Can we trust our memories? C. I. Lewiss coherence argument

In this paper we examine C. I. Lewis’s view on the role of coherence – what he calls “congruence” – in the justification of beliefs based on memory or testimony. Lewis has two main theses on the subject. His negative thesis states that coherence of independent items of evidence has no impact on the probability of a conclusion unless each item has some credibility of its own. The positive thesis says, roughly speaking, that coherence of independently obtained items of evidence – such as converging memories or testimonies – raises the probability of a conclusion to the extent sufficient for epistemic justification, or, to use Lewis’s expression, “rational and practical reliance”. It turns out that, while the negative thesis is essentially correct (apart from a slight flaw in Lewis’s account of independence), a strong positive connection between congruence and probability – a connection of the kind Lewis ultimately needs in his validation of memory – is contingent on the Principle of Indifference. In the final section we assess the repercussions of the latter fact for Lewis’s theory in particular and for coherence justification in general

An Impossibility Result for Coherence Rankings

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