From Data to Phenomena: A Kantian Stance

This paper investigates some metaphysical and epistemological assumptions behind Bogen and Woodward's data-to-phenomena inferences. I raise a series of points and suggest an alternative possible Kantian stance about data-to-phenomena inferences. I clarify the nature of the suggested Kantian stance by contrasting it with McAllister's view about phenomena as patterns in data sets

New Insights into the Mechanism of Visible Light Photocatalysis

ABSTRACT: In recent years, the area of developing visible-lightactive photocatalysts based on titanium dioxide has been enormously investigated due to its wide range of applications in energy and environment related fields. Various strategies have been designed to efficiently utilize the solar radiation and to enhance the efficiency of photocatalytic processes. Building on the fundamental strategies to improve the visible light activity of TiO2-based photocatalysts, this Perspective aims to give an insight into many contemporary developments in the field of visible-light-active photocatalysis. Various examples of advanced TiO2 composites have been discussed in relation to their visible light induced photoconversion efficiency, dynamics of electron− hole separation, and decomposition of organic and inorganic pollutants, which suggest the critical need for further development of these types of materials for energy conversion and environmental remediation purposes

Explaining science historically

The author brings out the many faces of explanation in history of science by commenting on the contributions to this Focus section. The essay starts by indicating several ways in which the term “explanation” is used in historiographical discourse. It then distinguishes the object of explanation from the process of explanation and points out common themes and points of contention among the thirteen contributions. It also discusses two of those points in more detail: the problems of causal explanation in history of science and the imperative of avoiding anachronism in historical interpretation. The essay concludes by suggesting a pluralist take on explaining science historically. © 2019 by The History of Science Society

Hidden Entities and Experimental Practice: Renewing the Dialogue Between History and Philosophy of Science

In this chapter I investigate the prospects of integrated history and philosophy of science, by examining how philosophical issues raised by “hidden entities”, entities that are not accessible to unmediated observation, can enrich the historical investigation of their careers. Conversely, I suggest that the history of those entities has important lessons to teach to the philosophy of science. Hidden entities have played a crucial role in the development of the natural sciences. Despite their centrality to past scientific practice, however, several of them (e.g., phlogiston, caloric, and the ether) turned out to be fictitious. For this reason, they have figured prominently in recent debates on scientific realism. The issues I explore in this paper are entangled with those debates. I argue that our understanding of hidden entities and their role in experimental practice can be enhanced by adopting an integrated historical-cum-philosophical approach. On the one hand, philosophical reflection on the reality of those entities has a lot to gain by examining historically how they were ntroduced and investigated. On the other hand, the historical reconstruction of the careers of those entities may profit from philosophical reflection on their existence. © 2011, Springer Science+Business Media B.V

What’s in It for the Historian of Science? Reflections on the Value of Philosophy of Science for History of Science

In this article, I explore the value of philosophy of science for history of science. I start by introducing a distinction between two ways of integrating history and philosophy of science: historical philosophy of science (HPS) and philosophical history of science (PHS). I then offer a critical discussion of Imre Lakatos’s project to bring philosophy of science to bear on historical interpretation. I point out certain flaws in Lakatos’s project, which I consider indicative of what went wrong with PHS in the past. Finally, I put forward my own attempt to bring out the historiographical potential of philosophy of science. Starting from Norwood Russell Hanson’s insight that historical studies of science involve metascientific concepts, I argue that philosophical reflection on those concepts can be (and, indeed, has been) historiographically fruitful. I focus on four issues (epistemic values, experimentation, scientific discovery and conceptual change) and discuss their significance and utility for historiographical practice. © 2017 Open Society Foundation