Comments on: Transversality of the Shapley value

It is a good tradition of TOP to invite experts in OR and game theory to write a surveyon a special topic. These papers are also interesting for readers who are not specialistsin the treated field but may have influence on their further research. For cooperativegame theory, in the past, there were survey papers on the compromise value (Tijsand Otten 1993) and on Operations Research Games (Borm et al. 2001), and thesepapers were frequently cited and inspired to new research. Now here is the paper byMoretti and Patrone on the Shapley value. As we can see in their list of references,in the fifty five years of the existence of the Shapley value, there have been not onlymany follow ups but also many surveys. This paper also gives a good survey of themany theoretical contributions in the past. But the feature of this survey is the eyefor applications. Many applications are well known just as the Shapley–Shubik indexin voting situations and the Baker–Thompson rule in landing fee problems, whereusers of a piece of the strip contribute equally to the costs. However, contributionsof the Shapley value in reliability theory and genetics are much less known. Theyare treated in this paper extensively, and they may inspire scientists in different otherdisciplines also to apply the Shapley value in new interactive situations. I think theauthors did an excellent job in writing a beautiful survey of topics around the Shapleyvalue and I expect that, inspired by this work, new practical situations will be foundwhere Shapleys ideas can again be useful

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