The Differential Impact of User Heterogeneity in Resource Management : A Case Study from Kerala

This paper analyses the heterogeneous users decision to participate in comanagement, which is an institutional alternative proposed in the wake of state's failure in managing the Cochin estuarine fisheries in Kerala, India. Since a collective action under co-management require not only user's active participation in terms of their labor but also involve various types of organizational and managerial costs, the users were given the following choices on co-operation. Firstly, the users had the choice to contribute their labor in conservation activities, which would ensure sustainability of the fisheries. Secondly, they could make a voluntary contribution towards meeting the organizational costs of collective action. Thirdly, they could contribute in terms of labor as well as in monetary terms. Finally, they had the choice not to participate at all. Keeping in view the problems of free rider and adoption of stratagic behaviour by users some incentives were given for each of the above ways of co-operation. A multinomial logit analysis of the decision of about 369 sample fishermen to participate in co-management as defined above shows the differential impact of user heterogeneity in resource management. While heterogeneity in terms of the present legal status of the users motivate them for contributing their labor even in the absence of any additional economic incentives, heterogeneity in economic status and membership in formal organizations matters when it comes to making monetary payments. In addition to these, the overall optimism of the users' motivates them to both physically engage in conservation activities as well as make monetary payments. Adoption of strategic behaviors by at least some users cannot, however, be ruled out. On the whole it is seen that the heterogeneous fishermen's decision to participate depend upon their anticipation of the distribution of benefits from cooperation. However, one must be cautious that those who anticipate disproportionate benefit from co-operation are likely to take a lead role. Therefore, care must be taken to prevent them from deciding the rules of the game in such a manner that they are disproportionately in their favorfisheries co-management, user heterogeneity, collective action

Developing Countries and the Multilateral Trading System after Doha

The Fourth Session of the Ministerial Conference of the World Trade Organization (WTO), held in Doha, Qatar, in November 2001, launched a new round of multilateral trade negotiations (MTN) and a work programme (WP) for the WTO involving the negotiating agenda and steps for meeting the challenges facing the multilateral trading system. The paper evaluates the WP, in particular, whether it would redress the unfavourable balance between benefits and costs to developing countries DCs of the agreement that concluded the previous (Uruguay) round of MTN. It discusses the failure of the third session in Seattle to launch a new round in December 1999, and also documents the unfavourable balance. While concluding that with adequate preparation, the negotiators could reach an agreement in the new round yielding substantial gains to DCs, the paper also suggests possible negotiating points for DCs.World Trade Organization (WTO), Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Developing Countries, Antidumping, Trade Related Intellectual Property Services (TRIPS), Trade and Labour Standards, Trade and Environment, Preferential Trade Agreements

Privatisation, Regulation, and Competition in South Asia

Privatisation has begun to accelerate in India and Pakistan. However, it is not clear that a change in ownership per se will contribute significantly to a more rapid, efficient, and equitable growth unless policies that ensure competition for these enterprises and remove distortions in factor markets also are undertaken at the same time or prior to privatisation. After a brief discussion of the transition from state-led development to more market-oriented policies and gradual opening to world markets, this paper reviews some of the analytical literature on privatisation and regulation. The translation of these theories into concrete policy suggestions is difficult for countries such as Pakistan and India, where many of the assumptions behind the theories do not hold. However, the results of empirical studies on past privatisations around the world do hold lessons for South Asia. Similarly, theories of regulation offer only broad recommendations, most notably (for South Asia) that regulation is not the best way to redistribute resources. The final section of the paper reviews India’s and Pakistan’s experience with privatisation thus far. Attempted privatisation of electricity in India serves as an example of the need for more attention to regulation, while the transfer of ownership has led to better service at lower cost in the telecommunications sector. Pakistan’s privatisation programme appears to have had similarly mixed results, though it is difficult to come to firm conclusions with the evidence at hand.

Invariants for E_0-semigroups on II_1 factors

We introduce four new cocycle conjugacy invariants for E_0-semigroups on II_1 factors: a coupling index, a dimension for the gauge group, a super product system and a C*-semiflow. Using noncommutative It\^o integrals we show that the dimension of the gauge group can be computed from the structure of the additive cocycles. We do this for the Clifford flows and even Clifford flows on the hyperfinite II_1 factor, and for the free flows on the free group factor $L(F_\infty)$. In all cases the index is 0, which implies they have trivial gauge groups. We compute the super product systems for these families and, using this, we show they have trivial coupling index. Finally, using the C*-semiflow and the boundary representation of Powers and Alevras, we show that the families of Clifford flows and even Clifford flows contain infinitely many mutually non-cocycle-conjugate E_0-semigroups.Comment: 51 page