The Epistemic Status of Processing Fluency as Source for Judgments of Truth

This article combines findings from cognitive psychology on the role of processing fluency in truth judgments with epistemological theory on justification of belief. We first review evidence that repeated exposure to a statement increases the subjective ease with which that statement is processed. This increased processing fluency, in turn, increases the probability that the statement is judged to be true. The basic question discussed here is whether the use of processing fluency as a cue to truth is epistemically justified. In the present analysis, based on Bayes’ Theorem, we adopt the reliable-process account of justification presented by Goldman (1986) and show that fluency is a reliable cue to truth, under the assumption that the majority of statements one has been exposed to are true. In the final section, we broaden the scope of this analysis and discuss how processing fluency as a potentially universal cue to judged truth may contribute to cultural differences in commonsense beliefs

The Influence of Object Relative Size on Priming and Explicit Memory

We investigated the effects of object relative size on priming and explicit memory for color photos of common objects. Participants were presented with color photos of pairs of objects displayed in either appropriate or inappropriate relative sizes. Implicit memory was assessed by speed of object size ratings whereas explicit memory was assessed by an old/new recognition test. Study-to-test changes in relative size reduced both priming and explicit memory and had large effects for objects displayed in large vs. small size at test. Our findings of substantial size-specific influences on priming with common objects under some but not other conditions are consistent with instance views of object perception and priming but inconsistent with structural description views

Current opinion on the role of testosterone in the development of prostate cancer: a dynamic model

Background: Since the landmark study conducted by Huggins and Hodges in 1941, a failure to distinguish between the role of testosterone in prostate cancer development and progression has led to the prevailing opinion that high levels of testosterone increase the risk of prostate cancer. To date, this claim remains unproven. Presentation of the Hypothesis: We present a novel dynamic mode of the relationship between testosterone and prostate cancer by hypothesizing that the magnitude of age-related declines in testosterone, rather than a static level of testosterone measured at a single point, may trigger and promote the development of prostate cancer. Testing of the Hypothesis: Although not easily testable currently, prospective cohort studies with population-representative samples and repeated measurements of testosterone or retrospective cohorts with stored blood samples from different ages are warranted in future to test the hypothesis. Implications of the Hypothesis: Our dynamic model can satisfactorily explain the observed age patterns of prostate cancer incidence, the apparent conflicts in epidemiological findings on testosterone and risk of prostate cancer, racial disparities in prostate cancer incidence, risk factors associated with prostate cancer, and the role of testosterone in prostate cancer progression. Our dynamic model may also have implications for testosterone replacement therapy