically, the simulations show that early initiation of antimicrobial therapy and combination therapy with two antibiotics prevents the emergence of resistant bacteria, whereas shorter courses of therapy and sequential administration of antibiotics promote the emergence of resistant strains. Conclusions/Significance: The principal findings suggest that (i) shorter lengths of antibiotic therapy and early interruption of antibiotic therapy provide an advantage for the resistant strains, (ii) combination therapy with two antibiotics prevents the emergence of resistance strains in contrast to sequential antibiotic therapy, and (iii) early initiation of antibiotics is among the most important factors preventing the emergence of resistant strains. These findings provide new insights into strategies aimed at optimizing the administration of antimicrobials for the treatment of infections and the prevention of the emergence of antimicrobial resistance

A simulation analysis to characterize the dynamics of vaccinating behaviour on contact networks

<p>Abstract</p> <p>Background</p> <p>Human behavior influences infectious disease transmission, and numerous "prevalence-behavior" models have analyzed this interplay. These previous analyses assumed homogeneously mixing populations without spatial or social structure. However, spatial and social heterogeneity are known to significantly impact transmission dynamics and are particularly relevant for certain diseases. Previous work has demonstrated that social contact structure can change the individual incentive to vaccinate, thus enabling eradication of a disease under a voluntary vaccination policy when the corresponding homogeneous mixing model predicts that eradication is impossible due to free rider effects. Here, we extend this work and characterize the range of possible behavior-prevalence dynamics on a network.</p> <p>Methods</p> <p>We simulate transmission of a vaccine-prevetable infection through a random, static contact network. Individuals choose whether or not to vaccinate on any given day according to perceived risks of vaccination and infection.</p> <p>Results</p> <p>We find three possible outcomes for behavior-prevalence dynamics on this type of network: small final number vaccinated and final epidemic size (due to rapid control through voluntary ring vaccination); large final number vaccinated and significant final epidemic size (due to imperfect voluntary ring vaccination), and little or no vaccination and large final epidemic size (corresponding to little or no voluntary ring vaccination). We also show that the social contact structure enables eradication under a broad range of assumptions, except when vaccine risk is sufficiently high, the disease risk is sufficiently low, or individuals vaccinate too late for the vaccine to be effective.</p> <p>Conclusion</p> <p>For populations where infection can spread only through social contact network, relatively small differences in parameter values relating to perceived risk or vaccination behavior at the individual level can translate into large differences in population-level outcomes such as final size and final number vaccinated. The qualitative outcome of rational, self interested behaviour under a voluntary vaccination policy can vary substantially depending on interactions between social contact structure, perceived vaccine and disease risks, and the way that individual vaccination decision-making is modelled.</p